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COMMENTS
AMERICA THE CRUEL AND UNUSUAL? AN
ANALYSIS OF THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
In 1992, the United States ratified the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights [ICCPR].1 ICCPR, along with its sibling document,
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
[ICESCR],2 and their parent document, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights [Universal Declaration], 3 constitute the United Nations'
1. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), adopted by the United
States Sept. 8, 1992 [hereinafter ICCPR]. In addition, the United Nations also established
the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A.
Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 59, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966),
999 U.N.T.S. 302, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967) [herein-
after Optional Protocol] (establishing procedures for the implementation of ICCPR
through state reporting and the submission of communications by individuals whose rights
a State party allegedly has violated under ICCPR). For a comprehensive treatment of the
United States ratification of ICCPR, see Symposium: The Ratification of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1167 (1993); John Quigley,
Criminal Law and Human Rights: Implications of the United States Ratification of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 59 (1993).
2. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993
U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976 [hereinafter ICESCR]. The United States has
not ratified either the ICESCR or the Optional Protocol. See HUMAN RIGHTS - INTERNA-
TIONAL INSTRUMENTS: CHART OF RATIFICATIONS AS AT 31 DECEMBER 1994, at 10-11,
U.N. Doc. ST/HR/4/Rev.11, U.N. Sales No. E.87.XIV.2 (1995) (listing the countries that
have ratified the major international human rights conventions); see also Oscar M. Gari-
baldi, Obligations Arising Under The Covenant and Protocol, in U.S. RATIFICATION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 51-61 (Hurst Hannum et al. eds.,
1993) (explaining the relationship between ICCPR and the Optional Protocol); LIESBETH
LIJNZAAD, RESERVATIONS TO UN-HuMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: RATIFY AND RUIN? 185-297
(1995) (discussing reservations made to ICCPR, on a country-by-country basis).
3, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. The Universal
Declaration articulated "rights as to which governments agreed to promote observance."
FRANK NEWMAN & DAVID WEISSBRODT, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY,
AND PROCESS 2 (1991). After the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Univer-
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International Bill of Human Rights.4 The two Covenants provide a more
specific interpretation of the Universal Declaration.5 Unlike the more
general and aspirational articles of the Universal Declaration, ICCPR
and ICESCR are binding treaties that provide procedures for the imple-
mentation of the rights and obligations promulgated in the Universal
Declaration.6
In submitting his proposal for ratification of ICCPR to the Senate for
its Advice and Consent,7 President Bush argued that ratification of
ICCPR reflected the role that he envisioned for the United States as a
sal Declaration, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights drafted the two Cove-
nants. Id. at 2-3.
For a more detailed treatment of the Universal Declaration, see THE UNIVERSAL DEC-
LARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTs: A COMMENTARY (Asbjorn Eide et al. eds., 1992).
4. See NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 3, at 2-3 (discussing the structure of the
International Bill of Human Rights and the role of each of the two Covenants therein).
The articles of ICCPR were intended to address the most fundamental human rights, such
as the right to be free from torture, slavery, and genocide. ICCPR was intended to be
immediately applicable. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 2(1) (describing the commitment of
States parties as "undertak[ing] to respect and to ensure" that the rights contained in the
Covenant are respected). By contrast, States parties to the ICESCR commit to implement
the economic, social, and cultural rights embodied in ICESCR "to the maximum of...
available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights.
. . by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures."
ICESCR, supra note 2, art. 2(1) (describing the commitment of States parties as "un-
dertak[ing] to take steps"). Newman and Weissbrodt contrast the nature of the obligations
of ICCPR and ICESCR thus "governments that ratify the Covenants should immediately
cease to torture their citizens, but are not immediately required to feed, clothe, and house
them." NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 3, at 3.
5. The preamble of the Universal Declaration describes the commitment of States
parties as "pledging." Universal Declaration, supra note 3, Preamble (stating that
"(w)hereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the
United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights
and fundamental freedoms"). The preambles of the two Covenants, however, describe the
commitment of States parties as "agreeing." See ICESCR, supra note 2, Preamble;
ICCPR, supra note 1, Preamble. Newman and Weissbrodt describe the purpose of the two
Covenants as "[to] interpret provisions of the Universal Declaration in binding treaties and
supply implementation procedures for states parties." NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra
note 3, at 2-3. Furthermore, the Optional Protocol provides procedures for implementing
the provisions of ICCPR. Optional Protocol, supra note 1, art. 1 (providing mechanisms
for state reporting and the submission of communications from individuals whose rights
have allegedly been violated by a State party); see also NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra
note 3, at 3.
6. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing the structure of the Interna-
tional Bill of Human Rights and the role of the two Covenants in implementing the Uni-
versal Declaration).
7. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Ratification of ICCPR, like any treaty, required
the President to seek the advice and consent of the Senate. Id. The Treaty Clause states
that "[h]e [the President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." Id.; see
infra notes 303-08 and accompanying text (discussing the process of treaty ratification).
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leader among nations.8 The ratification was limited, however, by a pleth-
ora of qualifications restricting the applicability of ICCPR in the United
States.9 The most significant of these limitations was the declaration that
the first twenty-seven articles of ICCPR were not "self-executing," but
required implementing congressional legislation.1" The Bush Adminis-
8. Letter from President George Bush to Senator Claiborne Pell, Chairman, Senate
Foreign Relations Comm. (Aug. 8, 1991), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 660 (1992). President Bush
argued that ratification would underscore the United States' leadership of the global trend
toward democracy. Id. President Bush stated that the "United States ratification of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights at this moment in history would underscore our
natural commitment to fostering democratic values through international law." Id. Presi-
dent Bush described ICCPR as a codification of "the essential freedoms people must enjoy
in a democratic society, such as the right to vote, freedom of peaceful assembly, equal
protection of the law, the right to liberty and security, and the freedom of opinion and
expression." Id. President Bush did not mention the right to be free from torture, or cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Id.
9. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COV-
ENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, S. REP. No. 23, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1992),
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 645 (1992) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT]. The Bush Administration
appended five reservations, five understandings, and four declarations. Id. at 651-58. Fur-
thermore, the Senate added the "Helms proviso." Id. at 660; 138 CONG. REC. S4783 (daily
ed. Apr. 2, 1992). This stipulated that "[n]othing in this Covenant requires or authorizes
legislation, or other action, by the United States of America prohibited by the Constitution
of the United States as interpreted by the United States." Id. at S4784.
10. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 657. The "non-self-executing" declaration ab-
ruptly states that "[tihe United States declares that the provisions of Articles 1 through 27
of the Covenant are not self-executing." Id. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan sought to
minimize the impact of the "non-self-executing" declaration by stating that "[e]ven though
the covenant is non-self-executing, these will now become binding international obligations
of the United States." 138 CONG. REc. S4783 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). But the various
limitations placed on ratification, chiefly the "non-self-executing" declaration, were so ex-
tensive that some human rights lawyers, who had long campaigned for United States ratifi-
cation of ICCPR, suggested that continued non-ratification might have been preferable.
See, e.g., Nadine Strossen, United States Ratification of the International Bill of Rights: A
Fitting Celebration of the Bicentennial of the US. Bill of Rights, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 203,207
& n.18 (1992) (citing Letter from Marvin E. Frankel, Chairman, Lawyers Comm. for
Human Rights, to Senator Claiborne Pell, Senate Foreign Relations Comm. (Mar. 2,
1992)). Frankel argued that "if the choice before the Senate is now between ratifying the
Covenant subject to the Administration's misguided principle or delaying ratification...
we support delay." Id.
The United States' reluctance to embrace the Covenants of the International Bill of
Human Rights is curious in light of the United States' (and in particular President Franklin
Roosevelt and First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt's) prominent role in the establishment of the
United Nations and its organizational infrastructure. See, e.g., Theodor Meron, Comment,
Reform of Lawmaking in the United Nations: The Human Rights Instance, 79 AM. J. INT'L
L. 664, 670 (1985) (stating that "[c]learly, the fact that the [United Nations] Commission
[on Human Rights] initially had as members of the caliber of ... Eleanor Roosevelt is an
important reason for the speedy adoption of a truly remarkable instrument: the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights"); Carl Q. Christol, Book Review, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 980,
980 (1980) (reviewing A. GLENN MOWER, JR., THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED NA-
TIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS. THE ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND JIMMY CARTER ERAS
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tration's main justification for the "non-self-executing" declaration was
its reluctance to create a new private cause of action in United States
courts. 1 Paradoxically, the United States argued that the protections of
(1979)) (stating that Mrs. Roosevelt "contributed materially to the writing of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. She was also heavily engaged in the establishment of a UN
system for the promotion and protection of such rights"); Marian N. Leich, Note, Marjorie
M. Whiteman (1898-1986), 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 938, 938 (1986); Christopher J. Papajohn,
Book Review, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 721, 721 (1991) (reviewing DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN,
ON THE LAW OF NATIONS (1990) (noting that "by 1945, public opinion was 'once again
fiercely internationalist.' President Franklin D. Roosevelt had solid support in Congress
for our participation in the United Nations."); see also NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra
note 3, at 361-63 (citing two of President Roosevelt's speeches, the so-called "Four Free-
doms" Speech of 1941 and the State of the Union address of 1944 as reflective of eco-
nomic, social, and cultural rights that subsequently were embodied in ICESCR).
Furthermore, in recent times, the United States Constitution has provided a framework
for the development of a body of international human rights law, as well as a model that
other nations have applied in developing their legal systems. See, e.g., Richard B. Lillich,
The Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 851, 851-55 (1989)
(discussing the contribution of United States constitutional law to the development of a
framework of international human rights law). Morris Abram describes the United States'
influence as follows: "in Eastern Europe and Latin America, governments are moving to-
ward democracy and the effective protection of human rights. I am convinced that these
changes are partly the result of the longstanding, careful and consistent articulation of a
single standard for human rights by the United States." Morris B. Abram, Human Rights
and the United Nations: Past as Prologue, 4 HARV. HUM. RmS. J. 69, 83 (1991); see also
Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV.
537, 561 (1988) (arguing that the adoption by other nations of laws and constitutional pro-
visions modeled after the United States Bill of Rights are "an important means of strength-
ening international human rights").
Lester, however, quotes Louis Henkin, who captures the paradoxical nature of the
United States' attitude towards international human rights:
For the United States, human rights have been a kind of "white man's burden,"
and international human rights have been "for export only." An abiding isola-
tionism (or unilateralism) ... continues to appeal to many Americans, even some
who readily judge others and are eager to intervene on behalf of democracy and
human rights in other countries. There is some reluctance to accept, and have our
courts apply, standards perceived to have been created by others, even if they
were borrowed from us and reflect our own values. There is some reluctance to
have the United States subject to scrutiny by others, even though Americans
pride themselves on an open society.
Id. (quoting Louis Henkin, The United States and International Human Rights, in Justice
for a Generation, Papers presented in London, England, July 15-19, 1985 at the plenary
sessions of a meeting between the American Bar Association, the Senate of the Inns of
Court and the Bar, and the Law Society of England and Wales, at 377).
For a history of the development of international human rights in the post-World War II
era, see Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals
Rather Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1982).
11. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 657. The "non-self-executing" declaration states
that "[tihe intent is to clarify that the Covenant will not create a private cause of action in
U.S. courts." Id.; see infra notes 319-35 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of
self-execution in detail).
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ICCPR already were available under United States law.12
This Comment questions the legal and logical foundations of the "non-
self-executing" declaration by comparing the protections available under
the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution 13 with those
available under article 7 of ICCPR.14 This Comment first reviews Eighth
Amendment case law, focusing on the continuing debate among members
of the United States Supreme Court as to how, if at all, international law
should be incorporated into Eighth Amendment interpretation. This
Comment then analyzes some of the key decisions of the European Court
of Human Rights15 and the United Nations Human Rights Committee'
6
12. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 649. In discussing the background of ICCPR,
the Senate Report states that "[t]he rights guaranteed by the Covenant are similar to those
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights." Id.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion stipulates that "fe]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id.
14. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 7. Article 7 stipulates that "[n]o one shall be subjected
to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Id. The origins of
article 7 lie in article 5 of the Universal Declaration, which states that "[n]o one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Univer-
sal Declaration, supra note 3, art. 5. ICCPR does not define the meaning of torture, but
United Nations Resolution 3452 of the General Assembly states that "[t]orture constitutes
an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment." Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, U.N.
GAOR, 30th Sess., Supp. No. 34, at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034, art. 1 para. 2 (1976) [hereinaf-
ter Resolution 3452].
For a detailed analysis of article 7, its meaning, and its implications, see General com-
ment No. 20 (44) (art. 7) in Annex VI: General Comments Adopted Under Article 40, Para-
graph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/
Rev.1 (1992) (discussing the aims and meaning of article 7); MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. Cov-
ENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, CCPR COMMENTARY 126-41 (1993) (discussing
article 7 in detail).
15. See infra notes 194-250 and accompanying text. Decisions of the European Court
of Human Rights provide interpretation of article 3 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, which states that "no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment." Convention For The Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, art. 3, entered into force Sept.
3, 1953 [hereinafter European Convention]. This language is substantially similar to the
wording of article 7 of ICCPR. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 7 (text of article 7 reprinted
supra note 14). Both trace their origins to article 5 of the Universal Declaration. Univer-
sal Declaration, supra note 3, art. 5.
For further discussion of article 3 of the European Convention, see P. VAN DIJK &
G.J.H. VAN HOOF, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 226-40 (2d ed. 1990); Love Kellberg, The Case-Law of the European Commission
of Human Rights on Art. 3 of the ECHR, THE INTERNATIONAL FIGHT AGAINST TORTURE
97-120 (A. Cassese ed., 1991).
16. See infra notes 251-89 and accompanying text. The United Nations Human Rights
Committee [hereinafter UNHRC or Committee] was established in 1977 under article 28
of ICCPR. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 28. Article 28 stipulates that the Committee must
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applying the international standard.17 Next, this Comment provides a
comprise 18 members, composed of nationals of States parties. Id. art. 28(1), (2). Mem-
bers of the Committee are elected and serve in their personal capacity. Id. art. 28(3). The
responsibilities of the Committee are established by articles 40 through 45 of ICCPR. Id.
arts. 40-45. Under article 41, a State party may declare that it recognizes the competence
of the Committee to receive and consider written communications from another State
party alleging that it has violated its obligations under ICCPR. Id. art. 41.
The Optional Protocol provides a parallel mechanism whereby a State party may con-
sent to the Committee's receipt of written communications from individuals who claim that
the State party has violated their rights under ICCPR. Optional Protocol, supra note 1,
Preamble, art. 1.
Curiously, the Optional Protocol does not address the question whether the UNHRC is
obligated to publish its decisions or "views." Theodor Meron, Book Review, 80 AM. J.
INT'L L. 267, 267 (1986) (reviewing The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Human Rights Committee: Selected Decisions under the Optional Protocol (Second
to sixteenth sessions), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1985)). Meron explains that "Article 5(4)
of the Optional Protocol requires only that the Committee forward its views to the state
party and to the individual concerned. Fortunately, the Committee decided (1979) that the
Protocol did not preclude publication of the 'views' provided that such publication was
desirable." Id.
The United States has not ratified the Optional Protocol. CHART OF RATIFICATIONS,
supra note 2, at 10-11. Since only States parties to the Optional Protocol (i.e., those coun-
tries that have ratified the Protocol) may be subjected to this procedure, it is not possible
to bring an individual communication against the United States to the Human Rights Com-
mittee. Optional Protocol, supra note 1, art. 1.
17. The term "international standard" in this Comment is used to refer to both article
7 of ICCPR and article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The wording of
the two articles is virtually interchangeable. See supra note 14 and accompanying text
(discussing article 7) and note 15 and accompanying text (discussing article 3). Further-
more, decisions of the European Court of Human Rights have referred to the United Na-
tions standard and its interpretation by United Nations bodies as a source of authority in
interpreting article 3. See infra notes 198-250 and accompanying text (discussing Ireland v.
United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978); Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989); "'yrer v. Isle of Man, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978)).
The level of consistency among the various international instruments in this area is re-
markable. See, e.g., Universal Declaration, supra note 3, art. 5; Standard Minimum Rules
for the Treatment of Prisoners, adopted by First United Nations Congress on the Preven-
tion of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/6/1, adopted July 31,
1957, E.S.C. Res. 663C, U.N. ESCOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 11, U.N. Doc. E/3048
(1957); Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/
39/51 (1984), entered into force June 26, 1987 [hereinafter Torture Convention]; Resolution
3452, supra note 14; Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form
of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess., Supp. No. 49, at
297, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1989); American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Off. Rec.
OEA/Ser./V/II.23, doc. 21, rev. 6 (1979), entered into force July 18, 1978; see Tullio Treves,
The UN Body of Principles for the Protection of Detained or Imprisoned Persons, 84 AM. J.
INT'L L. 578 (1990) (discussing the Body of Principles in some detail); see also Suzanne M.
Bernard, An Eye For An Eye: The Current Status of International Law On the Humane
Treatment of Prisoners, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 759, 792 (1994) (explaining that "the right not to
be subjected to 'cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment' appear[s] over and over in inter-
national treaties").
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brief review of some of the key differences between the language used in
the Eighth Amendment and the language of article 7 of ICCPR, and con-
cludes that the more detailed and specific language of article 7 reflects
the broader scope of protection available under the international stan-
dard. This Comment then analyzes the significance of the concept of self-
execution under international law and questions the legitimacy of the
"non-self-executing" declaration under international law. This Comment
next scrutinizes two specific situations where article 7 has been inter-
preted as providing broader protection than the Eighth Amendment: the
so-called death row phenomenon and the application of capital punish-
ment to juveniles. This Comment concludes that the international stan-
dard, embodied in article 7, provides broader protection than the Eighth
Amendment and that, therefore, the United States' declaration that arti-
cle 7 of ICCPR is "non-self-executing" is not justifiable on grounds that
the Eighth Amendment provides comparable protection.' 8
I. THE JURISPRUDENTIAL EVOLUTION OF THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT
AND THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARD
A. Review of Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
There are three identifiable phases in the development of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence with respect to the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause.19 Each phase represents an expansion in the scope of
18. This Comment does not seek to provide a critique of the human rights record of
the United States. Arguably, the United States' cautious approach to the ratification of
ICCPR is preferable to what one commentator has described as "the 'hypocrisy manifested
by states which adopt human rights instruments' yet continue to tolerate widespread viola-
tions of the very rights they have bound themselves to protect." Bernard, supra note 17, at
761 (citing Richard H. Goolsby, Note, Progress Report on United Nations Human Rights
Activities to Protect Prisoners, 7 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 467, 467 (1977)); see also Abram,
supra note 10, at 71 & nn.7-13. Abram observes that:
Today the ratification numbers game continues, played by countries with neither
the intention nor the desire to abide by them. Iraq had ratified many key human
rights treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Interna-
tional Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide;
and the four Geneva Conventions.
Id. (contrasting Iraq's excellent record of ratifying international human rights treaties with
its appalling record of human rights abuses and violations of international law, including
the 1990 invasion of Kuwait); see also 138 CONG. REC. S4783 (daily ed. April 2, 1992)
(remarks of Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan) (criticizing nations that ratify treaties without
intention to honor their obligations, but cautioning the United States that it is "[f]ar better
to ratify with the firm intention of living up to the covenant's terms").
19. See infra notes 24-58 and accompanying text (discussing three phases in the devel-
opment of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).
1996]
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Eighth Amendment protection."0 The first phase recognized protections
against barbaric and torturous punishments.2 " The second phase inter-
preted the Eighth Amendment as prohibiting punishments inflicting wan-
ton and unnecessary pain,2 2 and the third phase expanded Eighth
Amendment protection to prison conditions.2 3
1. Barbaric and Torturous Punishments
The United States Supreme Court initially interpreted the Eighth
Amendment as prohibiting only barbaric or torturous punishments.2" In
Weems v. United States,25 the Supreme Court, for the first time, extended
the scope of the Eighth Amendment to prevent disproportionate punish-
ments.26 In Weems, a Philippine court convicted the defendant of falsify-
ing an official document.2 7  Weems received a fifteen-year prison
sentence with hard labor.2 8 The Supreme Court held that Weems' sen-
tence was disproportionate to the crime for which he was convicted and,
therefore, violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the
Eighth Amendment. 9
20. See infra notes 24-58 and accompanying text (discussing the expanding scope of
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence through three phases of development).
21. See infra notes 24-39 and accompanying text (describing the first phase of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, which established a prohibition against barbaric and torturous
punishments).
22. See infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (describing the second phase of
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, which established that punishments inflicting wanton or
unnecessary pain violate the United States Constitution).
23. See infra notes 47-58 and accompanying text (describing the third phase of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, which established a constitutional prohibition against certain
prison conditions).
24. See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1879) (holding that "punishments of
torture ... and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by ... [the
Eighth Amendment]"); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (holding that
"[plunishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death"), Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (holding for the first time that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits disproportionate punishments).
25. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
26. Id. at 380-81.
27. Id at 357. The defendant was an "acting disbursing officer of the Bureau of Coast
Guard and Transportation of the United States Government of the Philippine Islands." Id.
28. Id. at 358. The terms of Weems' sentence stipulated that the prisoner "shall always
carry a chain at the ankle, hanging from the wrists; [he] shall be employed at hard and
painful labor, and shall receive no assistance whatsoever from without the institution." Id.
at 364. This form of punishment, an ancient ritual of.Spanish origin known as cadena
temporal, was used in the Philippines at that time but had not been deployed in the United
States. Id. at 380. The Weems Court, in declaring cadena temporal unconstitutional under
the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, remarked that "[tlhere
are degrees of homicide that are not punished so severely." Id.
29. Id. at 381. Prior to Weems, the Supreme Court had not expressed much concern
about the proportionality of punishment. See Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. 475, 478-
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Having established a proportionality test under the Eighth Amend-
ment, the Supreme Court subsequently ruled that contemporary stan-
dards of behavior could play a role in Eighth Amendment
interpretation.3" In The Paquete Habana,31 the Supreme Court estab-
lished that, under certain circumstances, the customs and norms of civi-
lized nations can establish standards for constitutional interpretation.32
The Court held that an informal, but traditional, prohibition against the
seizure of enemy fishing vessels during wartime developed into a "settled
rule of international law."33 The significance of The Paquete Habana is
that, when placing international law in a constitutional context, the Court
80 (1867) (holding that a sentence of three months of hard labor for the illegal sale of
intoxicating liquor does not violate the Eighth Amendment).
During the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court held that keeping condemned prison-
ers in solitary confinement prior to execution does not violate the Eighth Amendment.
See McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155, 160 (1891); Trezza v. Brush, 142 U.S. 160, 161
(1891). But see Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 688 (1978) (ruling that holding prisoners in
solitary confinement for periods exceeding 30 days violates the Eighth Amendment); infra
notes 55-58 and accompanying text (discussing the Hutto decision).
The nineteenth century Supreme Court also displayed little concern that prison over-
crowding might violate the Eighth Amendment. See Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 116
(1895) (rejecting petitioner's Eighth Amendment claim that a two-year sentence of con-
finement in a "narrow cell" with "limited appliances for comfort" constituted cruel and
unusual punishment). But eighty-six years later, Justice Rehnquist echoed the Johnson
Court's sentiments in his opinion in Atiyeh v. Capps, 449 U.S. 1312, 1316 (1981). Justice
Rehnquist stated that the Eighth Amendment does not require that prisoners "be housed
in a manner most pleasing to them." Id.; see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337,352
(1981) (holding that the housing of two prisoners in a single cell does not violate the Eighth
Amendment); infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (discussing the Rhodes decision).
30. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 712 (1900).
31. Id. at 694. The Court stated that:
[iun the present century a slow and silent, but very substantial mitigation has
taken place in the practice of war; and in proportion as that mitigated practice has
received the sanction of time, it is raised from the rank of mere usage, and be-
comes part of the law of nations.
Id. (quoting Sir James Mackintosh, Discourse on the Law of Nations, 38; 1 MISCELLANE-
ous WoRxs 360). Justice Gray also noted that "[ilnternational law is part of our law, and
must be ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination."
Id. at 700.
32. Id. at 712. The Court ruled that the United States? blockading squadron's seizure
of two Spanish fishing vessels off the coast of Cuba was unlawful according to a custom of
war older than the United States Constitution that developed into international law. Id. at
714. Specifically, the Court found that:
[I]t is an established rule of international law, founded on considerations of hu-
manity to a poor and industrious order of men, and of the mutual convenience of
belligerent States, that coast fishing vessels, with their implements and supplies,
cargoes and crews, unarmed, and honestly pursuing their peaceful calling of
catching and bringing in fresh fish, are exempt from capture as prize of war.
Id. at 708.
33. Id. at 694. The Court described this law as a standard that began as one of comity
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recognized that international law must be interpreted in light of contem-
porary standards rather than standards existing when the Framers drafted
the Constitution.34
In Trop v. Dulles,35 the Court merged the reasoning of Weems and The
and ripened over the preceding century into a settled rule of international law by the gen-
eral assent of civilized nations. Id.
34. See id. at 712. The Supreme Court confronted the tension between customary
international law and the use of the original intent of the Framers to interpret the United
States Constitution, concluding that where international law applies, customs of interna-
tional law must prevail. Id. "Thus it is clear that courts must interpret international law
not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the nations of the world
today." Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980) (interpreting Paquete).
In a key passage of Justice Gray's opinion, he appeared to endorse a sweeping form of
executive authority:
[I]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose,
where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as
evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators, who by years of
labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted
with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribu-
nals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to
be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (emphasis added). Some commentators have ex-
pressed grave reservations about the existence of a "controlling executive act." See, e.g.,
Monroe Leigh, Is the President Above Customary International Law?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
757, 758 (1992); Jordan J. Paust, The President Is Bound By International Law, 81 AM. J.
INT'L L. 377, 384-87 (1987); Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Agora: May the President Violate Cus-
tomary International Law?, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 371, 371 (1987).
However, Jordan Paust argued that "[flar too much consideration has been paid to [this]
ambiguous dictum." Jordan J. Paust, Paquete and the President: Rediscovering the Brief for
the United States, 34 VA. J. INT'L L. 981, 981 (1994) (examining the government's brief in
the Paquete case and concluding that no such sweeping assertion of executive authority was
either sought by the government or endorsed by Justice Gray's opinion). Paust concluded
by cautioning against the misuse of the "ambiguous dictum" in Paquete to support an over-
broad assertion of executive power:
A favored and admitted exercise of executive power, indeed its very discretion in
time of war, was placed openly before the Court to be judged according to inter-
national law. How strange then, and so out of focus, are the machinations
claimed by those who seem to prefer uncontrolled presidential illegality and seek
to rest this preference on ambiguous dictum in a case where no such claim was
made or apparently contemplated. In context, Paquete was a splendid reaffirma-
tion of international law. In actuality, it denies a newer and perilous preference
for raw power.
Id. at 989.
35. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). In Trop, a native-born citizen of the United States was con-
victed by court-martial of deserting the military during wartime. Id. at 87. When the peti-
tioner deserted in 1944, he was serving as a private in the United States Army in French
Morocco. Id. Petitioner escaped from a stockade at Casablanca, where he had been con-
fined following a previous breach of discipline. Id. On conviction, petitioner was sen-
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Paquete Habana, holding that a federal statute allowing the government
to deprive an individual of his citizenship violated the Eighth Amend-
ment.36 The Court held denationalization unconstitutional based on two
arguments that have since informed the debate over Eighth Amendment
interpretation. First, echoing The Paquete Habana, the Trop Court noted
that "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society" should inform interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. 37 Sec-
ond, the Court applied the Weems proportionality doctrine 38 in conclud-
ing that denationalization was excessive in relation to the crime.39
2. Wanton and Unnecessary Pain
At the time of Weems, the definitional parameters of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishments Clause remained unclear.4" The Court, however,
tenced to "three years at hard labor, forfeiture of all pay and allowances and a
dishonorable discharge." Id. at 88. In 1952, petitioner applied for a passport. Id. His
application was denied under § 401(g) of the Nationality Act of 1940. Id. The Supreme
Court ruled that § 401(g) was unconstitutional. Id. at 103.
36. See id. at 91-104.
37. Id. at 101. The Court recognized that the Eighth Amendment is a vague and dy-
namic standard that is difficult to apply. Id. at 100-01. This language echoes the statement
by the Court in Weems that the Eighth Amendment "may be therefore progressive, and is
not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlight-
ened by a humane justice." Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910). The Trop
Court also described the Eighth Amendment as guaranteeing "the principle of civilized
treatment." Trop, 356 U.S. at 99. "The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment
is nothing less than the dignity of man." Id. at 100.
38. See infra notes 169-91 and accompanying text (discussing the proportionality doc-
trine). In defining proportionality, one scholar attempted to place the concept in the philo-
sophical context of a theory of retributive justice. Joseph L. Hoffmann, On the Perils of
Line-Drawing: Juveniles and the Death Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229, 247-50 (1989) (citing
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976)). Hoffmann distinguishes between two
types of proportionality of punishment: cardinal and ordinal. Id. at 248-50. "Cardinal pro-
portionality" "deals with the relationship between the seriousness of a given offender's
crime and the punishment imposed against the offender." Id. at 249. "Ordinal" or "com-
parative" punishment, by contrast, "deals with comparisons between the deserts and pun-
ishments of different offenders." Id. at 250. Hoffmann argues that, whereas ordinal
proportionality should be relatively easy to achieve, cardinal proportionality "can never be
such an exact science." Id. Rather, cardinal proportionality serves only "as a crude limit-
ing device, not as a precise measure of punishment." Id.
39. Trop, 356 U.S. at 99 (reasoning that "the penalty of denationalization is excessive
in relation to the gravity of the crime"). The Trop Court decided that "a punishment of 12
years in irons at hard and painful labor imposed for the crime of falsifying public records
... was cruel in its excessiveness and unusual in its character." Id. at 100 (citing Weems,
217 U.S. at 377). Weems represented the first occasion where the Supreme Court ruled
that a punishment violated the Eighth Amendment because it was disproportionate to the
crime. Weems, 217 U.S. at 377.
40. See Weems, 217 U.S. at 349. In Weems, Justice McKenna's majority opinion stated
that "[t]ime works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes. Therefore
a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it
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eventually clarified its definition by recognizing that the Eighth Amend-
ment protected prisoners against infliction of wanton or unnecessary
pain.41 In Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber,42 the Supreme Court
ruled that the accidental malfunction of an electric chair did not consti-
tute an Eighth Amendment violation.43 Even in denying the petitioner's
claim, the Court recognized for the first time that wanton infliction of
pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 4 The Court concluded,
however, that the accidental malfunction was not a wanton act.45 Thus,
the Court recognized that the Eighth Amendment prohibited not only
barbaric and torturous punishments, but also punishments involving un-
necessary or wanton infliction of pain.46
3. Prison Conditions
During the 1970s, the Supreme Court expanded its Eighth Amendment
interpretation by recognizing that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause applied to prison conditions.47 In Estelle v. Gamble,48 the
Supreme Court held that a prison official's "deliberate indifference" to
the serious medical needs of a prisoner could constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation.49 In Estelle, the prisoner alleged that he suffered
birth." Id. at 373; see also Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01 (acknowledging that, in Weems, the
Court recognized that "the words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not precise"); In re
Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890) (establishing that the Eighth Amendment is a prohibi-
tion against torture, but failing to provide a clear definition of torture).
41. See Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,463 (1947) (ruling that the
accidental malfunction of an electric chair does not violate the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause of the Eighth Amendment).
42. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
43. Id. at 463. In Resweber, the petitioner sought to enjoin the State of Louisiana
from a proposed second attempt at execution after a malfunctioning electric chair resulted
in an unsuccessful first effort. Id. at 460-61. Resweber is significant to the development of
Eighth Amendment interpretation because it represents the first time that the Supreme
Court used the language of "unnecessary" and "wanton" pain. Id. at 463-64.
44. Id. at 463.
45. Id. at 464.
46. Id. at 463-64.
47. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (recognizing that "deliberate indif-
ference to serious medical needs of prisoners" violated the Eighth Amendment). In 1962,
the Supreme Court had opened the door to broader application of the Eighth Amendment
by holding that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Eighth Amendment, thereby
applying it to the states. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
48. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
49. Id. at 104. The petitioning prisoner alleged that prison officials exhibited deliber-
ate indifference to his medical needs following a back injury suffered while on a work
detail in prison. Id. at 98-101. The deliberate indifference standard, although discussed in
the context of the Eighth Amendment, is the progeny of a federal statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1988). The Supreme Court recognized that, under § 1983, individuals may recover dam-
ages in federal court against federal officials who violate their constitutional rights. Bivens
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a back injury while on a prison work detail." The Court ruled that prison
officials' failure to perform x-rays or other diagnostic tests on the pris-
oner did not constitute deliberate indifference and, therefore, did not vio-
late the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.
51
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397-98
(1971) (ruling that a statutory cause of action existed based on official violation of plain-
tiff's Fourth Amendment rights).
The Supreme Court extended the Bivens doctrine to claims based on the First, Fifth, and
Eighth Amendments. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-20 (1980) (holding that the
mother of a deceased prisoner could bring a Bivens-type action alleging that prison offi-
cials violated her son's Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide him with adequate
medical care); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248-49 (1979) (holding that a female em-
ployee of a Congressman could bring a Bivens-type action claiming that her termination
constituted sex discrimination in violation of the Fifth Amendment); Dellums v. Powell,
566 F.2d 167, 194-96 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding that Vietnam War protesters could bring a
Bivens-type action claiming that their arrest on the steps of the United States Capitol in
1971 constituted a violation of their First Amendment rights), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916
(1978).
Although § 1983 offered prisoners a new statutory remedy, it has been criticized for
imposing an onerous burden of proof on claimants. See, e.g., Barbara Kritchevsky, Making
Sense of State of Mind: Determining Responsibility in Section 1983 Municipal Liability Liti-
gation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 459-62 (1992) (arguing that liability should be judged
by objective, not subjective, criteria); Clay J. Pierce, The Misapplication of Qualified Im-
munity: Unfair Procedural Burdens for Constitutional Damage Claims Requiring Proof of
the Defendant's Intent, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769, 1773-77 (1994) (arguing that courts
should not raise procedural burdens for plaintiffs who bring constitutional claims based on
an official's unlawful intent).
50. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 98-101. On November 9, 1973, a bale of cotton fell on Gamble
while he was working on a prison detail. Id. at 99. On November 10, 1973, a prison doctor
diagnosed Gamble as suffering from a lower back strain. Id. The doctor prescribed a 21-
day course of treatment involving muscle relaxants and pain relievers, but Gamble's back
pain persisted. Id. Gamble refused to return to work and, as a result, the prison discipli-
nary committee placed him in "administrative segregation." Id. at 100. On February 11,
1973, Gamble submitted his complaint, claiming official indifference to a serious medical
condition. Id. at 98, 101.
51. Id. at 107. Following Estelle, the Supreme Court recognized that a prison official's
deliberate indifference to the medical needs of prisoners may violate both the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S.
239, 243-46 (1983) (holding the city liable on due process, rather than Eighth Amendment,
grounds for the medical care of a fleeing suspect shot by a police officer); DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 191-203 (1989) (holding that a
state official's failure to prevent a father from inflicting brain damage on his son by succes-
sive physical beatings did not violate the son's liberty interests, under the Due Process
Clause); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48-58 (1988) (ruling that a state-contracted private
physician's negligent medical treatment of a prisoner could violate the prisoner's due pro-
cess rights).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, meanwhile, used the deliber-
ate indifference standard to rule that a prison security policy, whereby male guards con-
ducted random clothed-body searches of female inmates, violated the Eighth Amendment.
Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1522-23 (9th Cir. 1993); see David J. Stollman, Com-
ment, Jordan v. Gardner: Female Prisoners' Rights To Be Free From Random, Cross-Gen-
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While the Court denied Estelle's claim, it recognized, for the first time
that, under more severe circumstances, the deliberate indifference of
prison officials could violate the Eighth Amendment.52 Justice Marshall's
majority opinion cited the Trop standard as the test for violations of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.53 Justice Marshall reasoned that
the "deliberate indifference" standard was required to guard against "un-
necessary and wanton infliction of pain."54
Following Estelle, the Supreme Court further expanded its application
of the Eighth Amendment to prison condition cases. In Hutto v. Fin-
der Clothed Body Searches, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 1877, 1910 (1994) (criticizing Jordan for
potentially opening the floodgates to prisoner litigation under the Eighth Amendment and
suggesting that a Fourth Amendment claim of unreasonable search would provide a more
appropriate recourse); Ian M. Ogilvie, Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment: The
Ninth Circuit Analyzes Prison Security Policy with "Deliberate Indifference" to Penological
Needs In Jordan v. Gardner, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 259, 280 (1994) (criticizing the court's
use of the deliberate indifference standard).
52. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. Perhaps the Supreme Court's most liberal decision
under the "deliberate indifference" standard came in Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475
(1993). In Helling, the Court permitted a prisoner to bring an Eighth Amendment claim
alleging risk of future harm from passive smoking. Id. at 2481-82. The petitioner was
forced to share his cell with another inmate who smoked five packs of cigarettes per day.
Id. at 2478. Helling is significant because it emphasizes that the Eighth Amendment may
be used to provide injunctive relief from a potential future deprivation. Id. at 2481; see
also Jacqueline M. Kane, Note, You've Come A Long Way, Felon: Helling v. McKinney
Extends the Eighth Amendment to Grant Prisoners the Exclusive Constitutional Right to a
Smoke-Free Environment, 72 N.C. L. REv. 1399, 1400 (1994) (arguing that Eighth Amend-
ment protection should be limited to prevent discontented prisoners from using it as a
catch-all provision). Kane criticized the Helling decision for "providing prisoners more
constitutional protection than other citizens." Id. But see Cornish F. Hitchcock, Environ-
mental Tobacco Smoke as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 13 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV.
661, 661-62 (1994) (recognizing that Helling merely ensured that the petitioner would
"have his day in court," but that the decision did not vouch for either the substantive merit
of Helling's particular claim, or for the prospects for success of such claims in general): see
also Lisa Gizzi, Note, Helling v. McKinney and Smoking in the Cell Block: Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishment?, 43 Am. U. L. REV. 1091 (1994). Gizzi interprets Helling as a subtle hint
from the Supreme Court to prison officials about the need to minimize health risks at-
tached to conditions of confinement, such as exposure to tobacco smoke. Id. at 1131.
Gizzi describes the decision as a "bittersweet victory" for prisoner rights because the Court
deferred responsibility for defining "substantial risk" to state legislatures. Id. at 1133.
Gizzi concluded that "[u]ntil the objective element of Helling is refined and made more
accessible for prisoners, the Helling decision will remain only a theoretical victory for pris-
oners' right to be protected from dangerous living conditions under the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 1133-34.
53. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102. Justice Marshall stated that "[t]he [Eighth] Amendment
embodies 'broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and de-
cency, against which we must evaluate penal measures. Thus, we have held repugnant to
the Eighth Amendment punishments which are incompatible with 'the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' " Id. (citation omitted) (citing
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
54. Id. at 103 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
America The Cruel and Unusual?
ney, 55 the Supreme Court used the Estelle "deliberate indifference" stan-
dard to hold that periods of solitary confinement exceeding thirty days
violate the Eighth Amendment.56 The Hutto decision reiterated the
Supreme Court's willingness to use the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause as a means of examining all aspects of prison conditions.57 Once
again, the Court relied on the language of Trop to justify this approach.5"
4. The 1980s: Progress Reversed
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Eighth Amendment fol-
lowed a century's steady course of cautious expansion from Weems in
1910 to Hutto in 1978. The 1980s, and the advent of the Rehnquist Court
in 1986, heralded a reversal in that long-established trend of progress.5 9
The Rehnquist Court's efforts to reign in Eighth Amendment interpreta-
tion focused on three principal areas: prison conditions, the death pen-
alty, and the proportionality doctrine.
a. Prison Condition Cases
During the 1980s, the Supreme Court narrowed its interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment.6° This narrow approach affected both the "wanton
55. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
56. Id. at 684-85. Hutto concerned allegations that certain conditions in the Arkansas
prison system violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. Id. at 680. The peti-
tioning prisoners provided a catalog of complaints encompassing every aspect of prison life
in Arkansas. Id. at 682-83. Specifically, the complaint cited overcrowded and unhygienic
conditions for eating, sleeping, and living. Id. Specifically, it focused on prison violence
and, in particular, on the arbitrary administration of disciplinary punishments, often en-
forced by armed prisoners. Id. at 682-87 & n.6.
The State did not dispute that the Arkansas prison conditions violated the Eighth
Amendment. Id. at 685. Rather, it unsuccessfully argued that the imposition on inmates of
periods of disciplinary isolation exceeding 30 days was not cruel and unusual punishment.
Id.
57. Id. at 685. The Court ruled that "[c]onfinement in a prison or in an isolation cell is
a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards." Id.
58. Id. The Hutto Court stated that the Eighth Amendment "prohibits penalties that
are grossly disproportionate to the offense, as well as those that transgress today's 'broad
and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency.' " Id. (cita-
tion omitted) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102); cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,100-01 (1958)
(holding that Eighth Amendment interpretation should be framed by "evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society").
59. See infra notes 60-191 and accompanying text (discussing the Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court).
60. See, e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 352 (1981) (holding that "double cei-
ling" did not violate the Eighth Amendment); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 325-26
(1986) (holding that the conduct of prison officials during the exigent circumstances of a
prison riot was exempt from Eighth Amendment scrutiny); Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294,
305-06 (1991) (requiring a prisoner to establish a prison official's culpable state of mind as
an element of a deliberate indifference claim under the Eighth Amendment).
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and unnecessary pain" standard and the "deliberate indifference" stan-
dard. In Rhodes v. Chapman,61 the Court held that housing two prison-
ers in a single cell does not constitute a wanton or unnecessary infliction
of pain. 2 The Court recognized that double celling might cause pain, but
held that the pain was not severe enough to be wanton or unnecessary. 63
In Whitley v. Albers,6 4 the Court ruled that a prison riot situation created
an exception to the "deliberate indifference" standard.65 The Court,
however, did recognize that the "deliberate indifference" standard pro-
tects against prison officials' use of excessive force. 66 The Court, never-
theless, rejected the petitioner's claim under both the "deliberate
indifference 67 standard and the "wanton and unnecessary" standard.68
The Court emphasized that the actions prison officials took during a
prison riot merited greater deference in light of the exigent nature of the
circumstances.69
61. 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
62. Id. at 348. Justice Marshall, in his dissenting opinion, however, cautioned that
Trop mandated Eighth Amendment scrutiny of prison conditions. Id. at 372.
63. Id. at 348.
64. 475 U.S. 312 (1986). In Whitley, the petitioner had been shot in the leg by a prison
official during a prison riot. Id. at 316. Petitioner alleged that his shooting constituted
deliberate indifference on the part of prison officials to his welfare in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 317.
65. Id. at 320. The Court in Whitley held that "a deliberate indifference standard does
not adequately capture the importance of such competing obligations, or convey the ap-
propriate hesitancy to critique in hindsight decisions necessarily made in haste, under pres-
sure, and frequently without the luxury of a second chance." Id.
66. Id. at 327. The Court reasoned that "the Eighth Amendment, which is specifically
concerned with the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain in penal institutions, serves
as the primary source of substantive protection to convicted prisoners in cases such as this
one, where the deliberate use of force is challenged as excessive and unjustified." Id.
67. Id. at 326.
68. Id. at 319. The Court drew a crucial distinction between "obduracy and wanton-
ness," which may be challenged under the Eighth Amendment and "inadvertence or error
in good faith," which may not. Id. "[T]he 'unnecessary and wanton' standard ... estab-
lishes a high hurdle to be overcome by a prisoner seeking relief for a constitutional viola-
tion." Id. at 329 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 321-22. Justice O'Connor stated that:
[wlhen the 'ever-present potential for violent confrontation and conflagration,'
Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 132 (1977),
ripens into actual unrest and conflict, the admonition that 'a prison's internal se-
curity is peculiarly a matter normally left to the discretion of prison administra-
tors,' Rhodes v. Chapman, [452 U.S. 337] at 349, n.14, [1981] carries special
weight.... That deference extends to a prison security measure taken in response
to an actual confrontation with riotous inmates, just as it does to prophylactic or
preventive measures intended to reduce the incidence of these or any other
breaches of prison discipline. It does not insulate from review actions taken in
bad faith and for no legitimate purpose, but it requires that neither judge nor jury
freely substitute their judgment for that of officials who have made a considered
choice.
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The Court clarified the meaning of the "deliberate indifference" stan-
dard first announced in Estelle v. Gamble,7° in two decisions: Wilson v.
Seiter71 and Farmer v. Brennan.72 In Wilson, the Court ruled that, to es-
tablish the "deliberate indifference" of a prison official, a petitioning pris-
oner must show that the official had a culpable state of mind.73 Justice
Scalia, writing for the majority, divided the "deliberate indifference" in-
quiry into a two-step test,74 whereby the petitioner must satisfy both an
objective and a subjective standard. 5 The objective test asks whether the
punishment at issue is "sufficiently serious" to fall under the purview of
the Eighth Amendment.76 The subjective test seeks to establish whether
the prison official had a culpable state of mind when imposing punish-
ment or establishing the prison conditions.77
Justice Scalia rejected the respondent prison officials' argument that
the Court generally should apply the "malicious-and-sadistic" standard to
prison condition cases, reserving the more lenient "deliberate indiffer-
ence" standard for those cases where the prisoner suffered a physical in-
jury.78 Instead, Justice Scalia reasoned that any aspect of prison life that
is a "condition of confinement" could meet the requirements of the ob-
jective prong.79 The Supreme Court remanded the case because the trial
Id.
70. 429 U.S. 97 (1976); see also Stollman, supra note 51, at 1881 (describing the
Court's expansion of the "deliberate indifference" standard, from Estelle to Wilson).
71. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
72. 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994).
73. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 300-01. In Wilson, an inmate at an Ohio state prison sued the
prison warden, alleging that conditions at the prison violated the Eighth Amendment. Id.
at 296. Specifically, the petitioner alleged "overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient
locker storage space, inadequate heating and cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and
inadequate restrooms, unsanitary dining facilities and food preparation, and housing with
mentally and physically ill inmates." Id.
74. Id. at 298, 300-01.
75. Id. at 298, 300.
76. Id. at 298. Justice Scalia explained that the petitioner satisfies the objective com-
ponent if he proves that the punishment deprived him of "the minimal civilized measure of
life's necessities." Id. (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 303-05. Justice Scalia argued that the "wantonness" of conduct depends on
the constraints facing the prison official, not the effect on the prisoner. Id. Under the
Scalia scheme, the objective prong inquires into the prisoner's injury, while the subjective
prong.goes to the circumstances under which the prison official acted. Id.
79. Id. at 303. Justice Scalia reasoned that "we see no significant distinction between
claims alleging inadequate medical care and those alleging inadequate 'conditions of con-
finement.' " Id. Justice Scalia quoted Justice Powell's definition of the scope of the delib-
erate indifference inquiry: "[w]hether one characterizes the treatment received by [the
prisoner] as inhumane conditions of confinement, failure to attend to his medical needs, or
a combination of both, it is appropriate to apply the 'deliberate indifference' standard."
Id. (citing LaFaut v. Smith, 834 F.2d 389, 391-92 (4th Cir. 1987)).
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court had applied a "malicious-and-sadistic" standard rather than the
"deliberate indifference" standard.8"
Following Wilson, the Supreme Court applied the two-step test to re-
duce the petitioner's burden under the objective prong, while increasing
the petitioner's burden under the subjective prong.81 With regard to the
objective prong, Wilson failed to clarify the threshold level at which a
prisoner's injury would be sufficiently serious to trigger an Eighth
Amendment violation.82  In Hudson v. McMillian ,83 however, the
Supreme Court rejected the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit's recently developed significant injury requirement.84 The Court
adjusted the subjective prong to require that the petitioner establish the
culpability of prison officials under a "malicious-and-sadistic" standard.
8 5
In Hudson, prison officials assaulted a prisoner who suffered minor inju-
ries.86 The Court, in Justice O'Connor's majority opinion, ruled that,
80. Id. at 305-06. Justice White, in a concurring opinion, criticized the majority for the
heavy burden of proof that the subjective prong places on the petitioning prisoner. Id. at
309. Justice White argued that the petitioner should not be required to establish the culpa-
ble state of mind of the prison official. Id. Justice White argued that this intent require-
ment might apply to excessive force cases, but should not extend to cases concerning
prison conditions, because inhumane conditions could result from "cumulative actions and
inactions by numerous officials inside and outside a prison, sometimes over a long period
of time." Id. at 310. As a result, a prisoner would likely find it impossible to satisfy the
intent requirement. Id.
81. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-9 (1992) (rejecting the requirement that
the prisoner prove that he suffered a significant injury under the objective element, but
insisting that the prisoner prove that officials acted in a malicious and sadistic manner
under the subjective element).
82. See Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298. Wilson did not address in detail the requirement of
the objective element of the test; the Court merely stated that the deprivation must be
"sufficiently serious." Id.
83. 503 U.S. 1 (1992).
84. Id. at 8. The significant injury requirement was developed in Johnson v. Morel,
876 F.2d 477, 479 (5th Cir. 1989), and relied upon in Huguet v. Barnett, 900 F.2d 838, 841
(5th Cir. 1990) (tracing the origins of the significant injury requirement under the Eighth
Amendment to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). Justice O'Connor, in her majority
opinion in Hudson, used the Trop standard to reject the serious injury requirement. Hud-
son, 503 U.S. at 8. Justice O'Connor reasoned that if prison officials' actions offend con-
temporary standards of decency under a Trop analysis, then the Eighth Amendment is
violated "whether or not significant injury is evidefit." Id. at 9.
85. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7. This reversal on the subjective prong represented a rejec-
tion of the culpable state of mind approach adopted in Wilson, 501 U.S. at 299, in favor of
the more onerous "malicious-and-sadistic" standard previously adopted in Whitley v. Al-
bers, 475 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1986).
86. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 4. In Hudson, petitioner Keith Hudson, an inmate at a Loui-
siana state penitentiary became embroiled in an argument with respondent McMillian, a
corrections security officer, and two of his colleagues. Id. Petitioner was handcuffed,
shackled, and led from his cell toward the "administrative lockdown" area. Id. Petitioner
alleged that on the way to the lockdown area, respondent kicked and punched him in the
mouth, eyes, chest, and stomach. Id. Petitioner also alleged that the supervisor on duty at
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even though the prisoner did not suffer serious injury, the use of excessive
physical force against him might constitute cruel and unusual
punishment.87
Hudson placed critical emphasis on the subjective question of whether
the prison official had a malicious and sadistic intent.8  The Court stipu-
lated that the "malicious-and-sadistic" standard must be applied to all
excessive force cases.8 9 This approach undermines the view that the
Court expressed in Whitley that greater deference is due to prison offi-
cials acting under the exigent circumstance of a riot situation.90
In Farmer v. Brennan,91 the Court rejected the "malicious-and-sadistic"
standard and reverted to the "deliberate indifference" standard to deter-
mine whether a prison official's action, or failure to act, might violate a
prisoner's Eighth Amendment rights.92 In Farmer, the petitioner, a pre-
operative transsexual who "projects feminine characteristics, 93 was
the time observed the beating and told respondent McMillian "not to have too much fun."
Id.
87. Id. at 6-7; see Diana L. Nelson, Note, Hudson v. McMillian: The Evolving Stan-
dard of Eighth Amendment Application to the Use of Excessive Force Against Prison In-
mates, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1814, 1836 (1993) (arguing that the Court's rejection of a serious
injury requirement alleviated the burden of establishing the prison official's mens rea).
88. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7. Justice O'Connor's majority opinion described this inquiry
as "whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or
maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Id.
89. Id. Justice Stevens and Justice Blackmun, concurring, disagreed with the applica-
tion of the malicious-and-sadistic standard to all excessive force cases. Id. at 12-13, 14.
One law review article argued that the Court erred in applying the "malicious-and-sadistic"
standard to all excessive force cases. Jennifer Buehler, Note, Hudson v. McMillian: Re-
jecting The Serious Injury Requirement, But Embracing The Malicious-And-Sadistic Stan-
dard, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 683, 710-13 (1993). The "malicious-and-sadistic" standard
emerged from Whitley v. Albers, which concerned a prison riot situation. 475 U.S. 312,
327-28 (1986). Hudson, which concerned non-riot prison conditions, is thus entirely distin-
guishable from Whitley. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 4 (involving a prisoner's allegation that
he was beaten by prison officials after an argument with a prison guard). Contra Whitley,
475 U.S. at 327-28 (involving a prisoner's allegation that he was shot in the leg by a prison
official during a prison riot).
90. Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22.
91. 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994).
92. Id. at 1974.
93. Id. at 1975. In what the LEGAL TIMES described as "one of the more interesting
rhetorical oddities from last term," the Supreme Court effected a compromise on the issue
of whether the petitioner, Dee Farmer, should be referenced by the male or female pro-
noun. Tony Mauro, Politics of Pronouns, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 15, 1994, at 2. Counsel for
the petitioner, in compliance with their client's wishes, used the female pronoun. Brief for
Petitioner at 2 n.2, Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994) (No. 92-7247). The govern-
ment, arguing that petitioner was a biological male, opted for the male pronoun. Brief for
Respondent at 2 n.3, Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994) (No. 92-7247). The Court
trod a diplomatic course by avoiding any gender-specific reference. It referred either to
"Dee Farmer" or to "petitioner." Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1974.
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transferred from a federal correctional institute to a penitentiary where a
fellow inmate allegedly assaulted and raped her.94 Petitioner's theory
was that prison officials knew she would be assaulted at the penitentiary,
and that, therefore, they acted with deliberate indifference to her welfare,
thereby violating her Eighth Amendment rights.95
Justice Souter's majority opinion refined the two-prong test for deliber-
ate indifference established in Wilson 9 6 Under the Farmer test, the peti-
tioner first must prove objectively that the deprivation suffered was
"sufficiently serious." 97 Second, the petitioner must show that the official
disregarded a risk of harm to the prisoner of which the official was
aware. 98 The second prong requires a showing of subjective recklessness,
which the Court deemed analogous to the criminal law recklessness stan-
dard. 99 The Farmer Court emphasized thatthe Eighth Amendment is a
prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments" rather than a prohibition
94. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1975. Petitioner Farmer alleged that, within two weeks of her
arrival at the penitentiary, she was beaten and raped in her cell by a fellow inmate. Id. at
1975; see also Panel Discussion: Men, Women and Rape, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 127
n.10, 128 n.11 (1994) (providing a catalog of legal, psychological and sociological sources
that discuss the phenomenon of homosexual rape in the penal system); The Supreme
Court, 1993 Term: Leading Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139, 237 n.52 (1994) (explaining the
prejudices that victims of homosexual rape must confront in bringing a claim); Kathleen
Knepper, Responsibility of Correctional Officials in Responding to the Incidence of the HIV
Virus in Jails and Prisons, 21 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 45 (1995) (doc-
umenting the problems of dealing with prisoners infected with the HIV virus).
95. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1975. Petitioner Farmer, acting initially without counsel, filed
a complaint alleging that respondent prison officials placed her in the penitentiary popula-
tion knowing that, as a transsexual, she inevitably would be targeted for sexual attack at an
institution with a history of violence and inmate assaults. Id This, petitioner alleged, con-
stituted deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Id.
96. Id. at 1977-78 (explaining that the Court had not previously "paused to explain the
meaning of the term 'deliberate indifference' "). The parties agreed that the deliberate
indifference standard applied, but disagreed as to its meaning. Id. at 1977.
97. Id. (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). The Court explained that,
for a claim such as petitioner Farmer's to prevail "based on a failure to prevent harm, the
inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of
serious harm." Id.
98. Id. at 1977-78. This "actual knowledge requirement" has been criticized for effec-
tively eliminating the use of a deliberate indifference claim to provide injunctive or pre-
attack relief. See Leading Cases, supra note 94, at 238. The Harvard survey argues that
Justice Souter's opinion assumes that a prisoner will discern an impending attack and then
be willing to inform the prison guards. Id. Yet, new prisoners in particular may be una-
ware of the imminence of attack and, even if they become aware, they may be reluctant to
"snitch" to the prison guards and face retribution from other prisoners. Id. at 238 & nn.54,
55 (citing a number of sources that discuss rape in prison culture). An experienced prison
guard will, ironically, be in a better position than a neophyte prisoner to identify an immi-
nent attack. Id. at 238 n.54.
99. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1978-79. Farmer may have clarified the Wilson two-step,
objective/subjective test, but this hardly satisfied critics who believe that a subjective com-
ponent is unduly onerous on prisoners and eviscerates their prospects of a successful claim.
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on conditions. 100
Justice Thomas concurred, stating that the Eighth Amendment is not
applicable to prison condition cases at all.1 ' Justice Blackmun, concur-
ring, rejected the view that prison conditions are beyond the scope of the
Eighth Amendment. 0 2 He asserted that the Eighth Amendment focuses
on physical, as well as psychological, punishment and, therefore, he char-
acterized the assault on Farmer as torture.10 3 Justice Blackmun's opinion
bears a clear theme: an interpretation of the Eighth Amendment that re-
stricts its scope merely to punishment and not to treatment of individuals
neither reflects the intent of the Framers nor the standards of decency in
a modern, civilized society.
10 4
Despite strong differences of opinion, the entire Court concurred in the
Farmer ruling.1°5 The "deliberate indifference" standard won Justice
Blackmun's nominal support because it holds prison officials, at least the-
oretically, liable for injuries such as Farmer's. 0 6 But this standard re-
quires that the complaining prisoner prove that the prison official's
subjective behavior constituted deliberate indifference, analogous to
criminal recklessness, toward the prisoner's welfare.107 Ironically, some
See, e.g., Kritchevsky, supra note 49, at 459-62 (arguing that liability should be judged by
objective, rather than subjective, criteria).
The annual Harvard Law Review survey of the Supreme Court's 1993 Term challenged
the Farmer Court's conclusion that Wilson mandated a subjective prong. Leading Cases,
supra note 94, at 239. The Harvard survey argued that Wilson did not define deliberate
indifference, thus leaving the Farmer Court free to develop a purely objective test for es-
tablishing an official's culpable state of mind. Id. (postulating that "[g]iven Wilson's si-
lence on this issue, the Farmer Court was hardly bound to adopt an unjust and unworkable
subjective standard"). The Harvard survey also noted with disapproval that Farmer main-
tained the Wilson requirement that the petitioning prisoner must identify at least one
prison official exhibiting deliberate indifference toward his welfare. Id. at 238-39. This
requirement, the Harvard survey argued, places a further burden on the prisoner. Id.
100. Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1979. The Court cautioned that although action or inaction
by a prison official without a significant risk of harm may not be cause for commendation,
it would not constitute the infliction of punishment either. Id.
101. Id. at 1990 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas rationalized his particularly
narrow interpretation by stating that "judges or juries-but not jailers-impose 'punish-
ment.' " Id. (citing his own opinions in Helling v. McKinney, 113 S. Ct. 2475, 2484 (1993)
and Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 18 (1992)).
102. Id. at 1986 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 1987.
104. Id. at 1989.
105. Id. at 1974.
106. Id. at 1986. Justice Blackmun concurred because the Court's decision "creates no
new obstacles for prison inmates to overcome," and because he believed that Farmer
would impose an affirmative duty on prison officials concerning prisoner welfare. Id.
107. Id. at 1978-80. The Courtalso recognized that administrative officials may be ex-
cused of liability on the basis of having acted, however mistakenly, in good faith. See
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (recognizing the validity of a search warrant
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hailed the Farmer decision as offering a breakthrough remedy for prison-
ers.1"8 This remedy, however, may not present "any realistic opportunity
to prevent or redress violations of [prisoners'] Eighth Amendment
rights."'10 9
b. Death Penalty Cases
In the early 1970s, the Supreme Court, in Furman v. Georgia,"0 de-
issued on the basis of inaccurate information that a police officer proffered in the good
faith belief that it was correct; this is the so-called "good faith" exception under the Fourth
Amendment). The Farmer Court emphasized its concern to establish "a standard that in-
corporates due regard for prison officials' 'unenviable task of keeping dangerous men in
safe custody under humane conditions.' " Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1983 (quoting Spain v.
Procunier, 600 F.2d 189, 193 (9th Cir. 1979)). But see Kritchevsky, supra note 49, at 459-62
(arguing that liability should be judged by objective, rather than subjective, criteria).
108. See, e.g., David G. Savage, High Court Opens Door to Rape Suits by Inmates, L.A.
TIMES, June 7, 1994, at A4. Advocates for petitioner Farmer's position struggled to inter-
pret the Court's decision as a victory. Jeffrey T. Renz, director of the Montana Defender
Project, who filed an amicus brief in support of Dee Farmer, claimed that the Court clari-
fied a "previously 'mushy,' fact-bound standard." Marcia Coyle, High Court Roundup:
Counsel, Jails, Taxes, NAT'L L.J., June 20, 1994, at All. Alvin J. Bronstein of the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, who represented Dee Farmer, stated that Farmer could enable
more prisoners to at least get their grievances to trial. Joan Biskupic, Justices Reinstate
Lawsuit Filed by Raped Prisoner: Officials Held Liable Only If They Know of Risk, WASH.
POST, June 7, 1994, at A6.
109. Leading Cases, supra note 94, at 240. The annual Harvard Law Review survey of
the Supreme Court's 1993 Term was scathing in its criticism of Farmer. Id. at 231-40. The
survey argued that "Farmer v. Brennan effectively leaves inhumane prison conditions with-
out constitutional remedy." Id. at 235.
If the deliberate indifference burden of proof is not onerous enough, petitioning prison-
ers' claims may fall victim to the prejudices of juries. Jon 0. Newman, Suing the Law-
breakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers'
Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 454 (1978) (arguing that prisoners must overcome the addi-
tional hurdle of appearing inherently less sympathetic than prison officials to a jury). New-
man describes this contrast in stark terms: "[alt the defendants' table sit the police officers
... with the American flag figuratively wrapped around them ... [while] the section 1983
plaintiff is likely to be black or Puerto Rican, poor, disheveled, a felon, and often a drug
addict." Id. The Harvard Law Review survey added that the transsexuality of a petitioner
such as Dee Farmer probably would not attract the jury's sympathy. Leading Cases, supra
note 94, at 237 n.50.
110. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). Furman was a 5-4 decision, with Justice Doug-
las, Justice Brennan, Justice Stewart, Justice White, and Justice Marshall in the majority
and Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist in the
minority. Id. at 240. The majority, that prevailed by the narrowest of margins, itself was
deeply divided. Each of the five majority justices wrote a separate opinion. Id. Similarly,
each of the four dissenting justices submitted a separate opinion. Id. The result is the
longest decision in the history of the Supreme Court. BOB WOODWARD & ScoTrr ARM-
STRONG, THE BRETHREN 220 (1979) (documenting the internal machinations of the delib-
erative and decision-making processes of the Burger Court).
Justice Douglas' concurrence relied on the rationale of In re Kemmler, that the Cruel
and Unusual Punishments Clause is a prohibition against "inhuman and barbarous" pun-
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clared a state death penalty statute unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment.11' Scholars and commentators describe Furman as a "wa-
ishments. Furman, 408 U.S. at 241 (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing In re Kemmler, 136
U.S. 436, 447 (1890)). Justice Brennan's concurring opinion argued that the death penalty
was not only unusual but unique by virtue of its "extreme severity." Id. at 287 (Brennan,
J., concurring). Justice Stewart's concurring opinion cited the "total irrevocability" of the
death penalty. Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice White, like Justice Brennan,
questioned whether the death penalty might be unusual due solely to the infrequency of its
application. Id. at 310-11 (White, J., concurring).
Two commentators, Nakell and Hardy, summarized the differing positions of the major-
ity justices as follows:
Justices Brennan and Marshall decided that the death penalty was an unconstitu-
tional form of punishment. Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White confined their
decisions to the death penalty as they perceived it was applied. The Court and
the conventional wisdom have considered their opinions the law of Furman in
some collective sense, often focusing primarily on Justice Stewart's opinion., The
theme common to all five opinions for the majority justices was an arbitrariness
rationale. Justice Stewart relied almost completely on that theory. Justice White
relied on arbitrariness and on a related infrequency theory. Justice Brennan con-
sidered the arbitrariness rationale one of four principles by which he determined
that the death penalty is unconstitutional. Justice Douglas concentrated on the
discrimination component of arbitrariness. Justice Marshall considered the dis-
crimination theory as one reason the death penalty was morally unacceptable in
the sense that it " 'shocks the conscience and sense of justice of the people.' "
BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH PENALTY
22 (1987) (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 360, quoting United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d
583, 608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952)).
This Comment does not attempt to summarize the separate views of the nine justices.
For a more detailed discussion of Furman decision, see THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA
247-70 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3d ed. 1982) (documenting each of the Furman opinions);
see also JAN GORECKI, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIMINAL LAW AND SOCIAL EVOLUTION 5-
13 (1983) (discussing the separate views of the justices); NAKELL & HARDY, supra, at 20-26
(summarizing each of the five majority opinions).
111. 408 U.S. at 239-40. In Furman, the Supreme Court held that the Georgia and
Texas death penalty statutes violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the
Eighth Amendment. Id. The Furman decision was announced on June 29, 1972 along with
two related cases: Jackson v. Georgia, 171 S.E.2d 501 (Ga. 1969); and Branch v. Texas, 447
S.W.2d 932 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). Id. Each of the three defendants had been sentenced
to death; one for murder, and the other two for rape. Id. at 240 n.1 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
The Furman decision prompted speculation that the Court might soon declare the death
penalty per se unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Daniel D. Polsby,
The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia, 1972 Sup. Cr. REV. 1, 40 (Philip B.
Kurland ed., 1973) (criticizing the failure of the majority in Furman to produce a cohesive,
unified rationale for the Court's decision, and predicting that the "five separate opinions
with none commanding the concurrence of any Justice other than its author" could "make
this judgment of dubious value as a precedent"). Polsby, an opponent of the death penalty,
id. at 3, nevertheless criticized Furman, stating that "in terms of reasoned judgments, the
majority justices in Furman did not have one of their finest hours." Id. at 40. As other
commentators noted, "[t]hough many hailed the Supreme Court's decision in Furman as
the final renunciation of the death penalty, a close examination of the decision reveals a
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tershed" or "landmark" decision.' 12 Among the five justices voting with
the majority, the opinions of Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan pro-
vided the most expansive interpretation of Eighth Amendment rights.", 3
Justice Marshall offered a general Eighth Amendment framework that
provided four reasons for finding a punishment cruel and unusual.114
This framework closely resembled four principles that Justice Brennan
presented in his concurring opinion. 115 First, Justice Marshall noted that
cruel punishments violate the Eighth Amendment. 116 Second, he empha-
much less certain result." FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISH-
MENT AND THE AMERICAN AGENDA 51 (1986).
Jan Gorecki evaluated Furman by explaining that:
Furman will stand in American legal history as one of the most peculiar decisions
for both what it did and what it refrained from doing. It did not resolve the basic
problem of validity of capital punishment; the issue was, in 1972, too dubious and
controversial. Instead, by answering a narrower question, it banned the death
penalty as applied in the cases at hand.
GORECKI, supra note 110, at 10.
112. BEDAU, supra note 110, at 248; Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion?
Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1938, 1940 n.10
(1988); Joseph L. Hoffmann, Is Innocence Sufficient? An Essay on the U.S. Supreme
Court's Continuing Problems with Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death Penalty, 68 IND.
L.J. 817, 820 (1993); Sandra D. Jordan, Death For Drug Related Killings: Revival of the
Federal Death Penalty, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 79,83 (1991); The Supreme Court, 1983 Term:
Leading Cases, 98 HARv. L. REV. 87, 97 (1984). Justice Brennan, an author of one of the
five majority opinions in Furman, shared this view. William J. Brennan, Jr., The 1986 Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Lecture: Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View
from the Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 313, 314 (1986) (describing Furman as one of the
"landmark cases").
113. Furman, 408 U.S. at 257.306 (Brennan, J., concurring), 314-74 (Marshall, J., con-
curring). Justice Marshall traced the development of the scope of the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the phrase, "cruel and unusual punishments," from Wilkerson v. Utah, 99
U.S. 130 (1879), In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890), Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349
(1910), through Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Id. at 322-45 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan also traced the expansion of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause through the same line of cases cited in Justice
Marshall's opinion. Id. at 257-306 (Brennan, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 330-33 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall conceded that, "[t]o ar-
rive at the conclusion that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment, we have had
to engage in a long and tedious journey." Id. at 370.
115. Id. at 270-80 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan reasoned that there are
four constitutional principles that apply to death penalty jurisprudence. Id. Justice Bren-
nan's first principle limits the severity of punishment in order to prevent the degradation of
human dignity. Id. at 271. The second principle prohibits the arbitrary infliction of severe
punishment. Id. at 274. The third principle cautions that a severe punishment must not
offend the standards of contemporary society. Id. at 277. Finally, the fourth principle de-
clares that severe punishments may not be excessive. Id. at 279.
116. Id. at 330 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall stated that "there are certain
punishments that inherently involve so much physical pain and suffering that civilized peo-
ple cannot tolerate them." Id.
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sized that unusual punishments are unconstitutional.117 Third, Justice
Marshall stated that excessive punishments violate the proportionality
doctrine.11 8 Fourth, Justice Marshall argued that, even if a punishment
does not violate the third test, it still might violate the Eighth Amend-
ment under a test resembling the Trop standard. 1 9 Justice Marshall used
a historical analysis of the Framers' intent and of the development of
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence to argue that the death penalty vio-
lated the first two tests. 120 Justice Marshall then used data on the applica-
tion of the death penalty to conclude that it failed the third and fourth
tests. 121
The Furman decision arguably represents the high-water mark in the
progressive development of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.122 Four
years later, in Gregg v. Georgia,'2' the Court upheld death penalty stat-
utes drafted specifically to alleviate some of the Furman Court's con-
cerns. 1'24 The Gregg decision reflected a greater concern for judicial
117. Id. at 331. Justice Marshall defined unusual punishments as those "previously un-
known as penalties for a given offense." Id.
118. Id. at 331-32. Justice Marshall explained that "a penalty may be cruel and unusual
because it is excessive and serves no valid legislative purpose." Id. at 331.
119. Id. at 332-33. Justice Marshall stated that "where a punishment is not excessive
and serves a valid legislative purpose, it still may be invalid if popular sentiment abhors it."
Id.; cf Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (interpreting the Eighth Amendment by
reference to "evolving standards of decency"). Justice Marshall argued that "there are
principles recognized in our cases and inherent in the Clause sufficient to permit a judicial
determination whether a challenged punishment comports with human dignity." Furman,
408 U.S. at 270 (Marshall, J., concurring).
120. Furman, 408 U.S. at 314-60 (Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing that the Framers
intended to prohibit the death penalty by the language of the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause).
121. Id. at 371-74 (using statistical data to demonstrate a trend among the states to-
wards abolishing the death penalty and reducing its application in those states retaining
death penalty statutes).
122. See id.
123. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). Justice Stewart announced the opinion of the Court, in which
Justice Powell and Justice Stevens concurred. Id. at 158. Justice White wrote a concurring
opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist. Id. at 207. Justice Black-
mun filed a separate concurring opinion. Id. at 227. Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall
filed dissenting opinions. Id. at 227, 231. Like the Furman majority, the Gregg majority
was criticized for failing to coalesce behind a single, unified approach. See Hans Zeisel,
The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: Facts v. Faiths, 1976 Sup. Or. REV. 317 (Philip B.
Kurland ed., 1977) (noting that "[o]nce again in the 1975 Term, the Justices of the Supreme
Court found themselves unable to express a unified position on the validity of the death
penalty"). Zeisel cited a number of statistical studies as evidence that "the deterrent effect
[of the death penalty], if it exists at all, can be only minute." Id. at 342.
124. 428 U.S. at 206-07 (upholding the Georgia death penalty statute that had been
drafted in response to Furman). Justice Stewart's plurality opinion stated that "the death
penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the circum-
stances of the offense, regardless of the character of the offender, and regardless of the
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deference to state legislatures than the Court displayed in Furman.25
Despite its concessions to state death penalty statutes in Gregg, the
Supreme Court continued placing restrictions on the application of such
statutes.1 26 The Court rejected statutes requiring death sentences for par-
ticular crimes as violating the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. 27
In Woodson v. North Carolina,28 the Court ruled that statutorily man-
dated death sentences violate the Eighth Amendment. 129 In Woodson,
the defendants were convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to
death pursuant to a North Carolina statute mandating the death penalty
for such an offense.1 30 Justice Stewart's majority opinion specified that
the key indicators of the Trop standard of "evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society"'131 were history, legislative
enactments, and jury determinations.132 Justice Stewart, however, ex-
plained that automatic death sentences deny juries the opportunity to
procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose it." Id. at 187. Justice Stewart con-
tinued that "the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in
an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures
that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance." Id. at 195.
125. See id. at 174-75. The concurring opinions of Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Mar-
shall in Furman all relied on statistical and social science data concerning the death pen-
alty. Furman, 408 U.S. at 249-50 (Douglas, J., concurring) (using statistical data to show
that the death penalty has been applied on a racially discriminatory basis); id. at 291-94 &
nn.40-46 (Brennan, J., concurring) (using statistical data to show that the application of the
death penalty has declined steadily since the 1930s); id. at 373-74 (Marshall, J., concurring)
(using statistical data to show a trend among the states toward abolition of the death pen-
alty, both on a statutory basis and in terms of a reluctance to impose capital punishment
even when the sanction remains available).
But the Gregg Court's restraint was a recognition that state legislatures considered the
Furman criticisms of the death penalty and passed death penalty statutes with built-in safe-
guards in response to those criticisms. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 162-63. The presence of new
safeguards addressed the first three of Justice Marshall's objections in Furman, while the
legislative endorsement of the new death penalty statutes, as a reflection of "popular en-
thusiasm," mitigated concerns under Justice Marshall's fourth test. See David 0. Stewart,
Dealing With Death, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1994, at 50.
126. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). In Coker, the Court held that the
imposition of the death penalty for the crime of raping an adult woman would violate the
Eighth Amendment on proportionality grounds. Id.; see also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 788 (1982) (invalidating the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who was
convicted.of felony-murder but did not commit the actual murder).
127. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (invalidating the
mandatory imposition of the death penalty by statute for defendants convicted of specified
crimes).
128. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
129. Id. at 305. The Court, citing Gregg, declined the petitioner's invitation to revert to
the Furman approach, which held that the death penalty is per se cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Id. at 285.
130. Id. at 284.
131. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
132. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 288.
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consider the particular circumstances of an individual defendant's case. 33
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its opposition to automatic death
sentences in Enmund v. Florida.'34 In Enmund, the Court specifically
recognized the influence of "international opinion."' 35 The Court held
that the Eighth Amendment does not permit the imposition of the death
penalty on a defendant who aids or abets the commission of a felony
where one of the other participants commits murder.136 In Enmund, the
defendant served as the getaway driver in a conspiracy to rob an elderly
couple.' 37 One of Enmund's co-conspirators shot and killed the couple in
the course of the robbery. 138 Enmund was convicted on the basis of aid-
ing and abetting in the commission of the crime, but he did not kill, at-
tempt to kill, or use lethal force. 139 Relying on "international opinion" to
guide its determination, the Court noted that the felony-murder doctrine
has been abolished in England and India, restricted in Canada, and has
133. Id. at 295. Justice Stewart argued that juries share with society at large an aversion
to the death penalty. Id. at 295.
134. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
135. Id. at 788. The Enmund Court cited Coker v. Georgia's reliance on, "the historical
development of the punishment at issue, legislative judgments, international opinion, and
the sentencing decisions juries have made" as factors to be weighed prior to the Court
exercising its own judgment. Id. at 788-89 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593
(1977)). Justice Brennan, concurring, reiterated his personal view that the death penalty is
prohibited by the Eighth Amendment in all circumstances. Id. at 801 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
Justice O'Connor, dissenting, argued that the death penalty for felony-murder was "not
disproportionate to the crime." Id. at 827 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor's
dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist, fol-
lowed the Woodson rationale against automatic death sentences. Id. Woodson empha-
sized the need for courts to make an individualized judgment concerning the defendant's
mens rea prior to imposing a death sentence. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293. Justice O'Connor
favored remanding the case for a new sentencing hearing on grounds that the Florida
Supreme Court failed to consider mitigating evidence that Enmund's role in the murders
was relatively minor. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 827.
136. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 783-84. The Court found that Enmund lacked an intent to
kill and concluded that "death is an unconstitutional penalty absent an intent to kill." Id.
at 796.
137. Id. at 784.
138. Id. The Court reasoned that the death penalty should not be imposed on a de-
fendant such as Enmund, who lacked the requisite culpable mental state for murder. Id. at
796, 799. "[I]f a person does not intend that life be taken or contemplate that lethal force
will be employed by others, the possibility that the death penalty will be imposed for vicari-
ous felony murder will not 'enter into the cold calculus that precedes the decision to act.' "
Id. at 799 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 186 (1976)). Under such circumstances,
the Court argued, the twin goals of the death penalty-retribution and deterrence-would
not be served. Id. at 798.
139. Id. at 801. The Court reasoned that "[p]utting Enmund to death to avenge two
killings that he did not commit and had no intention of committing or causing does not
measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the criminal gets his just
deserts [sic]." Id.
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never been applied in continental Europe. 140
But the Enmund decision was an aberration for a Supreme Court that,
by 1982, was "going out of the business of telling the states how to admin-
ister the death penalty phase of capital murder trials.",14' The Supreme
Court's shift on the death penalty issue is epitomized by its handling of
the issue of the capital punishment for juveniles. The Court addressed
this issue, and reached opposite results, in two cases that were decided
less than one year apart: Thompson v. Oklahoma142 and Stanford v.
Kentucky .
140. Id. at 796 n.22.
141. Robert Weisberg, Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. Cr. REV. 305, 305 (Philip B. Kur-
land ed., 1984). Weisberg cites four key death penalty cases where, on each occasion, the
Court upheld the death sentences imposed. Id. at 305 n.1. The four cases are: Barclay v;
Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983) (affirming the imposition of the death penalty under a Florida
statute); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983) (affirming the imposition of the death
penalty under a Texas statute); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983) (affirming the imposi-
tion of the death penalty under a Georgia statute); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992
(1983) (affirming the imposition of the death penalty under a California statute).
142. 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause
prohibits the execution of a person who is under the age of sixteen years at the time of the
offense).
Prior to discussing the Thompson and Stanford decisions, some background on the post-
Furman case law on juvenile executions is appropriate. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586,
604 (1978), a plurality held that under the Eighth Amendment, a defendant generally may
introduce mitigating evidence when confronted with a potential death sentence. Id. at 604
(Burger, C.J., plurality opinion). The Court's decision invalidated the Ohio death penalty
statute, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.03-.04 (Anderson 1975), which specifically prohib-
ited the introduction of mitigating evidence, such as the age or character of the defendant.
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 607-08. Lockett concerned a 21-year-old female defendant charged
with the aggravated murder of a pawnbroker, who had been shot by one of the defendant's
co-conspirators in the course of a robbery. Id. at 589-91. The defendant drove the get-
away car. Id. at 590. The group of three co-conspirators included the defendant's brother.
Id. at 590; see also Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637, 639 (1978) (reversing the conviction of a
defendant who, when 16 years old, participated with an 18-year-old friend in the kidnap-
ping and murder of a 64-year-old man).
Four years later, Eddings v. Oklahoma presented the Court with a slightly different situ-
ation. 455 U.S. 104 (1982). Like the defendant in Bell, the defendant in Eddings was 16
years old when he was alleged to have murdered a police officer. Id. at 105-06. Unlike the
Ohio statute at issue in Lockett and Bell, the Oklahoma death penalty statute permitted
the introduction of mitigating evidence. Id. at 106. While the judge considered evidence
of the defendant's age at the sentencing hearing, the judge ruled that evidence of the de-
fendant's "troubled youth" was not mitigating in nature. Id. at 107-09. The Supreme
Court reversed and remanded the sentence on the ground that the "troubled youth" evi-
dence was mitigating and should have been considered by the judge at the sentencing hear-
ing. Id. at 113.
In Lockett, Bell, and Eddings, the Supreme Court did not directly consider the issue of
the constitutionality of executing a juvenile. For further discussion of these cases, see Hoff-
mann, supra note 38, at 234-36.
143. 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (holding that the imposition of capital punishment on an
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In Thompson, the Court ruled that the Eighth Amendment prohibited
imposing the death penalty on defendants under the age of sixteen at the
time that they committed the crime.'" Justice Stevens' plurality opinion
specifically cited standards under international law, as well as the prac-
tices of other nations, to establish that an alternative ruling would violate
modern standards of decency among civilized nations.'45 His opinion
individual for a crime committed at the ages of 16 or 17 years does not constitute cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment).
144. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). Petitioner, who was 15
years old at the time, participated with three older persons in the murder of his former
brother-in-law. Id. at 819. The victim was shot twice, his throat, chest, and abdomen were
cut, and his leg was broken. Id. His body was chained to a concrete block and thrown in a
river. Id. Each of the four participants was tried separately, convicted of first-degree mur-
der, and sentenced to death. Id.
Hoffmann explained how Oklahoma justified imposing the same sentence on the 15-
year-old defendant as that meted out to his adult co-defendants:
Under Oklahoma law, fifteen year olds are treated as "children" subject to the
juvenile courts rather than the adult criminal justice system, unless a specific find-
ing is made to the contrary. In order to certify a fifteen year old to stand trial as
an adult, the trial judge must find that (1) the state has established the "prosecu-
tive merit" of the case, and (2) there are no reasonable prospects for rehabilita-
tion of the "child" within the juvenile justice system. After hearing testimony
from a clinical psychologist, a juvenile justice system employee, and other wit-
nesses familiar with Thompson's background, the trial judge entered an order
certifying Thompson to be tried as an adult.
Hoffmann, supra note 38, at 237 (footnotes omitted).
145. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830-31 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). Justice Stevens was
joined by Justices Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall. Id. at 818. Justice O'Connor con-
curred in the judgment but wrote a separate opinion. Id. at 848-59 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (arguing that the defendant's death sentence should be reversed on the ground that
the Oklahoma legislature had not adequately incorporated a minimum age provision in its
death penalty statute).
Justice Stevens' opinion relied on two principal elements: "societal factors," and princi-
ples of relative culpability: retribution and deterrence. Id. at 821-23. Justice Stevens' dis-
cussion of "societal factors" began with a review of individual states' laws on juvenile
execution. Id. at 824-29. Justice Stevens noted that 14 states abolished the death penalty,
while an additional 18 states specifically had established a minimum age for applying the
death penalty (ranging from 16-18 years). Id. at 826-29. Under Justice Stevens' survey,
there remained 19 states in which a 15-year-old could receive the death penalty. Id. at 826-
29 & n.29. Justice Stevens included the District of Columbia in his survey, which accounts
for the anomalous total of 51 "states" surveyed. Id. at 824 n.16. Justice Stevens added the
District of Columbia to a list of 14 states that had abolished the death penalty. Id. at 826
n.25. Justice Stevens questioned the specific nature of the position of those 19 states that
retained statutes permitting the execution of 15-year-olds, because those 19 legislatures
had not "expressly confronted the question of establishing a minimum age for imposition
of the death penalty." Id. at 826-28. Having established a domestic frame of reference,
Justice Stevens then bolstered his argument by referring to international standards. Id. at
830-31 (discussing the laws and practices of other nations).
Under the second factor of his analysis, Justice Stevens reasoned that punishment should
be related to culpability, and that "less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a
juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult." Id. at 833-35. Juveniles,
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cited data showing that the majority of Western European democracies,
and even the Soviet Union, prohibited the execution of minors.146 Justice
Stevens used this data to draw a parallel between the international trend
away from the practice of executing minors and a similar domestic trend
among state legislative and judicial branches.1
47
Justice Scalia's dissent, however, rejected the plurality's reliance on an
international frame of reference. 4 Justice Scalia criticized the use of the
Justice Stevens continued, generally are less experienced, less educated, less intelligent,
and more susceptible to act based on "mere emotion or peer pressure" than adults. Id. at
835.
146. Id. at 831 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). Justice Stevens relied on data provided
by Amnesty International concerning death penalty laws in different countries:
Although the death penalty has not been entirely abolished in the United King-
dom or New Zealand (it has been abolished in Australia, except in the State of
New South Wales, where it is available for treason and piracy), in neither of those
countries may a juvenile be executed. The death penalty has been abolished in
West Germany, France, Portugal, The Netherlands, and all of the Scandinavian
countries, and is available only for exceptional crimes such as treason in Canada,
Italy, Spain, and Switzerland. Juvenile executions are also prohibited in the So-
viet Union.
Id. at 830-31 & n.34 (citing Brief for Amnesty International as Amicus Curiae, at A-1 to A-
9).
147. Id. at 823-31 (Stevens, J., p9lurality opinion). Justice Stevens also relied on the
increasing reluctance among juries to impose the death penalty. Id. at 831-32. Justice Ste-
vens noted that only 18-20 persons had been executed during the twentieth century for
crimes committed while 16 years old or younger. Id. at 832 & n.36. Furthermore, the last
such execution had occurred in 1948. Id. at 832 & n.37. Justice Stevens also remarked that
between 1982 and 1986, only five of the persons who received a death sentence were under
16 years of age when they committed their crimes. Id. at 832-33. Echoing Trop, Justice
Stevens concluded that "it would offend civilized standards of decency to execute a person
who was less than 16 years old at the time of his or her offense." Id. at 830.
148. Id. at 868 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (excoriating the plurality's use of the Amnesty
International data as "totally inappropriate"). Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice White. Id. at 859. Justice Kennedy did not participate in the deci-
sion. Id. at 818. Justice Scalia took aim at the plurality's contention that a "national con-
sensus" existed opposing the execution of juveniles. Id. at 859. Justice Scalia reviewed
that data on state laws, which provided an essential foundation for Justice Stevens' opin-
ion, but reached exactly the opposite conclusion. Id. at 859-68. Focusing on the 19 states
that had retained death penalty statutes, Justice Scalia noted that these states "have deter-
mined that no minimum age for capital punishment is appropriate, leaving that to be gov-
erned by their general rules for the age at which juveniles can be criminally responsible."
Id. at 868. Justice Scalia added that many federal and state legislatures recently reduced
the minimum age of criminal responsibility. Id. at 865-68.
Justice Scalia concluded that the data reflected "the view that death is not different inso-
far as the age of juvenile criminal responsibility is concerned." Id. at 868. Justice Scalia
criticized the plurality for its failure to establish any "rational basis for discerning ... a
societal judgment that no one so much as a day under 16 can ever be mature and morally
responsible enough to deserve ... [the death] penalty; and there is no justification except
our own predilection for converting a statistical rarity of occurrence into an absolute con-
stitutional ban." Id. at 870-71.
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Trop standard as one that indulged the subjective views of individual jus-
tices.' 49 Justice Scalia based his dissent on his interpretation of the origi-
nal history of the Eighth Amendment. 150 Consequently, Justice Scalia
concluded that it was inappropriate to establish that the execution of
juveniles under sixteen years of age would violate the Eighth Amend-
ment in all circumstances.
151
Justice Scalia's view won majority support just one year later in Stan-
ford v. Kentucky.152 In Stanford,'53 the Court reversed Thompson on the
issue of executing juveniles, thus sharply narrowing its interpretation of
the scope of Eighth Amendment protection.'54 The Stanford Court held
149. Id. at 864-65. Justice Scalia argued that "the risk of assessing evolving standards is
that it is all too easy to believe that evolution has culminated in one's own views." Id.
Justice Scalia warned of the dangers of relying on the "perceptions of decency, or of penol-
ogy, or of mercy, entertained-or strongly entertained, or even held as an 'abiding convic-
tion'-by a majority of the small and unrepresentative segment of our society that sits on
this Court." Id. at 873.
150. Id. at 864 (arguing that there is no evidence supporting the majority's view that the
Eighth Amendment was intended to prohibit the execution of minors). Justice Scalia de-
scribed the Court's task in Eighth Amendment cases as to determine whether a form of
punishment violates either the original meaning of the Amendment or the meaning that
the Amendment has taken on in modern society. Id. at 873.
151. Id. at 859 (concluding that neither the history of the Eighth Amendment nor the
lack of consensus among state legislatures concerning death penalty statutes provide sup-
port for the view that imposing the death penalty on juveniles is unconstitutional). Justice
Scalia also rebuked Justice O'Connor for promulgating, in her concurring opinion, a
"[sjolomonic solution" that constituted an inappropriate intrusion into the discretion of the
Oklahoma state legislature. Id. at 874-78.
152. 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The Stanford decision marked a remarkable volte-face for a
Court whose personnel had not changed during the one-year period since Thompson. Jus-
tice Scalia and Justice White, along with Chief Justice Rehnquist, all of whom had dis-
sented in Thompson, formed the majority in Stanford along with Justice Kennedy, who did
not participate in the Thompson decision, and Justice O'Connor, who concurred in Stan-
ford after switching her vote from the position she espoused in a separate concurring opin-
ion in Thompson. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 857-58; Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380 (listing the
votes of the justices in each case).
153. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 365-66. Justice Scalia commenced his majority opinion with a
recitation of the facts of Stanford's case:
Petitioner Kevin Stanford committed the murder [of 20-year-old Barbara Poore]
on January 7, 1981, when he was approximately 17 years and 4 months of age.
Stanford and his accomplice repeatedly raped and sodomized Poore during and
after their commission of a robbery at a gas station where she worked as an at-
tendant. They then drove her to a secluded area near the station, where Stanford
shot her pointblank in the face and then in the back of her head. The proceeds
from the robbery were roughly 300 cartons of cigarettes, two gallons of fuel, and a
small amount of cash. ... Stanford was convicted of murder, first-degree sodomy,
first-degree robbery, and receiving stolen property, and. was sentenced to death
and 45 years in prison.
Id.
154. Id. at 369. The Court's holding that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit the
execution of minors reflects the extent to which, in less than 20 years, the Court has dis-
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that the imposition of the death penalty on a sixteen or seventeen-year-
old minor does not violate the Eighth Amendment.'55 Justice Scalia's
tanced itself from its position in Furman, where it held that a death penalty statute violated
the cruel and unusual punishments clause, and was therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 380.
Contra Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
In an article published just prior to the Stanford decision, one scholar criticized the use
of a "clear-cut 'bright-line' based on chronological age, separating those defendants who
may receive the death penalty from those who may not." Hoffmann, supra note 38, at 243.
While Hoffmann's opposition to a bright-line rule is based on his belief that age alone
cannot determine a capital criminal's suitability to receive a death sentence, Justice Scalia's
opposition to such a rule is based on his interpretation of the original meaning of the
Eighth Amendment. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 873-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
155. 492 U.S. at 380. As if to add salt to the wound inflicted on the Thompson plural-
ity, Justice Scalia's majority opinion uses the same statistical data relied upon by Justice
Stevens in his plurality opinion in Thompson to reach the opposite conclusion. Id. at 370-
77; see also supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Stevens' survey in
Thompson of state law on the execution of juveniles). Justice Scalia, in his dissenting opin-
ion in Thompson, criticized the conclusions drawn by Justice Stevens from that statistical
data. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 859-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But in his majority opinion in
Stanford, Justice Scalia based his conclusions on an even more selective interpretation of
the data. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370-77. Departing from his interpretation of the same data
in Thompson, Justice Scalia's opinion in Stanford excluded data from the 14 states and the
District of Columbia that did not employ capital punishment. Id. at 370 n.2; cf Thompson,
487 U.S. at 826-29 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) (using data from 14 "states," including
the District of Columbia, to establish the existence of a societal consensus against the im-
position of the death penalty on juveniles). By ignoring data from the 14 states and. the
District of Columbia that prohibited the death penalty, Justice Scalia's survey showed that
37 states permitted the death penalty, of which 15 explicitly declined to impose the sanc-
tion on 16-year-olds, while 12 states declined to impose it on 17-year-olds. Stanford, 492
U.S. at 370 n.2. Justice Scalia justified his decision to disregard those 14 states plus the
District of Columbia thus:
[wihile the number of those jurisdictions bears upon the question whether there is
a consensus against capital punishment altogether, it is quite irrelevant to the
specific inquiry in this case: whether there is a settled consensus in favor of pun-
ishing offenders under 18 differently from those over 18 insofar as capital punish-
ment is concerned. The dissent's position is rather like discerning a national
consensus that wagering on cockfights is inhumane by counting within that con-
sensus those States that bar all wagering.
Id.
Curiously, however, just one year earlier, in his dissenting opinion in Thompson, Justice
Scalia did not argue for the exclusion of data from the 14 "states," including the District of
Columbia, that had abolished the death penalty. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 859-78 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). Instead, Justice Scalia attempted to diminish the impact of that data by argu-
ing that those states only recently abolished the death penalty and, therefore, the trend
reflected a preference for "individualized sentencing determinations rather than automatic
death sentences." Id. at 870.
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, in which he was joined by Justices Marshall, Black-
mun, and Stevens, recorded the statistical data on state law in clear, unvarnished terms that
exposed the crude gerrymandering behind Justice Scalia's arithmetic. Stanford, 492 U.S. at
384-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated the position of the states directly:
I do not suggest ... that laws of these States cut against the constitutionality of
the juvenile death penalty-only that accuracy demands that the baseline for our
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majority opinion recognized the validity of the Trop benchmark. 156 Jus-
tice Scalia emphasized, however, that, in measuring the "evolving stan-
dards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," the true
benchmark is the standard of "modern American society as a whole.,
157
Reiterating his dissenting position in Thompson, Justice Scalia cautioned
against the use of either an individual justice's subjective views or the use
of the practices of other nations.
1 58
Justice O'Connor's change of position from Thompson to Stanford
provided the crucial vote resulting in the Court's about-face. 159 In
Thompson, Justice O'Connor argued that, although a national consensus
against the execution of juveniles probably existed, the evidence did not
clearly warrant its establishment as a principle of constitutional law. 6°
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment on the narrower ground that
the Oklahoma statute's failure to establish a minimum age for the appli-
cation of the death penalty for murder opened the door to the unconstitu-
deliberations should be that 27 States refuse to authorize a sentence of death in
the circumstances of petitioner Stanford's case ...; that 19 States have not
squarely faced the question; and that only the few remaining jurisdictions have
explicitly set an age below 18 at which a person may be sentenced to death.
Id. at 385. Incidentally, the discrepancy between the 14 "states" (including the District of
Columbia) cited in Thompson as prohibiting the death penalty, and the 14 states plus the
District of Columbia cited in Stanford may be attributable to the inclusion of Vermont in
the tally of death penalty opponents by Justice Brennan in his dissent in Stanford. See id.
at 384 n.1.
156. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369.
157. Id. (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). Justice Scalia argued that there
are two ways of measuring the standards of "modem American society as a whole." Id.
Justice Scalia first evaluated the various state legislatures' enactments of death penalty
statutes. Id. at 370-77. He found no clear trend toward abolition of the death penalty. Id.
Second, Justice Scalia considered the history of American society in general, and of the
Eighth Amendment in particular. Id. at 377-80. Again, he found no mandate or consensus
for prohibiting the use of the death penalty. Id.
158. Id.; cf Thompson, 487 U.S. at 864-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "the risk
of assessing evolving standards ['of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society']
is that it is all too easy to believe that evolution has culminated in one's own views").
Justice Scalia appeared to challenge the very basis of the Trop standard in his dissenting
opinion in Thompson. Id. In his majority opinion in Stanford, however, Justice Scalia did
not question the Trop standard itself, but merely its interpretation. Stanford, 492 U.S. at
369 (emphasizing that the Trop standard should be measured by the conceptions of de-
cency of "modem American society as a whole").
159. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 848 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Stanford, 492 U.S. at
380 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
160. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 848-49 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor
stated that "[a]lthough I believe that a national consensus forbidding the execution of any
person for a crime committed before the age of 16 very likely does exist, I am reluctant to
adopt this conclusion as a matter of constitutional law without better evidence than we
now possess." Id.
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tional execution of juveniles under fifteen years of age.' In Stanford,
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority that no national consensus
forbidding the execution of juveniles over sixteen years old existed.' 62
Justice O'Connor parted company with the majority, however, on the is-
sue of proportionality.
163
Justice Brennan's dissent examined the alternative view. 164 He argued
that the legislation and practices of other nations could assist our consti-
tutional interpretation in this area.165 Justice Brennan specifically cited
human rights treaties that the United States had ratified or signed that
either prohibit or express hostility toward the practice of executing
juveniles. 66 He took judicial notice of data showing that the United
States executes more juveniles than other nations.' 67 Justice Brennan
urged that the United States should not embrace the practice of executing
juveniles at a time when other nations were distancing themselves from
such a practice.' 68
c. The Proportionality Doctrine
Despite the historical role of proportionality analysis in Eighth
161. Id. at 857-59. Justice O'Connor stated that "I am prepared to conclude that peti-
tioner and others who were below the age of 16 at the time of their offense may not be
executed under the authority of a capital punishment statute that specifies no minimum
age at which the commission of a capital crime can lead to the offender's execution." Id. at
857-58. In other words, Justice O'Connor had sufficient confidence that a national consen-
sus existed to oppose the execution of 15-year-old juveniles, but that no such consensus
existed regarding 16-year-olds. Id.
162. 492 U.S. at 380-81 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
163. Id. at 382. Justice O'Connor argued that "there remains a constitutional obligation
imposed upon this Court to judge whether the 'nexus between the punishment imposed
and the defendant's blameworthiness' is proportional." Id. (quoting Enmund v. Florida,
458 U.S. 782, 825 (1982) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
164. Id. at 382-405 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 389-90.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 389. This is part of a broader international trend to repudiate the death
penalty. See John Pak, Canadian Extradition and the Death Penalty: Seeking a Constitu-
tional Assurance of Life, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 239, 239 nn.2-3 (1993) (listing 17 countries
that have abolished the death penalty for specific crimes and 44 other countries that have
abolished the punishment altogether); see also infra notes 376-85 and accompanying text
(discussing the United States' attachment of a reservation to its ratification of ICCPR to
permit the continued execution of 16 or 17-year-old juveniles in light of Stanford).
168. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 390 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's approach in
Stanford is consistent with the Court's majority opinion in Estelle v. Gamble, where the
Court cited, inter alia, United Nations' documents as an appropriate measure of the Trop
standard. Compare Stanford, 492 U.S. at 390 n.10 with Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-
04 n.8 (1976).
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Amendment jurisprudence, 169 the Supreme Court recently demonstrated
a reluctance to rely on the proportionality doctrine as a tool for interpret-
ing the Eighth Amendment.17 ° In Harmelin v. Michigan,'7' the Court
narrowed the proportionality doctrine.172  Although five justices sub-
scribed to the result of the case announced in Justice Scalia's opinion, the
Court was strongly divided as to its reasoning, and two of the majority's
justices joined Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion.1
73
Justice Kennedy distinguished his view of Eighth Amendment propor-
tionality analysis from that of Justice Scalia.174 Justice Kennedy argued
that "stare decisis counsels our adherence to the narrow proportionality
principle that has existed in our Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for 80
years.' 75  Justice Kennedy adapted a three-step test previously an-
nounced in Solem v. Helm.176 The first step considers the gravity of the
169. See supra notes 25-39 and accompanying text (discussing the establishment of the
proportionality doctrine in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910) and Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
170. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-96 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 288 (1983) (narrowing the scope of the proportionality doctrine in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence).
171. 501 U.S. 957 (1991). In Harmelin, the petitioner was convicted of possessing 672
grams of cocaine. Id. at 961 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). The Court held that a
mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole did not violate the
Eighth Amendment. Id. at 994-96.
172. Id. at 994-95. The proportionality doctrine is based on the belief that the punish-
ment should be commensurate to the crime for which the individual has been convicted.
Id.
173. Id. at 960. The majority comprised Justice Scalia, who announced the decision of
the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter.
Id. Justice Kennedy, however, wrote an opinion concurring in part, in which Justices
O'Connor and Souter joined. Id. Justices White, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun dis-
sented. Id.
174. Id. at 996-1009 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
175. Id. at 996. Justice Kennedy delineated a network of "common principles that give
content to the uses and limits of proportionality review." Id. at 998. Justice Kennedy
described these principles thus:
All of these principles-the primacy of the legislature, the variety of legitimate
penological schemes, the nature of our federal system, and the requirement that
proportionality review be guided by objective factors-inform the final one: The
Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and
sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are "grossly dispropor-
tionate" to the crime.
Id. at 1001 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288, 303 (1983)). For a more detailed
explanation of each of Justice Kennedy's principles, see id. at 998-1001.
176. 463 U.S. 277 (1983). In Solem, defendant Jerry Helm, whose record included six
nonviolent felonies, was convicted in a South Dakota state court of uttering a "no account"
check for $100. Id. at 279-83. Although ordinarily this offense would attract a maximum
punishment of five years' imprisonment and a $5,000 fine, based on the defendant's feloni-
ous history, he was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Id. at
282-83. The defendant brought a habeas corpus action, contending that his sentence con-
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offense for which the defendant was convicted and the harshness of the
penalty imposed.' 77 If the court finds an inference of gross dispropor-
tionality, it then considers the second step, which asks whether crimes of
equal or greater gravity are subject to the same penalty in that jurisdic-
tion.178 The third step repeats the inquiry of the second step, but seeks
comparisons with other jurisdictions. 179 Applying the test to Harmelin's
case, Justice Kennedy concluded that the sentence that the Michigan
court imposed was valid under the first step of the test, thus obviating the
need for any comparative analysis under the second and third steps.'
80
Justice Scalia, in a portion of his opinion joined by only Chief Justice
Rehnquist, directly attacked the proportionality doctrine.18 1 Justice
Scalia argued that Harmelin's sentence did not violate the Eighth
Amendment on proportionality grounds because the Eighth Amendment
contains no guarantee of proportionality."s Justice Scalia noted that the
Eighth Amendment does not contain textual or historical references to
proportionality.1 83 In the absence of such a specific proportionality re-
stituted cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
at 283. The United States District Court for the District of South Dakota denied relief, but
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. Id. The Supreme
Court affirmed and held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentences that are dispro-
portionate to the crime committed. Id. at 284. Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion
on behalf of Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Id. at 279. Chief Justice
Burger's dissenting opinion was joined by Justices White, Rehnquist, and O'Connor. Id.
177. Id. at 291.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 291-92.
180. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004-05 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy's test
differs from the Solem test in that Justice Kennedy considers the first step a threshold
question. Id. If the defendant prevails on this question, the inquiry proceeds to the second
and third steps. Id. at 1005. If, however, the defendant fails to establish an inference of
gross disproportionality at the first step, then the inquiry is terminated. Id. Justice Ken-
nedy, at the first step of the test, concluded that "[t]he severity of petitioner's crime brings
his sentence within the constitutional boundaries established by our prior decisions." Id. at
1004. Rejecting the petitioner's demands for "comparative analysis between petitioner's
sentence and sentences imposed for other crimes in Michigan and sentences imposed for
the same crime in other jurisdictions," Justice Kennedy added that "[g]iven the serious
nature of petitioner's crime, no such comparative analysis is necessary." Id. Justice Ken-
nedy continued that "intrajurisdictional and interjurisdictional analyses are appropriate
only in the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the
sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality," and that "[t]he proper
role for comparative analysis of sentences, then, is to validate an initial judgment that a
sentence is grossly disproportionate to a crime." Id at 1005.
181. Id. at 962-65 (Scalia, J.).
182. Id. at 990.
183. Id. at 975-85. Justice Scalia recognized that the origins of the Eighth Amendment
lie in the English Bill of Rights of 1689, which prohibited "cruell and unusuall [sic] punish-
ments." Id. at 966. Justice Scalia, however, could discern no incorporation of a guarantee
of proportionality in the English Bill of Rights. Id. at 966-67. Justice Scalia argued that
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quirement, Justice Scalia concluded that the length of sentence imposed
for a particular category of felony is a matter of legislative prerogative."8 4
Justice White, in his dissenting opinion, argued that a proportionality
doctrine exists and must be incorporated into Eighth Amendment analy-
sis.' 85 Justice White identified two weaknesses in Justice Scalia's ap-
proach. First, by disregarding all forms of proportionality analysis, the
Scalia approach fails to provide any restraint on even the most egre-
giously disproportionate sentences.1 86 Second, Justice White argued that,
by eliminating proportionality analysis, Justice Scalia undermined the
foundation that the Court had established to justify the constitutionality
of the death penalty.1
8 7
Justice White took issue with Justice Scalia's reliance on, and interpre-
the English Bill of Rights was aimed at restricting the King's Bench from imposing arbi-
trary sentences. Id. at 967-74. In other words, the English Bill of Rights was concerned
with illegal sentences, but not with disproportionate sentences. Id.
Justice Scalia concluded that the Framers of the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution shared the English concern with preventing illegal sentences, but failed to
incorporate an explicit guarantee against disproportionate sentences. Id. at 975-85. Justice
Scalia reasoned that this lack of a textual or historical frame of reference means that mod-
ern judges lack any standard by which to measure disproportionality. Id. at 985-90. Justice
Scalia argued that the first two of the Solem factors cannot be judged by objective criteria,
and that judges who seek to apply these two factors inevitably must succumb to the appli-
cation of their own subjective values. Id. at 987-89. Justice Scalia acknowledged that the
third Solem factor can be clearly and easily applied, but he discounted it as being irrelevant
to Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 989.
In Solem, the Court recognized a proportionality principle under the Eighth Amend-
ment, but Justice Scalia argued that "Solem was simply wrong; the Eighth Amendment
contains no proportionality guarantee." Id. at 965. Justice Scalia would reduce the Solem
inquiry to just one question: whether a punishment is "cruel and unusual" under a histori-
cal interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 994-95. Justice Kennedy disagreed
with Justice Scalia on this point, arguing that the Eighth Amendment does allow for a
"narrow proportionality principle." Id. at 996 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice White, in
his dissenting opinion, criticized both Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia for respectively
seeking to narrow and eviscerate Solem's guarantee of proportionality. Id. at 1018 (White,
J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 996 (Scalia, J.).
185. Id. at 1009-27 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White argued that, although the lan-
guage of the Eighth Amendment does not include reference to proportionality, the Court's
longstanding trend has been to incorporate the proportionality doctrine into its Eighth
Amendment decisions. Id. at 1009-12. Justice White also cited the Trop standard as play-
ing a part in the objective element of the Solem proportionality test. Id. at 1015.
186. Id. at 1018. Justice White derided Justice Scalia's approach for failing to combat a
hypothetical situation in which "a legislature makes overtime parking a felony punishable
by life imprisonment." Id.
187. Id. Justice White explained that:
Justice Scalia's position that the Eighth Amendment addresses only modes or
methods of punishment is quite inconsistent with our capital punishment cases,
which do not outlaw death as a mode or method of punishment, but instead put
limits on its application. If the concept of proportionality is downgraded in the
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tation of, original history.188 Both Justice Scalia and Justice White agreed
that the Eighth Amendment's origins lie in the English Bill of Rights of
1689.189 Justice White, however, argued that the Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Clause of the English Bill of Rights intended to serve two pur-
poses: to prevent the imposition of non-statutory punishments, and to
reflect a policy against disproportionate punishments.' 9 ° In contrast, Jus-
tice Scalia reasoned that, although the English may have had a policy
against disproportionality, that policy was not reflected in the English Bill
of Rights.19'
B. Review of Decisions Applying the International Standard
Decisions of the European Commission of Human Rights [European
Commission] and the European Court of Human Rights [European
Court] provide useful sources of interpretation of the international stan-
dard.192 In addition, decisions of the United Nations Human Rights
Eighth Amendment calculus, much of this Court's capital penalty jurisprudence
will rest on quicksand.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
188. Id. at 1011 & n.1. Justice White was not satisfied by Justice Scalia's or Justice
Kennedy's approach. Id. at 1018. "While Justice Scalia seeks to deliver a swift death sen-
tence to Solem, Justice Kennedy prefers to eviscerate it, leaving only an empty shell." Id.
(emphasis omitted). One scholar stated that "[a]lthough Harmelin did not expressly over-
rule Solem ... it appears to have done so sub silentio." Sherry F. Colb, Freedom From
Incarceration: Why Is This Right Different From All Other Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781,
783 n.9 (1994).
189. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 966-75 (Scalia, J.) (arguing that the Eighth Amendment
derives from the prohibition of the English Bill of Rights of 1689 against "cruell and
unusuall [sic] [p]unishments"; id. at 1011 n.1 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that both he
and Justice Scalia agree that the Eighth Amendment's origins lie in the English Bill of
Rights).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 975 n.5 (Scalia, J.). The debate between Justice Scalia and Justice White
over the original history of the Eighth Amendment focuses substantially on one particular,
much-quoted law review article. See Anthony F. Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Pun-
ishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969). Granucci's thesis is
that the Framers of the Eighth Amendment misinterpreted the English Bill of Rights of
1689. Id. at 839.
192. See infra notes 194-250 and accompanying text (describing and analyzing decisions
under the European Convention). For a detailed explanation of the procedures and imple-
mentation of the European Convention, see VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 15; THE
EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Ronald St. J. Macdonald et
al. eds., 1993); L.J. CLEMENTS, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS: TAKING A CASE UNDER THE
CONVENTION (1994); RALPH BEDDARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EUROPE (3d ed. 1993);
J.E.S. FAwcEr, THE APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
(1987); FRANCIS G. JACOBS, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1975);
HUMAN RIGHTS IN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (A.H. Robertson ed., 1968);
A.H. Robertson, The European Convention on Human Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 99 (Evan Luard ed., 1967).
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By July 28, 1994, a total of 30 nations ratified the European Convention. Chart of Ratifi-
cations of the ECHR, 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 114 (1994) (providing a chart of ratifications of the
European Convention and additional Protocols). When a state ratifies the Convention, it
accepts the jurisdiction of the European Commission of Human Rights to receive com-
plaints from other States parties, alleging that it has violated the Convention. European
Convention, supra note 15, art. 24. The Commission comprises 21 members, each elected
for a six-year period by the Committee of Ministers. See id. art. 20-22. Members of the
Commission serve in a personal capacity. Id. art. 23. The Committee of Ministers, the
governing body of the Council of Europe, retains authority to decide cases not presented
to the Commission and to execute judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. Id.
arts. 32, 54.
An individual may bring a private petition against a State party, alleging a violation of
the Convention, provided that state has recognized the right of the Commission to enter-
tain private petitions against it. Id. art. 25(1). This requires a special declaration by the
State party. Id. "By 1993 ... 28 of 32 Council of Europe member-states had recognized
the Court's jurisdiction and the same 28 states had ratified the European Convention."
NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 3, at Supp. 116.
The Convention attaches certain conditions to the admissibility of private petitions:
(a) The petitioner must be a "victim of the violation." European Convention, supra note
15, art. 25(1).
(b) The petition must not be "incompatible with the provisions of the present Conven-
tion, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of petition." Id. art. 27(2); see also
Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991), reprinted in 12 HUM. RTs. L.J.
142, 153 (1991) (ruling that extradition could proceed where petitioner failed to establish
"[s]ubstantial ground" to believe that his return to Chile would expose him to a real risk of
being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment).
(c) The petitioner must have exhausted all available domestic remedies. European Con-
vention, supra note 15, art. 27(3). Under extreme circumstances, however, the exhaustion
requirement may be waived. See Aksoy v. Turkey, (Decision on admissibility of 19 Oct.
1994, App. No. 21987/93), reprinted in 15 HUM. Rrs. L.J. 394, 398 (1994) (waiving require-
ment to exhaust all domestic remedies where applicant, having filed a complaint with a
prosecutor, was threatened and subsequently died in unexplained circumstances); Akduvar
et al. v. Turkey, (Decision on admissibility of 19 Oct. 1994, App. No. 21893/93), reprinted in
15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 399, 403 (1994) (ruling that petitioners who alleged that government
soldiers destroyed their village and forced them to evacuate did not need to exhaust do-
mestic remedies that the Commission found "lack[ed] the requisite accessibility and
effectiveness").
The Commission generally seeks to "place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned
with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of respect for
Human Rights as defined in this Convention." European Convention, supra note 15, art.
28(b). Such a settlement might involve a State party agreeing to pay compensation or
make other restitution, but usually is conditioned on the State party's refusal to admit that
a violation occurred. See, e.g., Amekrane v. United Kingdom, 16 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R.
356 (1973) (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.). In Amekrane, following an application to the Com-
mission, the United Kingdom paid Sterling 37,500 to the widow of Lieutenant-Colonel
Amekrane of the Moroccan army. Rita Maran, Against Torture - Three Spheres of Law, 4
HUM. RTs. REv. 85, 88 (1979). Amekrane had been extradited from Gibraltar to Morocco
where he was convicted of attempting to assassinate the King of Morocco. Amekrane, 16
Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 358-60. Amekrane subsequently was executed. Id. at 366. On
payment of the settlement, the Commission was not required to issue a report. Maran,
supra, at 88; see also Diaz Ruano v. Spain, 285-B Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994), reprinted in
15 HUM. RTS. L. J. 211, 211 (1994) (following a European Commission decision in favor of
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Committee [UNHRC] also offer interpretive guidance.' 93
1. Decisions under the European Convention
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms [European Convention] states that "[n]o one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment."' 94 The landmark case defining torture under article 3 was the
Greek Case,'9 5 in which the European Commission established a defini-
tion of torture that broadly conformed to the United Nations' definition
under Resolution 3452.196 Since the Greek Case, however, the European
petitioner, the parties reached a friendly settlement). If settlement efforts fail, then the
Commission will compile a report. European Convention, supra note 15, art. 31(1). The
Commission's report sets forth the facts of the case and an opinion as to whether a viola-
tion of the Convention has occurred. Id. Once the report is compiled, it is submitted to
the Committee of Ministers. Id. art. 31(2). If the parties decline to refer the case to the
European Court of Human Rights, the Committee must decide whether a violation of.the
Convention has occurred. Id. art. 32(1), The court comprises the "number of judges equal
to that of the Members of the Council of Europe." Id. art. 38. Each judge is elected to
serve a nine-year term by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe from a list
of three nominees submitted by each Member State of the Council. Id. art. 39(1), 40(1).
The Committee of Ministers is empowered to enforce judgments of the court. Id. art. 54.
This may take the form of money damages, an order that the offending state reform its
conduct to conform with the Convention, or some combination of these. See id. art. 50; see
also VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF, supra note 15, at 171-85 (discussing the award of compensa-
tion under article 50).
The requirement that cases reach the European Court of Human Rights only on referral
from the European Commission increases the likelihood that individual cases may fall prey
to political forces or bureaucratic inertia. See, e.g., East African Asians v. United King-
dom, App. Nos. 4403/70-4419/70,4422/70, 4423/70, 4434/70, 4443/70, 4476/70-4478/70,4486/
70, 4501/70, 4526/70-4530/70, 78-A, 31 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 76 (1973), reprinted
in 15 HUM. RTs. L.J. 215 (1994). In East African Asians, the Commission heard the case in
1973 and expressed the view that article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights
had been violated. Id. However, neither the Commission nor the United Kingdom gov-
ernment referred the case to the European Court of Human Rights. Id. When the case
failed to attract the necessary two-thirds vote at the Committee of Ministers, it was "re-
moved from the Committee of Ministers' agenda." Id. The Commission report was pub-
lished over twenty years later, in March 1994. Id.
The tripartite structure of the Commission, the Committee of Ministers, and the Euro-
pean Court is in the process of being replaced by a single European Court of Human.
Rights. See infra note 196 (discussing the recent adoption of Protocol No. 11 to the Euro-
pean Convention, aimed at creating a single European Court of Human Rights to adjudi-
cate all claims under the Convention).
193. See infra notes 251-89 and accompanying text (discussing decisions and procedures
of the UNHRC).
194. European Convention, supra note 15, art. 3.
195. Greek Case, 12 Y.B. Eur. Conv. On H.R. 1 (1969) (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
196. Resolution 3452, supra note 14. The Commission's report in the Greek Case
stated that "[i]t is plain that there may be treatment to which all these descriptions apply,
for all torture must be inhuman and degrading treatment, and inhuman treatment also
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Commission and the European Court developed definitional distinctions
between the concept of torture and the lesser, yet still significant, concept
of "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.'
'1 97
In Ireland v. United Kingdom,198 the European Court considered
whether British authorities' treatment of detainees in Northern Ireland
violated article 3V99 The court specifically considered five techniques
degrading." Greek Case, 12 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 186. More specifically, the Com-
mission described inhuman treatment as "such treatment as deliberately causes severe suf-
fering, mental or physical, which, in the particular situation, is unjustifiable." Id. One
author suggested that the only significant distinction between the United Nations and Eu-
ropean Union definitions is the absence in the United Nations definition of the element of
justifiability. Maran, supra note 192, at 87.
197. See, e.g., Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 66-67 (1978)
(defining "torture"); Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1989)
(defining "degrading treatment or punishment"); Tyrer v. Isle of Man, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 14-17 (1978) (defining "degrading treatment").
Under a protocol signed in May, 1994, States parties to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms have agreed to replace the pres-
ent system with one that incorporates the Court and the Commission into a single Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights. Council of Europe: Explanatory Report and Protocol No. 11
to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Restruc-
turing the Control Machinery Established Thereby, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 943, 960 (1994)
[hereinafter Explanatory Report], signed May 11, 1994 (all but one of the 32 member states
of the Council of Europe signed the Protocol). See Kevin Boyle, Book Review, 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 241 (1995) (reviewing THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS (Ronald St. J. Macdonald et al. eds., 1993)) (describing the impact of the proposed
unified structure as enabling the individual to "have direct access to an international court
to complain about violation of a Convention right").
The Explanatory Report issued by the Council of Europe describes how the tripartite
system (incorporating the Commission, the Committee of Ministers, and the Court) origi-
nally was created to combat the threat of frivolous litigation and to prevent the political
manipulation of the Court. Explanatory Report, supra, at 946.
The Explanatory Report documents how the growth of the volume of cases lodged with
the Commission, partly a result of the increasing number of States parties to the Conven-
tion, stimulated the impetus for a unified structure pursuant to Protocol No. 11. Id. at 948
(explaining that "[t]he number of applications registered with-the Commission has in-
creased from 404 in 1981 to 2,037 in 1993"). The Explanatory Report recognizes that
"[tihe backlog of cases before the Commission is considerable." Id. The Explanatory Re-
port acknowledges that "it takes on average over 5 years for a case to be finally determined
by the Court or the Committee of Ministers." Id. The Explanatory Report concludes that
"[tihe reform proposed is thus principally aimed at restructuring the system, so as to
shorten the length of Strasbourg proceedings. There is need for a supervising machinery
that can work efficiently and at acceptable costs even with forty member States and which
can maintain the authority and quality of the case-law in the future." Id. at 948-49. The
Explanatory Report provides a detailed description of the main features of the new system
under Protocol No. 11. Id. at 949-51. See also 15 HUM. RTS. L.J. 81 (1994) (reproducing
both Protocol No. 11 and the Explanatory Report, and containing a chart of ratifications
by member states of the European Convention and additional Protocols).
198. 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
199. Id. at 25. The government of Ireland initially lodged an application with the Euro-
pean Commission alleging that the British authorities had violated article 3. Id. The Com-
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that the British authorities used on Irish detainees. 200 The court first
agreed with the European Commission that, to trigger article 3, alleged
violations must attain a "minimum level of severity. '201  The court then
explained the difference between torture and inhuman or degrading
treatment as a matter of degree reflected by the intensity of the suffering
inflicted.202 The court interpreted torture as attaching a particular stigma
to "deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffer-
ing. '' 203 The court explained that, in assessing evidence of a possible arti-
cle 3 violation, all facts and circumstances must be taken into account.20 4
The court held that although the five techniques did not amount to
torture, they did constitute inhuman or degrading treatment, and as such
violated article 3. l °5 The court's opinion suggested that the totality of all
mission filed a report. 19 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 512 (1976) (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
The Irish government then referred the case to the European Court of Human Rights.
Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 25.
200. The Court cited the Commission's description of the five techniques of British
authorities that were at issue in the Ireland Case. Id. at 41. These techniques comprised:
(a) "wall-standing" (forcing detainees to stand for hours at a time spread-eagled against a
wall); (b) "hooding" (putting a bag over detainees' head and leaving it there at all times
except during interrogation); (c) "subjection to noise" (detainees were kept in a room with
a loud and continuous hissing noise); (d) sleep deprivation: and (e) "deprivation of food
and drink." Id.
201. Id. at 65. The Commission report, citing the Greek Case, distinguished article 3
violations from other cases involving "a certain roughness of treatment." Ireland, 19 Y.B.
Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 748 (citing the Greek Case, 12 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 1 (1969)
(Eur. Comm'n on H.R.)). The Commission stipulated that the minimum level of severity
may vary between different nations and even between different sections of a society. Id.
The court emphasized that the relative nature of this standard requires an examination of
the totality of the circumstances of a particular case. Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 65; see
also Maran, supra note 192, at 87.
202. Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 66.
203. Id. In support of its definition of torture, the Court cited Resolution 3452, stating
that "[tiorture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form of cruel, inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment." Resolution 3452, supra note 14, art. 1.
204. Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 65. Rita Maran argues that "[wihile there is no ques-
tion about the absolute nature of the prohibition contained in Article 3, the notion of
torture or inhuman treatment is not absolute." Maran, supra note 192, at 87. Maran ar-
gues that the distinction between an absolute and a relative definition of torture explains
the difference of opinion between the European Commission and the European Court in
the Ireland Case. Id. The Commission adopted an absolutist definition, but the Court
rejected this in favor of a relativist approach. Id. at 87-88. Maran argues that in establish-
ing that torture has occurred, "[t]he severity of suffering is a crucial element, as is its pur-
pose, and both are necessarily subject to interpretation, when an assessment of torture
needs to be made." Id. Maran also argues that the Commission's decision in Amekrane
used a relativist approach to the determination of inhuman treatment. Id. Maran con-
cludes that the differences of interpretation prompted by such a relative definition create
considerable difficulties for the victim who seeks to establish a claim of torture under arti-
cle 3. Id. at 88-89.
205. Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 66. The Commission found that the treatment of de-
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five techniques combined to establish an article 3 violation.20 6 It is by no
means certain that any one of these forms of treatment alone would be
sufficient.2 °7
The Ireland Case provides an illustration of the broader scope of pro-
tection available under the international standard as opposed to the
Eighth Amendment of the United States' Constitution. First, the Ireland
Case concerned treatment, 20 8 rather than punishment.20 9 A petitioner
bringing a factually similar claim under United States law would be un-
able to rely on the Eighth Amendment, which prohibits only "cruel and
unusual punishments. 21 ° Second, by differentiating between torture and
inhuman or degrading treatment, article 3 protects against a spectrum of
treatments or punishments once the "minimum level of severity" is estab-
lished.2 u' By contrast, under the Eighth Amendment, a minimum thresh-
old applies.212 But if, for example, the Supreme Court considered "cruel
and unusual punishments ' 213 analogous to torture, then "inhuman or de-
grading ... punishment" 214 might fail to pass the Eighth Amendment's
tainees constituted torture under article 3, but the court disagreed, and availed itself of the




208. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (noting that, while the Commission
ruled that the detainees' treatment constituted torture, the Court defined it as inhuman or
degrading treatment).
209. Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 10. The detainees in the Ireland Case were held under
"a series of extrajudicial powers of arrest, detention and internment." Id. These powers
enabled the British authorities to hold a suspect for 48 hours without issuing charges. Id.
at 32 (citing Regulation 10, Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland)
(1971)). Furthermore, under Regulation 12(1) of the same statute, the British authorities
could, at their discretion, hold a detainee for an unlimited period of time. Id. at 34-35.
These emergency measures were enacted as a specific response to the Irish Republican
Army's terrorist campaign in Northern Ireland. Id. at 10. Since no court had convicted the
detainees of any crime, any deprivations must be termed as treatment, rather than punish-
ment. See infra note 291 and accompanying text (noting the distinction between treatment
and punishment).
210. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Of course, this hypothetical petitioner could base his
claim on other constitutional provisions or on statutory law. See U.S. CONST. amends. V,
XIV (Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-97 (1971) (ruling that, under the
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, individuals may recover damages against federal offi-
cials who violate their constitutional rights).
211. Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 65.
212. See Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1973 (1994) (reiterating the holding in
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), requiring a plaintiff to show that the injury
suffered is "sufficiently serious" to trigger an Eighth Amendment inquiry).
213. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
214. European Convention, supra note 15, art. 3.
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minimum threshold.2" 5 Third, the Ireland Case recognized that article 3
protects against the psychological impact of treatment while in detention,
although the court did not premise its decision on this form of viola-
tion.2 t6 The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has not clearly estab-
lished the Eighth Amendment's applicability to cases of psychological
harm.217
A recent decision of the European Court clarified the "minimum level
of severity" threshold requirement for bringing an article 3 claim of "in-
human or degrading treatment. '2 18  Tomasi v. France2 19 concerned a
French national detained by French authorities for over five years before
he was finally acquitted.22' Tomasi brought an article 3 action, alleging
that French authorities had beaten and mistreated him while in deten-
* 221tion. 1 The European Court found that, despite evidence of only slight
physical injuries, the requisite "minimum level of severity" of ill-treat-
ment had occurred.222 The court recognized that where a detainee suffers
physical injuries while in custody, absent evidence to the contrary, an in-
ference exists that the detaining authorities bear responsibility for those
injuries.22 a
In 1978, the European Court decided Tyrer v. Isle of Man,224 and fur-
ther clarified the meaning of the "degrading punishment" language of
article 3. In Tyrer, a fifteen-year-old minor appealed his assault convic-
215. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 305-06 (1991) (emphasizing that a petitioning
prisoner must pass a minimum threshold, which, for example, "mere negligence" would
not satisfy, but failing to define that threshold).
216. Ireland, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 66-67. The court recognized that the detainees had
suffered "degrading treatment" in violation of article 3. Id. at 67.
217. See Farmer, 114 S. Ct. at 1986-89 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (discussing the appli-
cability of the Eighth Amendment to cases of psychological mistreatment). The Supreme
Court has recognized that the Eighth Amendment protects individuals from one form of
punishment that the Court characterized as psychological: depriving the offender of his
citizenship. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S 86, 101 (1958); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 273
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Trop, 356 U.S. at 101, characterizing expatriation
as "punishment more primitive than torture"). Justice Brennan argued that it is the enor-
mity of the deprivation involved in expatriation that violates the Eighth Amendment. Id.
218. Tomasi v. France, 241 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 41-42 (1993).
219. 241 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993).
220. Id. at 34. Tomasi, a French national, was arrested and charged with a number of
serious criminal offenses, including murder. Id. at 13. He was detained for a total of five
years and seven months, after which he was finally acquitted. Id. at 34.
221. Id. at 32.
222. Id. at 41-42. The Commission emphasized that its assessment was dependent on
all of the factors in the case, including the length of Tomasi's detention without conviction,
the nature and context of the treatment, and its physical and mental effects. Id. at 50.
223. Id. at 52.
224. T yrer v. Isle of Man, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 17 (1978).
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tion to the European Commission alleging an article 3 violation.225
Under Manx226 law, the appellant was sentenced to three strokes of a
birch.227 The court held that the punishment that the appellant suffered
was neither torture nor inhuman punishment under article 3.228 The
court, however, ruled that it did constitute "degrading punishment," in
violation of article 3.229 The court defined "degrading" as more than just
humiliating. 23° The court though did recognize that the mere fact of
criminal conviction may be humiliating.23' The punishment specifically
may be intended to inflict humiliation on the offender to provide an effec-
tive deterrent.232 The court declared that a punishment that violates arti-
cle 3, however, cannot be justified solely on the basis of its deterrent
effect.2 33 When humiliation is sufficiently severe, it may cross the thresh-
old into a violation of article 3's prohibition against degrading
punishment.234
225. Id. at 14. The applicant "pleaded guilty before the local juvenile court to unlawful
assault occasioning actual bodily harm to a senior pupil at his school." Id. at 6.
226. The term "Manx" refers to "the people of the Isle of Man." WEBSTER'S NEW
WORLD DiCrIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH 825 (3d ed. 1991).
227. Tyrer, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 6. Police officers carried out the sentence in a police
station. Id. at 7. The appellant was required to drop his trousers and underwear. Id. Two
officers held the appellant while a third administered the blows. Id. The birch broke into
pieces after the first stroke. Id. The birch raised the appellant's skin, but did not cut it. Id.
The appellant's father and a doctor witnessed the birching. Id. The father had to be re-
strained from attacking one of the police officers. Id. The appellant was sore for about 10
days afterwards. Id.
228. Id. at 14.
229. Id. at 17.
230. Id. at 15; see also East African Asians v. United Kingdom, Eur. Comm'n H.R.
Dec. & Rep. 5, 62 (1994) (ruling. that "discrimination based on race could, in certain cir-
cumstances, of itself amount to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3").
231. Tyrer, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 15. The court stated that "in most if not all cases this
may be one of the effects of judicial punishment, involving as it does unwilling subjection
to the demands of the penal system." Id.
232. Id. The court explained that "what is relevant for the purposes of Article 3 is that
he should be humiliated not simply by his conviction but by the execution of the punish-
ment which is imposed on him." Id.
233. Id. (cautioning that "it is never permissible to have recourse to punishments which
are contrary to Article 3, whatever their deterrent effect may be").
234. Id. The Tyrer court concluded that a determination of whether a punishment is
"degrading" under article 3 requires an examination of the facts and circumstances of the
individual case. Id. This may be vague but it is at least consistent with the court's ap-
proach to defining torture in the Ireland Case. Id.; cf Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 66-67 (1978). The Tyrer court also emphasized that this assessment
must be conducted in the context of "present-day conditions." 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at
15. Here, the court took notice of evidence that the Manx birching laws were under legis-
lative review. Id. at 16. The court also noted that birching is no longer part of "commonly
accepted standards in the penal policy of the member States of the Council of Europe."
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The Manx Attorney General argued that the punishment was not de-
grading because it was carried out in private and it preserved the appel-
lant's anonymity.z35 The court rejected this argument, ruling that
degradation may be a purely personal phenomenon. 36 The court stated
that one of article 3's main purposes is to protect the individual's physical
integrity and personal dignity.2 37 The violation of article 3 in Tyrer was
235. Tyrer, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 16.
236. Id. (explaining that "it may well suffice that the victim is humiliated in his own
eyes, even if not in the eyes of others"). The court clearly was influenced by the fact that
the punishment was administered to the appellant's "bare posterior," and by the "mental
anguish" that the appellant suffered as he awaited punishment. Id. at 17.
Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice dissented in Tyrer, arguing that the offender's punishment
could not be considered degrading. Id. at 29-30 (Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting). Judge Fitz-
maurice, arguing that the majority failed to appreciate the context of the punishment in
Tyrer, cited Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976). Handyside
held that sex literature, which would be considered innocuous when distributed to adults,
became offensive if distributed to minors. Tyrer, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 22 (Fitzmaurice, J.,
dissenting). Judge Fitzmaurice, using what might be termed a 'reverse-Handyside' argu-
ment, concluded that the punishment in Tyrer might be degrading if inflicted on an adult,
but involved no such degradation for a child. Id. at 30. Judge Fitzmaurice drew a curious
analogy between degradation and condescension when he reasoned that "[pleople would
not call a grown man 'Sonny' or pat him on the head as they would a child or youth, and
without causing any resentment." Id. at 30 n.8.
Judge Fitzmaurice interpreted the majority's holding to mean that "any judicial corporal
punishment meted out to a juvenile is degrading and a breach of article 3." Id. at 30.
However, Judge Fitzmaurice fundamentally misinterpreted the majority's position. The
Tyrer holding is not based on the conclusion that birching per se is degrading. Rather, the
Court concluded that particular aspects of the procedure used to effect the punishment
were degrading under article 3. Id. at 16-17.
237. Tyrer, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 16-17. The Tyrer holding stands in marked contrast to
the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977). In
Ingraham, two pupils at a Florida public junior high school filed suit under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981-1988 for damages and injunctive and declaratory relief against school officials, al-
leging that the infliction of corporal punishment upon the students pursuant to a Florida
statute violated their constitutional rights. Id. at 653-57. Justice Powell's majority opinion
ruled that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not
apply to disciplinary corporal punishment in public schools. Id. at 668-71. Furthermore,
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court ruled that the
students were not entitled to notice or a hearing prior to the infliction of corporal punish-
ment. Id. at 672-82. The Court reasoned that, if the punishment was excessive, the stu-
dents could seek civil damages in tort. Id. at 676-80. The Court noted that "[t]he
schoolchild has little need for the protection of the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 670. While
recognizing that the students had suffered harsh treatment, the Court stated that "such
mistreatment is an aberration." Id. at 677.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has sought to mitigate the
harshness of the Supreme Court's position in Ingraham. See Doe v. Taylor Indep. Sch.
Dist., 15 F.3d 443 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 70 (1994). In Doe, a 15 year-old school-
girl was subjected to persistent sexual harassment by one of her teachers, which culminated
in sexual intercourse. Id. at 445. The fifth circuit ruled that the girl's rights, under the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, as well as under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, had been
violated. Id. at 451-52, 54. The court reasoned that the compulsory nature of school at-
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not in the physical element of the birching, but in the psychological deg-
radation inflicted.238
In Soering v. United Kingdom,2 39 the European Court ruled that under
article 3, a citizen of the Federal Republic of Germany could not be ex-
tendance conferred a duty on school officials to take reasonable steps to protect students
from harm. Id. at 452-54. The court therefore concluded that a school official may be
liable for an injury suffered by a student while attending school if the official failed to take
reasonable measures to prevent that injury. Id. at 454. See also Robert C. Slim, Comment,
The Special Relationship Doctrine and a School Official's Duty to Protect Students From
Harm, 46 BAYLOR L. REv. 215, 229-30 (1994) (arguing that the applicable standard for
determining official liability is deliberate indifference). The Doe holding follows a broader
line of Supreme Court cases which have imputed civil liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to
officials, in spheres other than the public school, on the grounds of deliberate indifference.
See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-08 (1976) (applying the deliberate indiffer-
ence theory of liability to imprisonment cases); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-16
(1982) (applying the theory to cases of medical and psychological institutionalization). ,
238. 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 16-17. The Tyrer case has been cited in two recent cases before
the European Commission of Human Rights involving the corporal punishment of
juveniles in secondary schools in the United Kingdom. The cases of X & Y v. United
Kingdom, (App. No. 14229/88, Dec. 13, 1990) and Wendy & Jeremy Costello-Roberts v.
United Kingdom (App. No. 13134/87, Dec. 13, 1990) were both decided on the same day.
In both cases, a mother and son brought an article 3 action after a private school inflicted
corporal punishment on the son. X & Y v. United Kingdom, Eur. Comm'n H.R., Dec. 13,
1990, reprinted in 12 HUM. Rrs. L.J. 61 (1991); Wendy & Jeremy Costello-Roberts v.
United Kingdom, 67 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 216, 221-22 (1991).
In X & Y, the applicant alleged that he was caned through his trousers four times, with
the teacher taking a running approach prior to striking the blows (although the govern-
ment denied this). X & Y, 12 HUM. RTs. L.J. at 61. A doctor testified that the boy had
"four ... painful wheals across both buttocks, showing heavy bruising and swelling." Id.
The school inflicted the punishment due to the boy's " 'wanton vandalism.' " Id. In the
Costello-Roberts case, the "headmaster called the second applicant into his study and hit
him three times on his bottom, through his shorts, with a rubber soled gym shoe." 67 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 218.
Having exhausted their domestic remedies, the applicants had to establish a cause of
action against the United Kingdom government for the actions of an independent private
school. X & Y, 12 HUM. RTS. L.J. at 62; Costello-Roberts, 67 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. &
Rep. at 222-23. The Commission found that, under article 1 of the Convention, Con-
tracting States have an obligation to ensure that children within their jurisdiction are not
subjected to article 3 violations. X & Y, 12 HUM. RTs. L. at 62; Costello-Roberts, 67 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 222. Further, the Commission noted that, because in-
dependent schools are regulated by statute, government accountability existed. X & Y, 12
HUM. Rrs. L.J. at 62; Costello-Roberts, 67 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 223.
In both cases, the Commission dismissed the claims of the mothers on grounds that a
contract existed between school and parent and that, since the mothers knew, or should
have known of, the schools' policies regarding corporal punishment, they were estopped
from pursuing an article 3 claim. X & Y, 12 HUM. Rrs. L.J. at 63; Costello-Roberts, 67 Eur.
Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 223-24. The Commission ruled, however, that the two boys
did have grounds to pursue their claims and remanded the two cases for a determination of
whether "degrading treatment" had occurred under the Tyrer standard. X & Y, 12 HUM.
Rrs. L.J. at 63; Costello-Roberts, 67 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 224.
239. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
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tradited to Virginia to face a trial where, if convicted, he could receive
capital punishment.24 ° The decision was not premised on the threat of
the death penalty per se, but on the prospect that the applicant would
have to endure a long wait on death row:241 the so-called death row
240. Id. at 30-31. Jens Soering, a German national born in 1966, had been living in the
United States since he was eleven years old. Id. at 11-16. He enrolled at the University of
Virginia in 1984 where he developed a relationship with a fellow student, Elizabeth
Haysom. Id. at 11. Ms. Haysom's parents strongly opposed this relationship. Id. The
prosecution alleged that Soering and Ms. Haysom devised a plot to kill Ms. Haysom's
parents. Id. On March 30, 1985, Soering drove by himself to the Haysom's house, where
he got involved in an argument with the Haysoms. Id. Prosecutors alleged that Soering
then attacked them with a knife, slitting their throats and inflicting multiple stab wounds.
Id. In October 1985, Soering and Ms. Haysom fled to Europe and were arrested in Eng-
land on April 30, 1986, on charges of check fraud. Id. On June 13, 1986, a Virginia grand
jury indicted Soering, charging him with the capital murder of the Haysoms. Id. at 12. On
August 11, 1986, the United States sought extradition of Soering from the United King-
dom. Id. Soering contested the extradition proceedings both under English law, and
under the European Convention on Human Rights. Id. at 12-16. Since article 2(1) clearly
permits, and article 3 has not been interpreted to prohibit, the death penalty, Soering was
obliged to rest his article 3 claim on the death row phenomenon. European Convention,
supra note 15, arts. 2(1), 3. In light of facing a potential death sentence if convicted of
capital murder in Virginia, Soering alleged that extradition would violate his rights under
article 3 of the European Convention because a long wait on death row (the death row
phenomenon) would constitute inhuman or degrading treatment. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct.
H.R. at 30-31.
241. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 30-31. Article 2(1) of the European Convention on
Human Rights permits the imposition of the death penalty under certain circumstances.
European Convention, supra note 15, art. 2(1). In light of article 2(1), Soering did not
argue that the death penalty would be a per se violation of article 3. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct.
H.R. at 40. Nevertheless, the court did address the issue of reconciling the death penalty
with article 3. Id. at 40-41. The court recognized that article 3 could not have been in-
tended as a general prohibition of capital punishment, as that would have rendered article
2(1) meaningless. Id. at 40. The court cited Protocol No. 6 to the Convention which states
that the death penalty should be abolished in peacetime. Id. at 40-41. Recognizing that
the Convention must be interpreted in light of the values and practices of modern society,
the court also cited an Amnesty International report which pointed to a "'virtual consen-
sus in Western European legal systems that the death penalty is, under current circum-
stances, no longer consistent with regional standards of justice.' " Id. at 40. The court,
therefore, viewed article 2(1) as an exception to the general rule under article 3 that capital
punishment is unacceptable. Id.
There are strong grounds for believing that even if Soering had been extradited, he
never would have faced the death penalty. Id. at 37. By the court's own admission, Soer-
ing could establish four of the five factors listed in the Virginia Code as mitigating circum-
stances which may be used to avoid imposition of the death penalty. Id. These included
Soering's age, lack of a criminal history, extreme mental disturbance, and diminished ca-
pacity at the time the crime was committed. Id. Furthermore, the United Kingdom, which
brought extradition proceedings on behalf of the United States, pledged that if extradition
was permitted, United States prosecutors would make a submission on behalf of the
United Kingdom government to the Virginia court urging it to refrain from issuing a death
sentence. Id. at 38. Despite these factors, the European Court still found an article 3
violation in a collateral consequence of the, arguably remote, possibility of the imposition
[Vol. 45:481
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phenomenon. 42
Soering has many striking implications.243 First, it provided injunctive
relief to prevent the occurrence of an article 3 violation.2 "4 Second, it
held that extradition proceedings may be halted if they are likely to give
rise to an article 3 violation.2 45 Further, the court ruled that, in an extra-
of the death penalty: the degrading impact of the so-called death row phenomenon. Id. at
44-45.
Ironically, the European Court-cited the very factors that might have mitigated a death
penalty under the Virginia Code as reasons for protecting Soering from even the possibility
of a stay on death row. Id. at 43. After the Soering decision, the United States dropped
the offense of capital murder from its list of charges against Soering and successfully sought
Soering's extradition. NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 3, at 477 n.6.
242. See infra notes 370-75 and accompanying text (discussing the death row phenome-
non in the context of the United States' reservation to its ratification of ICCPR). The
European Court characterized the "death row phenomenon" as the highly damaging physi-
cal and emotional impact imposed on convicts who experience a lengthy wait in prison
between the imposition of a death sentence and its execution. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.
at 32. Features of the phenomenon include the length of detention prior to execution,
prison conditions on death row, and the prisoner's age and mental state. Id. at 41-43; see
ROBERT JOHNSON, CONDEMNED To DIE: LIFE UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH (1981) (dis-
cussing the damaging psychological effects on the prisoner of a prolonged stay on death
row); Robert Johnson, Under Sentence of Death: The Psychology of Death Row Confine-
ment, 5 LAW & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 141, 142, 156 n.30 (1979); see also infra note 372 (dis-
cussing English and Commonwealth rulings on the death row phenomenon).
243. Richard B. Lillich, Note, The Soering Case, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 128 (1991). Lillich
describes the impact of the Soering case thus:
Aside from its effect on the future ability of the United States (and many other
countries) to obtain the extradition from Council of Europe countries of persons
charged with offenses carrying the death penalty, the judgment in Soering has
implications of a far wider nature for international criminal law, the law of state
responsibility, the jurisprudence of the European Convention, and international
human rights law in general .... Like the proverbial pebble thrown in the pond,
Soering will cause ripples for some time to come.
Id. at 128. For further discussion of the Soering case and its implications, see John Quigley
& S. Adele Shank, Death Row as a Violation of Human Rights: Is It Illegal to Extradite to
Virginia?, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 241 (1989); Renee E. Boxman, Comment, The Road to Soer-
ing and Beyond" Will the United States Recognize the "Death Row Phenomenon?", 14
Hous. J. INT'L L. 151 (1991); Colin Warbrick, Coherence and the European Court of
Human Rights: The Adjudicative Background To The Soering Case, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1073 (1989-90); see also Theo Volger, The Scope of Extradition in the Light of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN Di-
MENSION 663 (Franz Matscher & Herbert Petzold eds., 1988). Volger states that "[n]either
Article 3 nor Article 6 [of the European Convention on Human Rights] constitute prohibi-
tions of extradition with a constitutive effect." Id. at 669. But Volger also points out that
"the speciality of extradition is designed to protect the rights of the requested State, not
those of the extradited person." Id. at 670-71.
For a discussion of extradition decisions of the UNHRC addressing the death row phe-
nomenon in light of Soering, see infra notes 274-89 (discussing the cases of Kindler v.
Canada and Ng v. Canada).
244. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 44-45.
245. Id.
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dition situation, conditions in the country seeking extradition must inevi-
tably be measured by the standards of the Convention.246 Third, it added
clarification to the definition of degrading treatment or punishment,
which had been established earlier in the Ireland and Tyrer cases.247
Soering suggested that the "minimum level of severity" standard for es-
tablishing a threat of a possible future article 3 violation emphasizes the
severity of potential harm, with only secondary regard for the likelihood
of that harm actually occurring.248
Soering thus stretched the disparity between the Eighth Amendment
and the international standard further than prior cases because it pro-
vided injunctive relief against a purely psychological harm that was un-
likely to occur.249 Furthermore, if the harm did occur, it would do so in a
jurisdiction not directly subject to article 3.250
2. Decisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee
The UNHRC has applied article 7 of ICCPR in response to complaints
from individuals under the procedure established under the Optional
Protocol.25' The language of article 7 suggests ample potential for a
broad interpretation that would expand the scope of ICCPR well beyond
that of the Eighth Amendment.252 The UNHRC, however, has remained
246. Id.; see also Vilvarajah v. United Kingdom, 215 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1992) (con-
firming the Soering approach). Vilvarajah explained that:
[cjontracting States have an obligation under Article 3 of the Convention not to
send people to countries where there are substantial grounds for believing that
they would be in danger of being subjected to treatment proscribed by Article 3
... [t]he establishment of such responsibility inevitably involves an assessment of
conditions in the requesting country against the standards of Article 3 of the
Convention.
Id. at 47.
247. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 36; cf Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) at 65 (1978); Tyrer v. Isle of Man, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 14 (1978).
248. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 39. But see Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 201 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1991), reprinted in 12 HUM. R-s. L.J. 142, 143 (1991). In Cruz-Varas, the Swedish
government deported three Chilean nationals (a husband, wife, and son) to Chile, after
refusing their application for refugee status. Id. at 142. In rejecting the petitioner's article
3 claim, the court cited the petitioner's silence over a period of 18 months after his first
interrogation by Swedish authorities, continuous changes in his story, and lack of substanti-
ation, all of which impaired the petitioner's credibility. Id. at 143. The court also cited the
improved political climate in Chile, the voluntary return of many refugees to that country,
and the thorough examination of the petitioner's case by the Swedish authorities. Id.
249. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 44.
250. Id. at 44-45.
251. See supra note 16 (discussing the procedure under the Optional Protocol whereby
the UNHRC may hear communications from individuals alleging violations of ICCPR).
252. See infra notes 290-301 and accompanying text (discussing differences in language
between the two provisions and the implications arising therefrom).
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relatively restrained in its interpretation of ICCPR.2 5 3 Nevertheless, the
UNHRC has found violations of article 7's prohibitions on torture,254 and
253. See infra notes 259-73 and accompanying text (describing the procedures of the
UNHRC, which may explain its cautious approach toward ICCPR interpretation).
254. Decisions of the UNHRC finding a violation of the article 7 prohibition against
torture include:
Minanga v. Zaire, Communication No. 366/1989, reprinted in 1 INT'L HUM. RrS. R. 158,
160 (1994) (finding torture where the detainee, a political activist, "remained strapped to
the concrete floor of his cell for close to four hours, and ... was thereafter subjected to acts
of torture for several more hours"). The UNHRC ruled in favor of the author of the
communication because his photographic evidence raised an inference of torture that the
State party failed to refute. Id. at 159-60.
Berterretche Acosta v. Uruguay, Communication No. 162/1983, summarized in Manfred
Nowak, UN-Human Rights Committee. Survey of decisions given up till July 1989, 11 HUM.
RTs. L.J. 139, 149 (1990) (finding torture under article 7 in the case of a meteorologist who
was detained by agents of the Uruguayan military regime, brutalized, and sentenced to 14
years of imprisonment).
Martinez Portorreal v. Dominican Republic, Communication No. 188/1984, reprinted in
2 SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMIr-EE UNDER THE OPTIONAL PRO-
TOCOL 214, 216, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 (1990) [hereinafter 2 SELECTED DECISIONS]
(finding violations of article 7's prohibition against torture in the case of a human rights
activist held for 50 hours in a 20 x 5 meter cell along with 125 other detainees, and was
denied food and water until the next day).
Herrera Rubio v. Colombia, Communication No. 161/1983, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DE-
CISIONS 192, 195 (finding article 7 torture violations in the case of an individual arrested on
suspicion of being a member of a guerilla organization, who had been subjected to beatings
and hangings. The victim's parents were kidnapped and killed).
Lafuente Penarrieta et al. v. Bolivia, Communication No. 176/1984, reprinted in 2 SE-
LECTED DECISIONS 201, 205 (finding article 7 torture violations where the victim was held
incommunicado and in solitary confinement for 44 days in a small cell, and subjected to
electric shock treatment).
Cariboni v. Uruguay, Communication No. 159/1983, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS
189, 191 (finding violation of torture prohibition of article 7 in the case of a university
professor arrested, held, under inhuman conditions and sentenced on the basis of forced
confessions to 15 years of imprisonment for the crime of 'subversive association').
Miango Muiyo v. Zaire, Communication No. 194/1985, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECI-
SIONS 219 (finding article 7 violations of the torture prohibition in the case of an individual
who was kidnapped by the armed forces of Zaire, and mistreated to such an extent that he
died under "dubious circumstances"). The Zaire government's failure to provide any in-
formation or clarification of events influenced the UNHRC's decision. Id. at 221.
Arzuaga Gilboa v. Uruguay, Communication No. 147/1983, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DE-
CISIONS 176, 177-78 (finding violations of the article 7 torture prohibition in the case of a
female student subjected to beatings, electric shock treatment, and hanging by the wrists
until she lost consciousness).
Conteris v. Uruguay, Communication No. 139/1983, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS
168, 171 (finding a violation of the article 7 torture prohibition in the case of a journalist
and university professor held incommunicado and subjected to hanging by the wrists for
ten days, burnings, and immersion of his head in water fouled with blood, vomit, and urine
almost to the point of drowning).
Estrella v. Uruguay, Communication No. 74/1980, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS
93, 97-98 (finding violations of article 7 and article 10(1) in the case of an individual kid-
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cruel and inhuman treatment,2 55 as well as article 10,S256 stipulation that
napped at his home, held in military detention without trial in a cage, blindfolded, with his
hands tied behind his back, and subjected to 30 days in solitary confinement and seven
months without mail or recreation).
See also Bleier Lewenhoff and Valino de Bleier v. Uruguay, Communication No. 30/
1978, reprinted in SELECTED DECISIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE UNDER THE
OPTIONAL PROTOCOL 109, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1 (1982) [hereinafter 1 SELECTED DECI-
SIONS]; Setelich v. Uruguay, Communication No. 63/1979, reprinted in 1 SELECTED DECI-
SIONS 101; Grille Motta v. Uruguay, Communication No. 11/1977, reprinted in 1 SELECTED
DECISIONS 54; Hernandez Valentini de Bazzano v. Uruguay, Communication No. 5/1977,
reprinted in 1 SELECTED DECISIONS 40.
255. Decisions of the UNHRC finding violations of article 7's prohibition against cruel
and inhuman treatment include:
Thomas v. Jamaica, Communication No. 321/1988, reprinted in 1 INT'L HUM. RTS. R.
132, 134 (1994) (finding degrading treatment where soldiers and prison wardens assaulted
a convicted murderer with rifle butts, causing serious injuries for which he did not receive
medical treatment).
Soogrim v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No. 362/1989, reprinted in 1 INT'L
HUM. RTS. R. 169, 172-74 (1994) (finding a violation of article 7 in the case of a convicted
murderer who suffered a significant deterioration in his health due to inadequate medical
treatment and prison conditions which included being forced to remain naked for two
weeks).
Bailey v. Jamaica, Communication No. 334/1988, reprinted in 1 INT'L HUM. RTS. R. 139
(1994) (finding violations of article 7's prohibition against cruel and inhuman treatment in
the case of a convicted murderer who allegedly received beatings from prison officials us-
ing clubs, iron pipes, and batons, after which he received no medical attention).
Francis v. Jamaica, Communication No. 320/1988, reprinted in 1 INT'L HUM. RTs. R. 117,
122 (1994) (finding a violation of article 7's prohibition against degrading treatment in the
case of a convicted murderer who alleged that prison officials beat him, prodded him with
a bayonet, threw urine on him, tossed his food and water on the floor and removed his
mattress from his cell).
Linton v. Jamaica, Communication No. 255/1987, reprinted in 1 INT'L HUM. RTs. R. 73,
74, 77 (1994) (finding a violation of article 7's prohibition against cruel and inhuman treat-
ment in the case of a prisoner who, while serving a life sentence for murder, suffered a
range of physical abuse, including a mock execution and inadequate medical care).
Pratt, Robinson and Morgan v. Jamaica, Communication No. 210/1986, Communication
Nos. 223 and 225/1987, summarized in Nowak, supra note 254, at 150 (holding that a delay
of nearly 20 hours from the time complainants were granted a stay of execution to the time
complainants were notified and removed from their cells constituted cruel and inhuman
treatment in violation of article 7. Complainants were released only 45 minutes prior to
the scheduled time of execution).
Martinez Portorreal, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS 214 (discussed supra note 254);
Wight v. Madagascar, Communication No. 115/1982, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS,
supra note 254, at 151. The UNHRC found torture under article 7 in the case of a South
African national who made an emergency airplane landing in Madagascar, and was sen-
tenced to five years of imprisonment for flying over Madagascan airspace. Id. The victim
was kept incommunicado in a solitary room, chained to a bed with minimal clothing and
severe rationing of food. Id. at 151-52. Madagascar also sentenced a passenger in Wight's
plane, Dave Marais, Jr., also a South African national, to five years' imprisonment for the
unauthorized violation of Madagascan airspace. Marais v. Madagascar, Communication
No. 49/1979, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 82. Marais' parents
submitted a communication on his behalf to the UNHRC. Id. The UNHRC found viola-
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detainees be treated with humanity.257 Although the UNHRC generally
tions of article 7 and article 10(1) due to the inhuman conditions in which Madagascar held
Marais. Id. at 86.
See also Minanga, reprinted in 1 INT'L HUM. RTS. R. 158 (1994) (discussed supra note
254); Viana Acosta v. Uruguay, Communication No. 110/1981, reprinted in 2 SELECTED
DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 148; Larrosa Bequio v. Uruguay, Communication No. 88/
1981, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 118; Vasilskis v. Uruguay,
Communication No. 80/1980, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 105;
Massiotti & Baritussio v. Uruguay, Communication No. 25/1978, reprinted in 1 SELECTED
DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 136; Teti Izquierdo v. Uruguay, Communication No. 73/1980,
reprinted in 1 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 132; Setelich, reprinted in 1 SE-
LECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 101; Soriano de Bouton v. Uruguay, Communica-
tion No. 37/1978, reprinted in 1 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 72; Buffo
Carballal v. Uruguay, Communication No. 33/1978, reprinted in 1 SELECTED DECISIONS,
supra note 254, at 63; Weinberger Weisz v. Uruguay, Communication No. 28/1978, re-
printed in 1 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 57; Grille Motta, reprinted in 1 SE-
LECTED DECISIONS, supra note 260, at 54; Torres Ramirez v. Uruguay, Communication No.
4/1977, reprinted in 1 SELECTED DECISIONS 1, supra note 254, at 49; Garcia Lanza de Netto
et al. v. Uruguay, Communication No. 8/1977, reprinted in 1 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra
note 254, at 45.
But see Vuolanne v. Finland, Communication No. 265/1987, summarized in Nowak,
supra note 254, at 151 (ruling that the communicant's solitary confinement did not consti-
tute inhuman treatment under articles 7 and 10).
256. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 10. Article 10(1) states that "[a]ll persons deprived of
their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person." Id. For a detailed analysis of the meaning and implications of article
10(1), see General comment No. 21 (44) (art. 10) in Annex VI: General Comments
Adopted Under Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1 (discussing the aims and meaning of article 10); NOWAK,
supra note 14, at 183-89.
257. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 10(1). Decisions of the UNHRC finding violations of
article 10(1)'s stipulation that detainees should be treated with humanity include:
Viana Acosta, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 148 (finding viola-
tions of articles 7 and 10(1) due to the inhuman treatment of the communicant while in
detention). Acosta, an activist in the opposition political party between 1969 and 1971, was
arrested several times on suspicion of subversive activities but was never charged. Id. In
1971, Acosta left Uruguay for Argentina, but in February 1974, a joint Uruguayan-Argen-
tinian commando operation allegedly kidnapped Acosta from his Buenos Aires home. Id.
He alleged that he was tortured and forced to confess to involvement in opposition parties
in Uruguay and Argentina. Id. He was sent back to Uruguay, placed in detention, tried
for "attempting to subvert the Constitution at the level of conspiracy followed by prepara-
tory acts, possession of arms and explosives and use of false identity papers," convicted and
sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. Id. at 149. Acosta alleged that he was forcibly sub-
jected to "psychiatric experiments," and that he was held incommunicado for 45 days with-
out any medical attention. Id. The UNHRC ruled that Acosta had been subjected to
inhuman treatment. Id. at 150-51. However, the UNHRC rejected Acosta's allegations of
torture due to lack of evidentiary support. Id. Furthermore, many of the events alleged by
Acosta occurred prior to ICCPR's and the Optional Protocol's entry into force in Uruguay.
Id.
Vasilskis, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 105 (finding violations
of articles 7 and 10(1) in the case of a woman who, although in excellent physical shape at
the time of her arrest, suffered extensive physical injuries while in detention). Vasilskis was
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entertains communications concerning the most egregious and outra-
geous allegations of physical human rights abuses, the UNHRC also has
imprisoned for eight years for her alleged participation in subversive activities. Id. at 106.
After years of alleged torture and medical neglect, Vasilskis had suffered diminished vision
in both eyes, had lost 40% of the hearing in her left ear, and suffered from Raynaud's
disease. Id. The UNHRC ruled that Vasilskis' treatment in prison was inhumane and
lacked respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. Id. at 108.
Larrosa Bequio, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 118 (recognizing
violations of articles 7 and 10(1) in the case of a detainee who lost his hearing in one ear
allegedly due to torture, and suffered diminished vision due to malnutrition while in
prison). Bequio was not allowed to exercise, read, or write. Id. at 119. The UNHRC
found that Bequio had not been treated "with humanity and with respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person." Id. at 121.
Campora Schweizer, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 90 (finding
violation of article 10(1) due to the inhuman prison conditions in which the communicant
was held). Campora was arrested in March, 1971, on grounds of "association to break the
law." Id. In September 1971, he escaped from prison, but was recaptured in April, 1972.
Id. In May 1974, a judge ordered Campora's provisional release and officials approved his
request for permission to leave the country in November, 1974. Id. Under emergency
national security laws, however, an order of detention was issued against Campora and he
remained in prison without having been charged with any crime. Id. The prison conditions
that prompted UNHRC's finding of an article 10(1) violation included "constant harass-
ment and persecution by the guards," a regime under which Campora was kept in solitary
confinement, yet constantly was "listened to and followed by microphones and through
peepholes." Id. at 92. Campora was deprived of contact with his family, and suffered
malnutrition, lack of sunshine, and exercise. Id.
See also Berterretche Acosta, summarized in Nowak, supra note 254, at 149 (discussed
supra note 254); Martinez Portorreal, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254,
at 216 (discussed supra note 254); Herrera Rubio, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS.
supra note 254, at 192 (discussed supra note 254); Lafuente Penarrieta, reprinted in 2 SE-
LECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 201 (discussed supra note 254); Arzuaga Gilboa,
reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 176 (discussed supra note 254);
Conteris, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 168 (discussed supra note
254); Wight, reprinted in 2 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 151 (discussed supra
note 255); Linton, reprinted in 1 INr'L HUM. RTs. R. 73 (1994) (discussed supra note 255);
Francis, reprinted in 1 Ir'L HUM. RTS. R. 117 (1994) (discussed supra note 255); Bailey,
reprinted in 1 IN-r'L HUM. RTs. R. 139 (1994) (discussed supra note 255); Soogrim, re-
printed in I INT'L HuM. RTs. R. 169 (1994) (discussed supra note 255); Thomas, reprinted
in I INT'L HUM. RTS. R. 132 (1994) (discussed supra note 255); Minanga, reprinted in 1
INT'L HUM. RTs. R. 158 (1994) (discussed supra note 254); Estrella, reprinted in 2 SE-
LECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 93 (discussed supra note 254); Massiotti and Baritus-
sio, reprinted in 1 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 136; Teti Izquierdo, reprinted in
1 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 132; Bleier Lewenhoff, reprinted in 1 SELECTED
DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 109; Setelich, reprinted in 1 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note
254, at 101; Soriano de Bouton, reprinted in 1 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 72;
Buffo Carballal, reprinted in 1 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 63; Weinberger
Weisz, reprinted in 1 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 57; Grille Motta, reprinted in
1 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 54; Torres Ramirez, reprinted in 1 SELECTED
DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 49; Garcia Lanza de Netto, reprinted in 1 SELECTED DECI-
SIONS, supra note 254, at 45; Hernandez Valentini de Bazzano, reprinted in 1 SELECTED
DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 40.
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recognized more indirect, psychological forms of abuse.258
a. Procedural Defects of the UNHRC
The UNHRC procedure has failed to provide an effective source of
relief for those claiming violation of their rights under article 7 and article
10.259 There are many reasons for this.260 First, relatively few countries
258. See Almeida de Quinteros v. Uruguay, Communication No. 107/1981, reprinted in
2 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 138-43 (recognizing violations of articles 7, 9,
and 10(1) in the case of a daughter held in military detention and subjected to torture and
of her mother, who endured the psychological anguish of not knowing her daughter's fate).
Maria del Carmen Almeida de Quinteros submitted a communication to UNHRC on her
own and her daughter, Elena Quinteros Almeida's, behalf. Id. at 139. Elena was held at a
military unit where all detainees were addressed only by an identification number, blind-
folded, with their hands tied behind their backs, and systematically tortured. Id. Another
inmate corroborated allegations of Elena's torture. Id. Maria alleged that she was a victim
of violations of article 7, due to the psychological torture of not knowing the fate of her
daughter. Id. at 140. The UNHRC recognized that Maria was the victim of an article 7
violation:
The Committee understands the anguish and stress caused to the mother by the
disappearance of her daughter and by the continuing uncertainty concerning her
fate and whereabouts. The author [Maria] has the right to know what has hap-
pened to her daughter. In these respects, she too is a victim of the violations of
the Covenant suffered by her daughter in particular, of article 7.
Id. at 142. The UNHRC concluded that the Uruguay authorities must take responsibility
for Elena's disappearance, and that Uruguay was obligated to take immediate and effective
steps to secure her release. Id. at 142-43.
259. See Quigley, supra note 1, at 64. Professor Quigley summarizes the deficiencies of
the UNHRC procedures thus:
The enforcement mechanisms to which the United States is subject have little
bite. As a party to the Covenant, the United States must submit a periodic report
to the Human Rights Committee; but the Committee has few investigatory pow-
ers and has been reluctant to take other affirmative steps toward more effective
monitoring.
Id. at 62.
Perhaps recognizing the difficulties that the United Nations faces in taking a member
state to task based on individual complaints, the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights developed a thematic approach to human rights abuses focusing on categories of
abuse rather than specifically on the countries that are allegedly responsible for such
abuse. See NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 3, at 139-40; see also David Weissbrodt,
The Three "Theme" Special Rapporteurs of the UN Commission on Human Rights, 80 AM.
J. INT'L L. 685 (1986). Among its various "thematic" mechanisms, the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights established a Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances in 1980, a Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions in
1982, and a Special Rapporteur on Torture in 1985. NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note
3, at 139. According to Newman and Weissbrodt, "(e)ach of these mechanisms has the
authority to receive information on human rights problems within its area of concern and
to take 'effective action' in trying to urge governments to resolve the problems." Id.
260. NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 3, at 71-73. Under the United Nations' pro-
cedures, there is a requirement that prior to bringing a complaint to the UNHRC, the
complainant first must exhaust any available remedies in domestic court. Optional Proto-
col, supra note 1, arts. 2, 5(2)(b). Many complaints brought before the Committee fail this
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allow an individual communication to be brought before the UNHRC.261
This results from the requirement that the "target country" of an individ-
ual communication be a State party to the Optional Protocol, and consent
to the individual communication process.262
Second, the UNHRC only meets three times per year for three weeks
at a time.263 At each meeting, the UNHRC considers reports from States
parties detailing their human rights record and the steps taken to imple-
ment the terms of ICCPR.264 The UNHRC considers individual commu-
nications at closed meetings where the State party implicated in the
communication is represented.265 The individual responsible for the com-
munication, however, is not permitted to attend.266 Although the
UNHRC's deliberations are confidential, it publishes its final
decisions.267
Third, the UNHRC's procedures are extremely slow, and no mecha-
nism for acceleration in response to emergency communications exists.268
The lethargic nature of the process, combined with the requirement that
the complainant exhaust all domestic remedies, effectively eliminates the
possibility of obtaining injunctive relief.269 Fourth, many individual com-
threshold step, and thus the Committee never considers the substance of those complaints.
NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 3, at 9-10.
261. NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 3, at Supp. 9. As of October 1993, there
were 124 States parties to ICCPR, of which 68 states were parties to the Optional Protocol.
Id. Of those, 43 states had made the declaration recognizing the competence of the
UNHRC to consider communications relating to inter-state disputes. Id.
262. See supra note 16 (discussing the procedure under the Optional Protocol whereby
the UNHRC may hear communications from individuals alleging violations of ICCPR).
263. See supra note 16 (discussing procedural aspects of the UNHRC).
264. NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 3, at 71-73.
265. Optional Protocol, supra note 1, art. 5(3). "Consideration of communications
under the Optional Protocol takes place in closed meetings (art. 5(3) of the Optional Pro-
tocol). All documents pertaining to the work of the Committee under the Optional Proto-
col (submissions from the parties and other working documents of the Committee) are
confidential." NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 3, at 71.
266. NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 3, at 71.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 72. Newman and Weissbrodt explain that:
Since the Committee, which meets three times a year, must allow both the author
and the State party sufficient time to prepare their submissions, a decision on
admissibility can only be taken between six months and a year after the initial
submission; views under Article 5(4) may follow one year later. The entire proce-
dure normally may be completed within two to three years. The Committee tries
to deal expeditiously with all communications.
Id.
269. Id. The lack of availability of injunctive or even prompt post-injury relief means
that the individual communication process of the UNHRC is, in reality, a mechanism for
applying pressure on a government to reform its policies and behavior rather than a genu-
ine source of a remedy for individual victims.
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munications also are rejected on procedural grounds, and the UNHRC
never considers the substance of their allegations.270 Furthermore, States
parties who are the subject of UNHRC communications often fail to re-
spond to allegations that they have violated ICCPR.271 As a result, deci-
sions of the UNHRC often read as exhortations to, or admonishments of,
the State party that the communication implicates for more information
or an explanation.272
Despite providing a useful source of interpretation of the article 7
prohibitions of torture and cruel and inhuman treatment, decisions of the
UNHRC generally represent the clearly established core, rather than the
controversial margins, of article 7 protection.273
b. The UNHRC's Treatment of Extradition Cases
The UNHRC recently has addressed the issue raised in Soering of
whether extradition of an individual to a country whose criminal justice
system may violate a human rights treaty is itself a violation of ICCPR.274
The UNHRC first addressed this issue in Kindler v. Canada.275 Joseph
270. Optional Protocol, supra note 1; see also NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 3,
at 72-74. Reasons for the Committee's rejection of individual communications on proce-
dural grounds are:
a) failure of claims due to ratione temporis (i.e. the State party that is the subject of the
communication had not ratified the Optional Protocol at the time of the alleged violation).
Id. at 73; see also M.T. v. Spain, Communication No. 310/1988, reprinted in 12 HuM. RT's.
L.J. 299-300 (1991) (declaring petitioner's claim of torture inadmissible on the ground of
ratione temporis, since Spain had not yet ratified the Optional Protocol when the alleged
incident occurred).
b) standing problems: under article 1, the individual communicant must actually be a
victim of the alleged violation. NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 3, at 73.
c) failure of the communicant to substantiate his allegations, or to show that he is a
victim. Id. at 73.
d) failure to exhaust domestic remedies under articles 2 and 5(2)(b). Id. at 74.
271. See, e.g., Miango Miuyo, reprinted in 2 SELECrED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at
219; Marais, reprinted in 2 SELECrED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 82; Almeida de
Quinteros, reprinted in 2 SELECrED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at 138.
In other cases, the implicated State party provided only a perfunctory response that the
UNHRC deemed unsatisfactory. See, e.g., Buffo Carballal, reprinted in 1 SELECrED DECI-
SIONS, supra note 254, at 63; Weinberger Weisz, reprinted in 1 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra
note 254, at 57; Soriano de Bouton, reprinted in 1 SELECTED DECISIONS, supra note 254, at
72.
272. See supra note 271 (listing cases where a State party implicated by a communica-
tion to the UNHRC has either failed to respond or has responded in a perfunctory and
unsatisfactory manner).
273. See supra notes 254-55, 257-58 and accompanying text (providing a catalog of deci-
sions of the UNHRC under the ICCPR and the Optional Protocol).
274. See supra notes 239-50 and accompanying text (discussing the European Court of
Human Rights' decision in Soering).
275. Communication No. 470/1991, reprinted in 14 HUM. RTs. L.J. 307 (1993).
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Kindler was convicted of first-degree murder and kidnapping in Penn-
sylvania, and the jury recommended a death sentence. 76 Prior to sen-
tencing, Kindler escaped from custody and fled to Canada.277 While
extradition proceedings were pending, Kindler petitioned the UNHRC,
arguing that his extradition to face the death penalty would violate
ICCPR.278 Specifically, Kindler reasoned not only that the death penalty
constituted per se cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment, but also
that conditions on Pennsylvania's death row were cruel, inhuman, and
degrading.2 79 In a decision heavily influenced by the European Court of
Human Rights' approach in Soering, the UNHRC ruled that Canada had
an obligation under ICCPR to weigh the United States' potential viola-
tions of Kindler's rights before acceding to the extradition request.
28 °
The UNHRC established a "real risk" test of potential violation: whether
Kindler faced a "real risk" that the United States would violate his
ICCPR rights.218 1 The UNHRC rejected Kindler's claim, however, recog-
nizing that ICCPR does not prohibit the death penalty28 2 and that Kin-
dler had failed to substantiate his allegation that conditions on
276. Id. at 308.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. Canada responded that, while it was answerable for its own violations of
ICCPR, it could not be held accountable for the United States' violations. See id.
280. Id. at 309. ICCPR obligates States parties to guarantee the rights of all individuals
within their jurisdiction. Id. (citing ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 2). However, ICCPR does
not impose an express requirement on States parties to "guarantee the rights of persons
within another jurisdiction." Id. But the UNHRC reasoned that "a State party's duty
under (ICCPR) would be negated by the handing over of a person to another State
(whether a State party to the Covenant or not) where treatment contrary to the Covenant
is certain or is the very purpose of the handing over." Id. The UNHRC continued:
a State party would itself be in violation of the Covenant if it handed over a
person to another State in circumstances in which it was foreseeable that torture
would take place. The foreseeability of the consequence would mean that there
was a present violation by the State party, even though the consequence would
not occur until later on.
Id.
281. Id. at 313. The UNHRC stated that "[i]f a State party extradites a person within
its jurisdiction in circumstances such that as a result there is a real risk that his or her rights
under the Covenant will be violated in another jurisdiction, the State party itself may be in
violation of the Covenant." Id.
282. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 6(2); see also infra notes 368 and accompanying text
(explaining that ICCPR restricts, rather than prohibits, application of the death penalty).
The UNHRC stated that " 'prolonged judicial proceedings do not per se constitute cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment, even if they can be a source of mental strain for the
convicted persons.'" Kindler, reprinted in 14 HuM. Rs. L.J. 307, 309, 314 (1993) (quoting
UNHRC views on communications Nos. 210/1986 and 225/1987 (Pratt and Morgan v. Ja-
maica) adopted on 6 April 1989, para. 13.6). The UNHRC emphasized that no article 7
violation occurs when a "convicted person is merely availing himself of appellate reme-
dies." Id. at 314.
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Pennsylvania's death row violated ICCPR.28 3
The UNHRC returned to the extradition issue later in 1993 in the case
of Ng v. Canada.24 Authorities accused Charles Chitat Ng of committing
twelve murders in California.285 When the United States sought Ng's ex-
tradition from Canada, Ng petitioned the UNHRC.286 Canada extradited
Ng to California, however, prior to the UNHRC's decision.2 87 The
UNHRC ruled that California's method of execution, gas asphyxiation,
constituted cruel and inhuman treatment, and therefore that Ng's extradi-
tion violated ICCPR.288
These decisions demonstrate that the UNHRC interprets ICCPR to
prohibit extradition to a jurisdiction where the extraditee faces a "real
risk" that his rights under ICCPR will be violated. This position is conso-
nant with the European Court's interpretation of the European Conven-
tion in Soering.289
283. Id. at 313-14. In addition, Kindler failed to provide adequate evidence of the po-
tential psychological effect upon him from confinement on Pennsylvania's death row. Id.
at 314. The UNHRC noted that the "age and mental state of the offender" influenced the
decision in Soering. Id.
See also Cox v. Canada, Communication No. 539/1993, reprinted in 15 HUM. Ri-s. L.J.
410 (1994) (ruling that extradition of an accused murderer to the United States to face
possible imposition of the death penalty did not violate ICCPR). Keith Cox faced extradi-
tion from Canada to the United States to face two charges of first-degree murder in Penn-
sylvania. Id. at 410. The UNHRC rejected Cox's petition on grounds that his submissions
to the Committee failed to establish that he faced a "real risk" of suffering a violation of
his rights under ICCPR if extradited to Pennsylvania. Id. at 416-17.
284. Communication No. 469/1991, reprinted in 15 HUM. RTS. L. 149 (1994).
285. Id. at 149.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 157. The UNHRC ruled that California's use of execution by gas asphyxia-
tion violated article 7 because it failed to ensure that a death sentence would be " 'carried
out in such a way as to cause the least possible physical and mental suffering.' " Id. (quot-
ing UNHRC's General Comment 20[44] on article 7 of ICCPR (CCPR/C/21/Add.3, para-
graph 6)). Since Ng's extradition to the United States had occurred already, the UNHRC
requested Canada to make representations to the United States to avoid the imposition of
the death penalty and exhorted Canada not to let this situation arise again in the future.
Id.
289. See Ng, reprinted in 15 HUM. R-rs. L.J. 149, 157 (1994) (referencing the European
Court of Human Rights' approach in Soering). The UNHRC stated that:
In determining whether, in a particular case, the imposition of capital punishment
constitutes a violation of article 7, the Committee will have regard to the relevant
personal factors regarding the author [i.e., the petitioner], the specific conditions
of detention on death row, and whether the proposed method of execution is
particularly abhorrent.
Id.; cf supra notes 239-50 and accompanying text (discussing the European Court of
Human Rights' decision in Soering). But see Pak, supra note 167, at 276-77 (arguing that
Canada violated its obligations under ICCPR by extraditing Ng and Kindler to the United
States).
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II. INTEGRATING THE INTERNATIONAL STANDARD INTO AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE
A. Comparing the Language of the Eighth Amendment and Article 7
The differences in the respective language of article 7 and the Eighth
Amendment provide a clear basis for establishing divergent interpreta-
tions of the two provisions. First, article 7 specifically prohibits "torture,"
while the Eighth Amendment makes no specific reference to the concept
of torture.290  Second, article 7 refers to "treatment or punishment,"
while the Eighth Amendment refers to only punishment.291 Third, article
7, unlike the Eighth Amendment, uses the term, "degrading. 292 Fourth,
article 7, unlike the Eighth Amendment, uses the term, "inhuman.
293
The phrase "cruel and unusual punishments" has been described as a
"three-word term of art" whereby the words- "cruel" and "unusual" oper-
ate interdependently rather than independently of each other. 9 The
Eighth Amendment, unlike article 7, contains the word "unusual," a term
that has given rise to considerable ambiguity and interpretive debate in
Supreme Court opinions.295 Justice White and Justice Scalia engaged in a
debate in Harmelin over the meaning of the term "unusual" in the Eighth
Amendment.296 Justice Scalia argued that the term has never carried any
technical or legal meaning,297 and therefore concluded that any legisla-
tively-authorized punishment must not be "unusual" as long as it is "regu-
290. Compare ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 7 (stating that "[n]o one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment") with U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII (prohibiting only "cruel and unusual punishments"); see also NOWAK, supra
note 14, at 126-34 (analyzing the significance of the language of article 7).
291. Compare ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 7 with U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See also
NOWAK, supra note 14, at 126-34 (analyzing the significance of the language of article 7).
292. Compare ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 7 with U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See also
NOWAK, supra note 14, at 126-34 (analyzing the significance of the language of article 7).
293. Compare ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 7 with U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See also
NOWAK, supra note 14, at 126-34 (analyzing the significance of the language of article 7).
294. Ogilvie, supra note 51, at 259 n.2 (quoting JAMES J. GO3ERT & NEAL P. COHEN,
RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 11.02, at 314 (1981)); see also John E. Theuman, Annotation, Con-
ditions of Confinement as Constituting Cruel and Unusual Punishment in Violation of Fed-
eral Constitution's Eighth Amendment, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1151 (1994). Theuman describes four
categories of punishment that are cruel and unusual under the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the Eighth Amendment: punishments that are (1) inherently cruel or severe, (2)
excessive, disproportionate, or unnecessary, (3) unacceptable to society, or (4) inflicted
arbitrarily. Id. at 1154.
295. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
296. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 975-88 (1990) (Scalia, J.); 1009-18 (White, J.,
dissenting).
297. See id. at 976 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia referred to Webster's definition
of "unusual" as" 'such as [does not] occu[r] in ordinary practice' " or " '[s]uch as is [not] in
common use.'" Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S SECOND INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2807
(1954)).
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larly or customarily employed."29 Justice White accused Justice Scalia of
suggesting that legislative enactment of a form of punishment would
render it per se "usual." '29 9 He castigated Justice Scalia for propagating a
definition of "unusual" that would render the term meaningless, thereby
frustrating constitutional judicial review of legislation.3 °°
The linguistic contrast between article 7 and the Eighth Amendment
might best be summarized thus: the Eighth Amendment contains vague
language that has been interpreted with considerable specificity, whereas
article 7 contains more specific language that still awaits a correspond-
ingly specific interpretation.
30 1
298. See id. (Scalia, J.) (concluding that "[the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause]
disables the Legislature from authorizing particular forms or 'modes' of punishment -
specifically, cruel methods of punishment that are not regularly or customarily em-
ployed"). The Supreme Court debate over Eighth Amendment interpretation is sub-
merged in a wider debate among members of the Court as to the appropriate degree of
deference that the judicial branch should afford its legislative counterpart. This debate
sometimes has hinged on whether it is possible to drive a wedge between a state statute
and the Eighth Amendment by arguing that the statute is "unusual" under the interna-
tional standard. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 384-91 (1989) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (using statistical data to argue that the execution of minors is "unusual" both in a
domestic and international context); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 268 (1972) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) (arguing that the Framers intended the Eighth Amendment to be a
"'constitutional check'" on the legislative branch). Justice Brennan cautioned that
" 'when we come to punishments, no latitude ought to be left, nor dependence put on the
virtue of representatives'.... We know that the Framers did not envision, 'so narrow a role
for this basic guaranty of human rights.' " Id. (citing Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Der-
showitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1782
(1970)).
299. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1016-17 (White, J., dissenting).
300. Id. at 1016-17. Justice White pointed out that "contrary to Justice Scalia's sugges-
tion.... the fact that a punishment has been legislatively mandated does not automatically
render it 'legal' or 'usual' in the constitutional sense. Indeed, as noted above, if this were
the case, then the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments would be devoid of
any meaning." Id. Justice White continued, "the suggestion that a legislatively mandated
punishment is necessarily 'legal' is the antithesis of the principles established in Marbury v.
Madison, for 'Jilt is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is,' and to determine whether a legislative enactment is consistent with the
Constitution." Id. at 1017 (citation omitted).
301. See Theuman, supra note 294, at 1155 (observing that "[als a general matter, the
Supreme Court has held that conditions of confinement may not be considered cruel and
unusual punishment unless they are shown to deprive prisoners of some identifiable human
need - such as food, warmth, or exercise - and violate the minimal civilized measure of
life's necessities"). But see Bernard, supra note 17, at 784-85. Bernard explains the diffi-
culty of defining 'humane treatment' under international law thus:
If "humane treatment" means freedom from torture, then there is already near-
universal recognition of a binding norm of international law. However, once the
definition of "humane treatment" is expanded to include a prohibition on "cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment," the status as customary international law is
less clear. And if "humane treatment" includes the right to a library, a single cell,
or dental services, which are among the numerous Standard Minimum Rules [for
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B. The Applicability of International Law in the United States
There are three broad theories that provide a basis for the incorpora-
tion of international law into United States domestic law.302 These three
theories may be characterized as direct enforcement, enforcement as cus-
tomary law, and enforcement by constructive interpretation.
1. Direct Enforcement. 3
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,3° any
treaty, once ratified, becomes part of the supreme law of the United
States, of equal status to a federal statute, and prevalent over state law.305
A treaty is ratified when the President signs it on the Advice and Consent
of two-thirds of the United States Senate.30 6 Like a federal statute, an
the Treatment of Prisoners], then it most certainly has not been generally ac-
cepted as a binding norm.
Id. at 786 (footnotes omitted). Bernard criticizes the drafters of article 7 for failing to
"define or explain the phrase cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment." Id. at 768.
302. Kathryn Burke et al., Application of International Human Rights Law in State and
Federal Courts, 18 TEX. INT'L L.J. 291 (1983); see also Richard B. Bilder, The Status of
International Human Rights Law: An Overview, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
AND PRACTICE: THE ROLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THE Gov-
ERNMENT, AND THEIR LAWYERS 1 (James C. Thttle ed., 1978) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW] (discussing the sources and basic enforcement alternatives of inter-
national human rights law); Richard B. Lillich, Invoking International Human Rights Law
in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367 (1985) (describing and evaluating the status of
international human rights law in the United States).
303. Burke, supra note 302, at 295-314 (discussing direct enforcement of international
human rights treaty law).
304. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2.
305. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2; see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, T.S. No. 58 (1980), reprinted in 8 IL.M. 679-713 (1969), entered into
force Jan. 27, 1980, art. 2 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (defining the concept of a
treaty); B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583, 600 (1912) (defining a treaty as
"'a compact made between two or more independent nations with a view to the public
welfare' " (quoting 2 BOUVIER'S DICTIONARY 1136)). If a treaty conflicts with state law,
the treaty (like federal law) prevails. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (hold-
ing that enforcement of treaty protecting migratory birds did not infringe on sovereignty
reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment).
306. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also David Weissbrodt, United States Ratification
of the Human Rights Covenants, 63 MINN. L. REV. 35, 63-72 (1978) (criticizing President
Jimmy Carter's reservations to human rights covenants); Detlev F. Vagts, The Exclusive
Treaty Power Revisited, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 40 (1995) (explaining the respective roles of the
executive and legislative branches in the treaty ratification process); Malvina Halberstam,
A Treaty Is A Treaty Is A Treaty, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 51 (1992) (criticizing the so-called 'dual
treaty rule' and arguing for a single, common approach to treaty interpretation under both
domestic and international law). Halberstam characterizes the dual treaty rule thus:
The ... dual treaty rule . . . is: that there are two treaties, one as domestically
interpreted by reference to U.S. legislative history, and one as interpreted under
international law by reference to the negotiating history; that under Article VI it
is the treaty as domestically interpreted, or even more narrowly, as the Senate
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international treaty may not violate any provision of the United States
Constitution.3 °7 If a conflict arises between a federal statute and a rati-
fied treaty, then the more recently enacted instrument prevails.
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2. Customary Law Enforcement
International law may be enforced in the United States based on its
status as customary law.309 Customary international law is defined as
"part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts
of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right de-
pending upon it are duly presented for their determination., 310 In Filar-
tiga v. Pena-Irala,311 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
understood it, that is the supreme law of the land; and that the President is re-
quired to implement the treaty as so understood, regardless of whether that
would impose greater obligations than necessary under international law or re-
quire the United States to breach its obligations internationally. Such a rule is
not, has never been, and should not be, the law. The rule is and should continue
to be that there is only one treaty. If the United States is bound internationally it
is bound domestically unless the treaty is unconstitutional or Congress enacts su-
perseding legislation. If the United States is not bound internationally, it is not
bound domestically, at least by the exercise of the treaty power.
Id. at 67 (footnote omitted).
307. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2; see also Burke, supra note 302, at 295-314 (discuss-
ing direct enforcement of international human rights treaty law in the United States).
308. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 n.34 (1955); see also Burke, supra note 302, at 295-
96 (explaining the priority given to the more recently enacted instrument).
309. Burke, supra note 302, at 315-22 (discussing enforcement of international human
rights law as customary law).
310. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see Jordan J. Paust, Customary
International Law: Its Nature, Sources and Status as Law of the United States, 12 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 59 (1990) (defining the concept of customary international law and describing its
origins). Paust identifies "several constitutional bases" mandating the incorporation of
customary international law into domestic United States law. Id. at 77-91; see also Lillich,
supra note 302, at 393-408 (discussing the status of customary international law in the
United States); see also Theodor Meron, On A Hierarchy of International Human Rights,
80 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (1986) (documenting efforts to establish a hierarchy of norms in
international human rights law). Meron explains that the establishment of a hierarchy of
such norms is highly problematic, but notes that the right of freedom from torture is one of
the few rights whose place at the top of such a hierarchy is unquestionable. Id. at 4.
Meron argues that four rights represent an "irreducible core" of fundamental rights. Id. at
11. Those include "the right to life and the prohibitions of slavery, torture and retroactive
penal measures." Id.; see also David Catania, Note, The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and Sodomy Laws: A Federal Common Law Right to Privacy for Homosexuals
Based on Customary International Law, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 289, 323-25 (1994) (arguing
that customary international law mandates the recognition of a federal common law right
to privacy for homosexual activity).
311. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). Dr. Joel Filartiga and his daughter, Dolly, citizens of
Paraguay, brought an action in the Eastern District of New York against Americo
Norberto Pena-Irala, erstwhile Inspector General for police in Ascuncion, Paraguay, for
the wrongful death of Dr. Filartiga's son, Joelito. Id. at 878. The Filartigas alleged that on
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Circuit ruled that torture violates customary international law and, there-
fore, jurisdiction could be established in the United States under the
Alien Tort Claims Act 312 to hear a claim that Paraguayan officials tor-
tured a Paraguayan national in Paraguay.313
March 29, 1976, Joelito was kidnapped, tortured, and murdered by Pena-Irala in retaliation
for Dr. Filartiga's political opposition to the regime of President Alfredo Stroessner. Id.
By 1978, Dr. Filartiga, Dolly Filartiga, and Pena-Irala all lived in the United States, where
Dolly Filartiga served Pena-Irala with a summons and a civil complaint. Id. at 878-79. The
complaint sought compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of 10 million dollars
and also sought to enjoin Pena-Irala's deportation to Paraguay, so the Filartigas could pro-
ceed with their suit against him in the United States. Id. at 879. According to Judge Kauf-
man's opinion:
The cause of action is stated as arising under "wrongful death statutes; the U.N.
Charter; the Universal Declaration on Human Rights; the U.N. Declaration
Against Torture; the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; and
other pertinent declarations, documents and practices constituting the customary
international law of human rights and the law of nations," as well as 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 [the Alien Tort Claims Act], Article II, sec. 2 and the Supremacy Clause of
the U.S. Constitution.
Id. Although the court recognized that the Alien Tort Claims Act enabled the Filartigas to
overcome the jurisdictional obstacles to bringing their claim, United States authorities de-
ported Pena-Irala to Paraguay on May 22, 1979. Id. at 880.
For a more detailed appraisal of the Filartiga case, see Karen E. Holt, Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala After Ten Years: Major Breakthrough or Legal Oddity?, GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 543
(1990) (analyzing the impact of the Filartiga decision on the application of international
human rights law in the United States).
312. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976).
313. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889; see Holt, supra note 311, at 568 (evaluating the impact of
the Filartiga decision and concluding that, in addition to its contribution to the establish-
ment of an individual remedy under United States law, Filartiga also bore the "psychologi-
cal and academic value" of a "moral and even political victory for plaintiffs, both
domestically and internationally").
But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (dismissing an
action brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350). In Tel-Oren, a group
largely comprising Israeli citizens sued the Libyan Arab Republic, the Palestinian Libera-
tion Organization, the Palestine Information Office and other Palestine-affiliated groups,
for compensatory and punitive damages arising from an armed attack on a civilian bus in
Israel in March 1978. Id. at 775. The plaintiffs were either survivors of, or had lost rela-
tives in, the attack. Id.
All three members of the three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals con-
curred in the result, but for different reasons. Id. at 775. Judge Bork wrote that although
§ 1350 provides a grant of jurisdiction, the plaintiffs failed to establish a private right of
action. Id. at 811-19 (Bork, J., concurring). Judge Robb dismissed the action on the
grounds that the dispute involved international political action and, therefore, was not jus-
ticiable under the political question doctrine. Id. at 823-27. (Robb, J., concurring). The
third member of the panel, Judge Edwards, interpreted § 1350 in a manner consistent with
Filartiga. Id. at 781 (Edwards, J., concurring). Judge Edwards argued that § 1350 does
provide a cause of action for certain categories of torts "committed in violation of the law
of nations." Id. at 779. Therefore, the plaintiffs should not be required to establish a pri-
vate right of action independent of § 1350. Id. However, Judge Edwards recognized that
"[tihe Filartiga formulation is not flawless" because "it places an awesome duty on federal
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3. Enforcement by Constructive Interpretation
International law may be used as a persuasive, interpretive guide in
defining rights under domestic state and federal law.314
4. Applying the Three Enforcement Theories to the Incorporation
of Article 7 Into United States Domestic Law
Article 7 of ICCPR should be directly enforceable in the United States
under the first, or direct enforcement, theory.315 But assuming, argu-
endo, that article 7 is not directly enforceable, the power of the article 7
prohibitions as both customary international law and as an interpretive
tool under the second and third theories remains considerable 6.3 " Fur-
thermore, the theory of jus cogens might compel the application of inter-
national standards regarding torture.3 1 7 The doctrine of self-execution,
however, poses a potential obstacle to direct enforcement of international
district courts to derive from an amorphous entity-i.e., the 'law of nations'-standards of
liability applicable in concrete situations." Id. at 781. Since the plaintiffs failed to allege
facts sufficient to support a § 1350 claim, Judge Edwards concurred in the dismissal. Id. at
798; accord Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541-43 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (Jensen,
D.J.) (ruling that § 1350 provided a right of action to two Argentine citizens who brought a
claim against an Argentine general seeking damages on behalf of themselves and their
families for acts of murder, torture, and prolonged and arbitrary detention committed by
military personnel acting under the defendant's authority).
The Forti action was dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to establish "the requisite
degree of international concensus [sic] which demonstrates a customary international
norm" regarding the disappearance of the mother of one of the plaintiffs. Id. at 1542-43.
The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' claims of "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment"
on the grounds that they failed to provide sufficient evidence of international consensus
regarding this norm. Id. at 1543. The court concluded that this claim "lacks readily ascer-
tainable parameters." Id. The court later dismissed the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider
dismissal of the claim for "Torture or other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment," but
granted leave to amend the complaint to include the claim for "Disappearance and Pre-
sumed Summary Execution." Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707, 712 (N.D. Cal.
1988).
For further discussion of the Tel-Oren decision, see Anthony D'Amato, What Does Tel-
Oren Tell Lawyers? Judge Bork's Concept of the Law of Nations Is Seriously Mistaken, 79
AM. J. INT'L L. 92 (1985) (providing a detailed critique of Judge Bork's position); Alfred P.
Rubin, What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers? Professor D'Amato's Concept of American Ju-
risdiction Is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 105 (1985) (responding to Professor
D'Amato's critique of Judge Bork); Anthony D'Amato, What Does Tel-Oren Tell Law-
yers? Professor Rubin's Reply Does Not Live up to Its Title, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 112 (1985)
(rebutting Professor Rubin's response).
314. Burke, supra note 302, at 322-28 (discussing the use of international human rights
law to expand the scope of protections against human rights abuses under national law in
state and federal courts).
315. Id. at 295-314 (discussing direct enforcement of international human rights law).
316. Id. at 315-22 (discussing the customary law theory), 322-26 (discussing the inter-
pretive theory).
317. See infra notes 336-49 and accompanying text (discussing the theory of jus cogens).
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law in general, and of article 7 in particular, in the United States.318
a. The Doctrine of Self-Execution
In addition to the constitutional constraints on the application of trea-
ties as domestic law,3 19 the Supreme Court has imposed a further re-
straint: the doctrine of self-execution.32 ° The Court first introduced the
doctrine in the early nineteenth century, in Foster v. Neilson.321 There,
the Court held that a treaty is self-executing, or directly implementable,
in the United States only if "it operates of itself without the aid of any
legislative provision.
''3 22
318. See infra notes 319-35 and accompanying text (discussing the self-execution
doctrine).
319. See supra notes 302-14 and accompanying text (discussing various theories
whereby international law may be applicable in the United States).
320. See Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988) (describ-
ing and defining the doctrine of self-execution). Paust concludes that all treaties are pre-
sumptively self-executing, "except those ... which, by their terms considered in context,
require domestic implementing legislation or seek to declare war on behalf of the United
States. All treaties are supreme federal law, but some treaties, by their terms, are not
directly operative." Id. at 782; see also Lillich, supra note 302, at 372-74 (discussing the
Supreme Court's decision in Foster v. Neilson and the concept of self-execution); Burke,
supra note 302, at 301-04 (describing and defining the concept of self-execution).
International legal scholars often draw a distinction between "monist" and "dualist"
states. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed.
1990); JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELA-
TIONS (3d ed. 1995). According to JACKSON ET AL., "the 'monist' state's legal system is
considered to include international treaties to which [the state] is obligated. . . On the
other hand, . . . [i]n a dualist state, international treaties are part of a separate legal system
from that of the domestic law." Id. at 126. The doctrine of self-execution in effect bridges
the gap between monist and dualist states in that it establishes that dualist states must
enact implementing legislation in order to give effect to international treaties within their
borders. But see Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 620-22 (Cal. 1952) (holding that articles 55
and 56 of the United Nations Charter are not self-executing); see also infra notes 328-35
and accompanying text (discussing the Sei Fujii decision). In light of Foster and Sei Fujii,
the United States must be regarded as a dualist state. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
253, 314 (1829) (recognizing that the doctrine of self-execution applies under United States
law); Sei Fujii, 242 P.2d at 619-22; see also NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 3, at 579-
88 (discussing the Sei Fujii decision and the self-execution doctrine).
321. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (recognizing that the doctrine of self-execution
applies under United States law). This decision later was overruled in part due to a differ-
ent interpretation of the treaty sought to be enforced. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 51 (1833). Foster concerned title to a disputed tract of land in Louisiana that the
plaintiff purchased from the Spanish government. Id. at 254. Plaintiff claimed that his title
should be recognized under United States law pursuant to a treaty that Spain and the
United States signed in 1819. Id. at 277. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Marshall, ruled that plaintiff could not base his claim on the treaty because Con-
gress had not ratified the treaty. Id. at 314-15.
322. Id. at 314. Chief Justice Marshall analogized such a treaty to a contract that
awaited congressional "execution." Id.
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a legislative act. It
1996] America The Cruel and Unusual?
In determining whether a treaty may be deemed self-executing, the
most common point of reference is the intent of the signatory parties.32 3
If such an intent is unclear, the Third Restatement of the Foreign Rela-
tions Law of the United States [Third Restatement] advises courts to con-
sider any statements that the executive or legislative branches made
concerning the treaty.32 4 International legal scholars, however, have ar-
gued that self-execution must be evaluated in a broader context than that
of the intent of the United States.32 5 Indeed some have argued that
United States courts are neglecting their constitutional duty under the
Supremacy Clause if they do not seek to implement faithfully the terms of
a ratified treaty.
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does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished, especially so far
as its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into execution by the sovereign
power of the respective parties to the instrument.
In the United States a different principle is established. Our constitution de-
clares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently, to be regarded in
courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of
itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipu-
lation import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a particu-
lar act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and
the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the
Court.
Id. Such implementing legislation is sometimes referred to as an "act of transformation."
See JACKSON ET AL., supra note 320, at 127.
323. See 1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 111 cmt. h (1987) [hereinafter THIRD RESTATEMENT]. The Third Restatement
stipulates that:
In the absence of special agreement, it is ordinarily for the United States to de-
cide how it will carry out its international obligations. Accordingly, the intention
of the United States determines whether an agreement is to be self-executing in
the United States or should await implementation by legislation or appropriate
executive or administrative action.
Id.
324. Id. The Third Restatement suggests that the following sources provide persuasive
evidence of the United States' intent: "any statement by the President in concluding the
agreement or in submitting it to the Senate for consent or to the Congress as a whole for
approval, and of any expression by the Senate or by Congress in dealing with the agree-
ment." Id.
325. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 302, at 302. These commentators argue that self-exe-
cution depends on obligations that the treaty creates. Id. If the agreement merely involves
a promise to enact domestic legislation or a general declaration of intent, then it is not self-
executing. Id. Stefan Riesenfeld argues that a treaty is self-executing if it "(a) involves the
rights and duties of individuals; (b) does not cover a subject for which legislative action is
required by the Constitution; and (c) does not leave discretion to the parties in the applica-
tion of the particular provision." Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing
Treaties and GATT: A Notable German Judgment, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 548, 550 (1971); see
also JACKSON ET AL., supra note 320, at 129 (examining how a court determines when an
international agreement is self-executing).
326. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that "all Treaties made.., under the Authority of
the United States shall be the supreme Law of the Land"); see Von Dardel v. U.S.S.R., 623
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The issue of whether human rights clauses of the United Nations are
self-executing in the United States, once ratified, is an open question.
The International Court of Justice has ruled that the human rights provi-
sions of the United Nations Charter impose binding obligations on all
United Nations member states.327 The Supreme Court of California,
however, in Sei Fujii v. California,328 ruled that articles 55(c) and 56 of
the United Nations Charter are not self-executing.3 29 In Sei Fujii, the
plaintiff, a Japanese alien, brought suit to recover land that he purchased
in 1948 that escheated to the state under a California statute.330 The
plaintiff argued that articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter,
which stipulate that member nations will promote the observance of
human rights without discriminating on the basis of race, superseded the
California statute.331 The Supreme Court of California ruled that an indi-
vidual could not bring suit under the United Nations Charter absent do-
mestic implementing legislation.332
F. Supp. 246, 256 (D.D.C. 1985), vacated, dismissed, 736 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1990) (quoting
RICHARD LILLICH, FRANK NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF
LAW AND POLICY 76 (1979)).
327. Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 57.
328. 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
329. Id. at 620; see Lillich, supra note 302, at 374-85 (discussing the applicability of the
United Nations Charter under United States law and concluding that Sei Fujii should be
overruled); Richard B. Lillich, The Role of Domestic Courts in Promoting International
Human Rights Norms, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 302, at 105
(examining New York state and federal cases in which parties attempted to invoke interna-
tional law, and in particular, the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration, in
domestic litigation). Lillich criticizes the failure of those courts to accommodate interna-
tional law in the domestic legal context, and attributes a large measure of responsibility for
this trend to the Sei Fujii decision. Id. at 105, 130-31. Lillich applauds those litigants who
have invoked international law, stating that "[a]t the very least, they have raised the con-
sciousness of lawyers, judges, government officials and, last but not least, the general public
- both in the United States and abroad - to the existence and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, to the potential of this body of law." Id. at 130-31. For further discussion, see
Virginia Leary, When Does the Implementation of International Human Rights Constitute
Interference Into the Essentially Domestic Affairs of a State?, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW, supra note 302, at 15. Leary concludes that:
gross violations of human rights can no longer be considered a matter essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of the offending state under the U.N. Charter,
although there are limitations on the permissible actions of the U.N. in response
to such violations in the absence of the finding of a direct threat to international
peace.
Id. at 21.
330. Sei Fujii, 242 P.2d at 619.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 619-20. It is important to draw a distinction between the questions of
whether a treaty is self-executing and whether an individual may be entitled to invoke that
treaty's provisions - more specifically, whether the individual has "standing." JACKSON
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Professor (formerly California Supreme Court Judge) Frank Newman
has argued that the California Supreme Court's comments in Sei Fiujii
regarding the self-execution issue were dicta. 333 Newman reasoned that
subsequently ratified United Nations treaties such as ICCPR contain a
degree of specificity not found in the United Nations Charter, increasing
the likelihood that those subsequent treaties are self-executing. 334 Arti-
cle 7 contains such specificity.
33"
b. The Jus Cogens Argument for Direct Enforcement of Article 7 in
the United States
In general, states may derogate their obligations under a particular pro-
vision of a treaty by adding a limitation to ratification.336 Some provi-
ET AL., supra note 320, at 129. Some forms of treaties or international agreements may be
self-executing or may enjoy the support of implementing domestic legislation, yet individu-
als may not have standing to invoke purportedly relevant provisions in litigation. See
Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 849-50 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (ruling that individuals could
not rely on a United Nations resolution calling on members to have no dealings with South
Africa as long as South Africa continued to occupy Namibia). In Diggs, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia stated that "the U.N. resolution underlying
that obligation does not confer rights on the citizens of the United States that are enforcea-
ble in court in the absence of implementing legislation." Id. at 850. For further discussion
of the Diggs case, see INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 302, at 125-30.
333. See People v. Mirmirani, 636 P.2d 1130, 1138 n.1 (Cal. 1981) (Newman J., concur-
ring) (discussing the "dicta" in Sei Fujii).
. 334. See NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 3, at 294 (citing Frank Newman, Inter-
preting the Human Rights Clauses of the U.N. Charter, 1972 REVUE DES DROITS DE
L'HOMME 283). Newman and Weissbrodt argue that the International Bill of Human
Rights provides the authoritative interpretation of the more vague language of articles 55
and 56 of the United Nations Charter. Id. at 582. The greater specificity that the Interna-
tional Bill of Human Rights offers therefore rebuts any suggestion that its provisions may
be considered non-self-executing due to vagueness. Id. This position is known as the New-
man-Berkeley thesis. Id. at 582 n.14. Newman and Weissbrodt have argued that the ques-
tion of whether articles 55 and 56 should be deemed to be self-executing as to a particular
right in the International Bill of Human Rights depends on the specificity of the language
of the particular provision. Id. at 583. Of course, the "non-self-executing" declaration
might be interpreted as an implicit acknowledgement that ICCPR is otherwise directly
enforceable in the United States.
335. Id. Newman and Weissbrodt argue that article 7 "is both sufficiently precise and
generally accepted" to be deemed self-executing. Id.
336. See Vienna Convention, supra note 305. The Vienna Convention recognizes that
states may enter a reservation when ratifying a particular provision of a treaty. Id. art.
2(1)(d) (defining a reservation as a "unilateral statement, however phrased or named,
made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty,
whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the
treaty in their application to that State"). Id. Article 19 of the Vienna Convention stipu-
lates that "[a] State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a
treaty, formulate a reservation unless ... the reservation is incompatible with the object
and purpose of the treaty." Id. art. 19. Article 20 provides a mechanism whereby a State
party may challenge the legitimacy of a reservation made by another State party. Id. art.
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sions, however, are considered so fundamental that no derogation can be
contemplated. 337 The doctrine of jus cogens recognizes the establishment
of certain peremptory norms under 'international law.3 38 Article 53 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties [Vienna Convention] defines a
peremptory norm as a norm from which, due to fundamental character,
no derogation is permitted. 339 This lack of derogability distinguishes a
peremptory from a customary norm.3 4 ° The Third Restatement, in clari-
20. Articles 20 and 21 clearly state that reservations do not preclude the entry into force of
a treaty. Id. arts. 20, 21; see Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 22-26 (delineating the
conditions under which the International Court of Justice was prepared to permit State
parties to make reservations to the Genocide Convention); 14 MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN,
DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 17, at 137-38 (1970) (defining an "understanding" as a
statement that clarifies or explains a treaty provision). Whiteman also defines "declara-
tion" and "statement" as interchangeable terms used to denote an effort by a State party to
give notice of an aspect of its law or policy). Id. at 138. See generally IAN M. SINCLAIR,
THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (1973) (describing and analyzing the
Vienna Convention).
337. See ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 4(2). Article 4(2) of ICCPR is the non-derogability
clause, which stipulates that States parties may not derogate or deviate from certain of the
most fundamental ICCPR provisions. Id.
338. Stanislaw E. Nahlik, Book Review, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 779 (1990) (reviewing LAURI
HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (JUS COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: HISTORICAL
DEVELOPMENT, CRITERIA, PRESENT STATUS). Nahlik quotes Hannikainen's description of
peremptory norms:
[Tihere are, in international law, rules of a peremptory character, referred to by
scholars as jus cogens norms. To have that status, however, they must comply
with four criteria ... namely: they must be norms of general international law;
they must be accepted by the international community of states as a whole: they
must not be capable of derogation; and there must be no possibility of modifying
them in any other way than by new peremptory norms.
Id. at 779 (citation omitted). Nahlik states that Hannikainen adds a fifth requirement:
peremptory norms create an obligation toward the international community of states. Id.
Nahlik describes Hannikainen's view of jus cogens as "a distinct supreme category within
the whole body of international law rules." Id.; see also Meron, supra note 310, at 13-21
(discussing and defining the doctrine of jus cogens).
339. Vienna Convention, supra note 305, art. 53. A peremptory norm is defined by
article 53 of the Vienna Convention as "a norm accepted and recognized by the interna-
tional community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted
and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having
the same character." Id. The United States has signed but not ratified the Vienna Conven-
tion. NEWMAN & WEISSBRODT, supra note 3, at 290 n.1.
340. Nadine Strossen, Recent U.S. and International Judicial Protection of Individual
Rights: A Comparative Legal Process Analysis and Proposed Synthesis, 41 HASTINGS L.J.
805, 816 (1990) (distinguishing between customary and peremptory norms). Strossen de-
fines customary norms as "those that are so widely accepted by the international commu-
nity that they are binding even on states that have not ratified treaties embodying them."
Id. at 816. Strossen then distinguishes peremptory norms as follows: "most international
human rights principles are included in a subset of customary norms that are so fundamen-
tal that they are nonderogable. Referred to as 'peremptory' norms or 'jus cogens,' these
standards cannot be changed by agreement." Id. at 816-17. Strossen then cites the defini-
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fying the Vienna Convention's definition, emphasizes that a norm does
not lose its peremptory character in the face of the dissent of a few na-
tions, so long as a substantial majority of nations recognize it.341 The
Third Restatement's definition of a peremptory norm includes "gross vio-
lations of human rights," which suggests that the definition includes
torture.342
If torture, as incorporated into article 7 of ICCPR, does constitute a
peremptory, non-derogable norm, the validity of the United States' "non-
self-executing" declaration may be challenged on the ground that it vio-
lates the doctrine of jus cogens.343 Further, even if article 7 is not deemed
to contain a peremptory norm, article 27 of the Vienna Convention pro-
vides a response to the United States' non-self-execution argument by
stipulating that "[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. ''341 One means of
reconciling the "non-self-executing" declaration with the peremptory
character of the norm against torture is that the United States' qualifica-
tion does not seek to derogate obligations of the United States respecting
torture, but merely to limit the applicability of the other elements of arti-
cle 7.345 However, that argument contains an inherent flaw: ICCPR itself
contains a non-derogability clause, whereby a State party may not disre-
gard or abstain from its non-derogable provisions.346 Article 4(2) of
ICCPR designates article 7 as a non-derogable provision.347 Therefore,
the "non-self-executing" declaration is not only contradictory to the es-
sence of ICCPR, but also constitutes an attempt to disregard one of
ICCPR's most fundamental provisions. 348 As such, the "non-self-execut-
ing" declaration reads more as a repudiation of ICCPR's essence.349
tion of peremptory norms in the Vienna Convention for further clarification. Id. at 817
n.50 (citing Vienna Convention, supra note 305, art. 53).
341. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 323, § 102, reporter's note 6.
342. Id. The Third Restatement specifically lists genocide, slave-trading, slavery,
apartheid, and "perhaps attacks on diplomats" as violating jus cogens. Id.
343. See supra notes 336-40 and accompanying text (explaining that norms that are
peremptory or jus cogens are non-derogable).
344. Vienna Convention, supra note 305, art. 27.
345. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 7. These might include the article 7 wording concerning
"cruel, inhuman or degrading" and the article 7 protection of treatment as well as punish-
ment. See id.
346. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 4(2). Article 4(2) of ICCPR states that "no derogation
from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provi-
sion." Id.
347. Id.
348. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 4(2); contra SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 652. The
Senate Report makes no reference to the non-derogability provision contained in article
4(2) of ICCPR. Id.
349. One writer has argued that the reservations, qualifications, and declarations have
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III. THE "NON-SELF-EXECUTING" DECLARATION
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations' report on ratification of
ICCPR [Senate Report] contained a number of general arguments in
favor of the "non-self-executing" declaration. First, it sought to prevent
the establishment of a new cause of action under ICCPR in federal and
state courts.35 ° Second, it stated that ICCPR protections generally al-
ready are available under United States law.351 Third, the Senate Report
argued that certain ICCPR provisions may conflict with the United States
Constitution.352 For example, hate speech violates ICCPR, but the
United States Supreme Court has recognized it as a protected right under
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.353
The Senate Report specifically addressed article 7's applicability to
American jurisprudence. 354 The Senate Report argued that, because the
United States already was in the process of ratifying the "more detailed"
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment [Torture Convention] 35 5 an unreserved ratifi-
not eliminated the individual's.recourse to ICCPR under United States law. Sandra B.
Reiss, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Can It Free the Cuban De-
tainees?, 6 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 577, 631 (1992) (analyzing whether the United States'
ratification of ICCPR might offer Cuban refugees detained by the United States a legal
remedy). Reiss argues that the ratification of ICCPR offers "avenues of hope to those who
are currently 'excluded' by our legal system." Id. at 631. Reiss, writing in the immediate
aftermath of the ratification, concludes on an optimistic note:
Even though [ICCPR] was ratified as non-self-executing, it may 'assist in more
liberal interpretation[s] of constitutional and legislative provisions, thus enlarging
the sphere of the domestic protection of human rights.' It is especially important
that the United States interpret its domestic legislation in keeping with its inter-
national obligations.
It would be sadly ironic if while the U.S. Constitution had an important affect
[sic] in the formation of the Covenant, the Covenant would later play a narrow
role in effecting rights in our own nation.
Id. at 634 (footnotes omitted).
350. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 657.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 649-50. The Committee Comments stated that "[t]he principal argument
against ratification was rooted in concern about certain limitations that the Covenant al-
lows on freedom of speech and freedom of expression." Id. at 650.
353. Id. The Committee Comments stated that ratification was conditional on ensuring
that "no restrictions will be imposed on the rights of free speech and expression in the
United States." Id.; see, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (hold-
ing a city ordinance facially unconstitutional under the First Amendment for imposing spe-
cial prohibitions against those expressing views on disfavored subjects).
354. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 654.
355. Torture Convention, supra note 17. Article 1 of the Torture Convention provides
a highly detailed definition of 'torture.' Id. art. 1. Article 16 of the Torture Convention,
however, contains highly similar language to that of article 7 of ICCPR in stating that
"[ejach State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other
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cation of ICCPR would be both redundant and give rise to a lack of uni-
formity of interpretation between the Torture Convention and ICCPR.3 56
The Senate Report did not draw a direct parallel between the protections
of the Eighth Amendment and those of article 7 of ICCPR.35 7 Instead,
the Senate Report asserted that "[t]he rights guaranteed by the Covenant
are similar to those guaranteed by the U. S. Constitution and the Bill of
Rights." '358 Specifically, the Senate Report equated article 7 protections
with those available under the Fifth, 359 Eighth,360 and Fourteenth
361
Amendments of the United States Constitution. 361 The Senate Report
acknowledged, however, that article 7 offers greater protection than
United States law on two issues: the death row phenomenon,363 and the
acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to
torture." Id. art. 16.
356. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 654. The Senate Report recommended the fol-
lowing reservation: "[t]he United States considers itself bound by Article 7 [of ICCPR] to
the extent that 'cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment' means the cruel and
unusual treatment or punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States." Id. The stated rationale for this
reservation was the need to ensure uniformity of interpretation between ICCPR and the
Torture Convention that the United States planned to ratify. Id.
357. Id. (limiting the scope of the United States' ratification of article 7 to the protec-
tions available under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments).
358. Id. at 649.
359. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides that:
[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
Id.
360. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (stating that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted").
361. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment provides that:
[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they re-
side. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
362. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 654. This Comment does not address the extent
to which article 7 protections may be found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
363. Id. The Senate Report recognized that "the Human Rights Committee like the
European Court of Human Rights [ ] has adopted the view that prolonged judicial pro-
ceedings in cases involving capital punishment could in certain circumstances constitute
[cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment]." Id.
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imposition of capital punishment on juveniles.3"
A. The Death Row Phenomenon
Neither the Eighth Amendment 365 nor ICCPR3 66 expressly prohibit
the imposition of capital punishment. However, while the United States
Supreme Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment as imposing only
procedural and methodological limits on the imposition of capital punish-
ment,367 ICCPR is unambiguously hostile368 to what Justice Brennan
once described as "truly an awesome punishment.-
369
364. Id. at 650. The Senate Committee Comments stated that "the Covenant prohibits
the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by persons below the age of
eighteen but U.S. law allows it for juveniles between the ages of 16 and 18." Id.
365. See supra note 13 (quoting the language of the Eighth Amendment).
366. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 6(2).
367. See supra notes 110-68 and accompanying text (discussing Eighth Amendment
death penalty jurisprudence).
368. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 6. Article 6 specifically addresses the death penalty and,
although it does not prohibit application of the death penalty, the article emphasizes that
those "countries which have not abolished the death penalty" should reserve this sanction
only for "the most serious crimes." Id. art. 6(2). Article 6(2) is stated in terms that suggest
that abolition of the death penalty is, or at least should be, the norm:
[i]n countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may
be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at
the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the
present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final
judgement rendered by a competent court.
Id.
Article 6(6) confirms this interpretation, stating that "[n]othing in this article shall be
invoked to delay or to prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to the
present Covenant." Id. art. 6(6).
If ICCPR's failure to incorporate an express prohibition of the death penalty suggested
equivocation on this issue, the General Assembly's adoption of a Second Optional Proto-
col eliminated any such suggestion. Second Optional Protocol to the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, G.A. Res.
44/128 (XLIV), U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 206, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989),
approved Dec. 15, 1989, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1464 (1990) [hereinafter OP2]. The title of
OP2 incorporates the words, "aiming at the abolition of the death penalty." Id. (emphasis
added). A country that has ratified OP2 has agreed that no individual within its jurisdic-
tion shall be executed, and agrees to undertake "all necessary measures to abolish the
death penalty within its jurisdiction." Id. art. 1(2). By December 31, 1994, 25 States par-
ties to ICCPR had ratified, and a further five had signed but not yet ratified, OP2. Human
Rights: International Instruments: Chart of Ratifications as at 31 December 1994 (ST/HR/4/
Revil) (1995). The United States was not among these signatories. Id.
369. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 290 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice
Brennan noted earlier in his opinion that "[tihe only explanation for the uniqueness of
death is its extreme severity. Death is today an unusually severe punishment, unusual in its
pain, in its finality, and in its enormity. No other existing punishment is comparable to
death in terms of physical and mental suffering." Id. at 287.
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The Senate Report conceded that United States law does not offer the
same protection against the death row phenomenon that article 7 pro-
vides.370 In its discussion of the death row phenomenon, the Senate Re-
370. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 654. Richard Lillich has argued, however, that
Soering might reflect customary international law as an interpretation of article 3 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, which tracks the Universal Declaration. Lillich,
supra note 243, at 146. One federal judge has described the limits of Soering's applicability
in the United States thus: "Soering constitutes an important precedent on the refusal to
extradite because of anticipated torture, cruel conditions of incarceration or lack of due
process at trial in the requesting country. It reflects a persuasive though non-binding inter-
national standard." Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 414 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 910
F.2d 1063 (2d Cir.), stay denied, 497 U.S. 1054 (1990).
Yet, ironically, the United States Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia has
been most influential over the development of what might be termed the international
"death row phenomenon" jurisprudence. See, e.g., Catholic Comm'n for Justice and Peace
in Zimbabwe v. Attorney-General, Judgment No. S.C. 73/93 of 24 June 1993, reprinted in
14 HuM. RTS. L. J. 323, 326 (1993) (citing Justice Brennan's discussion in Furman of the
"mental pain" that the death penalty inflicts); Riley v. Attorney-General of Jamaica, 1
A.C. 719, 734 (1983) (Lord Scarman and Lord Brightman, dissenting) (citing Furman in
condemning the "inhumanity and degradation a delayed death penalty can cause").
Furman certainly opened the door to the view that the death row phenomenon violates
the Eighth Amendment. See Note, Mental Suffering Under Sentence of Death: A Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, 57 IOWA L. REv. 814 (1972) (arguing that the death row phenome-
non constitutes cruel and unusual punishment).
Since the ratification of ICCPR, members of the Supreme Court have expressed views
on the death row phenomenon that are more consistent with international opinion. See,
e.g., Lackey v. Texas, 115 S. Ct. 1421 (1995) (Stevens, J., commenting on denial of certio-
rari). In Lackey, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, questioned "whether executing
a prisoner who ha[d] already spent some 17 years on death row violates the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment." Id. at 1421. Justice Ste-
vens, in arguing that such a protracted stay on death row would have offended the English
Bill of Rights of 1689 (the prototype for the United States' Eighth Amendment provision),
quoted the Riley case, which stated that " 'execution after inordinate delay would have
infringed the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments to be found in section 10
of the Bill of Rights of 1689.' " Id. at 1422 (quoting Riley v. Attorney-General of Jamaica,
1 A.C. 719, 734 (1983)); see also State v. McKenzie, 894 P.2d 289, 294 (Mont. 1995)
(Leaphart, J., dissenting) (arguing for remand to consider whether 20 years on death row
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in light of Justice Stevens' comments in Lackey).
Just prior to his retirement from the Supreme Court, Justice Blackmun repudiated the
death penalty in scathing terms:
[f]rom this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death. For
more than 20 years I have endeavored - indeed, I have struggled - along with a
majority of this Court, to develop procedural and substantive rules that would
lend more than the mere appearance of fairness to the death penalty endeavor.
Rather than continue to coddle the Court's delusion that the desired level of fair-
ness has been achieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally and
intellectually obligated simply to concede that the death penalty experiment has
failed. It is virtually self-evident to me now that no combination of procedural
rules or substantive regulations ever can save the death penalty from its inherent
constitutional deficiencies . . . The problem is that the inevitability of factual,
legal, and moral error gives us a system that we know must wrongly kill some
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port made specific reference to the European Court is landmark ruling in
Soering v. United Kingdom.371 The European Court did not premise its
decision in Soering on the threat of the death penalty per se, but on the
prospect that the defendant would have to endure a long wait on death
row.372 The Senate Report acknowledged that, following Soering, the
defendants, a system that fails to deliver the fair, consistent, and reliable
sentences of death required by the Constitution.
Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1130-31 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (footnote omitted).
Perhaps international pressure has played some part in these indications of concern ema-
nating from the Supreme Court. See, e.g., British Lawyers Try to Halt U.S. Executions,
REUTERS, Feb. 21, 1995 (available in LEXIS, Nexis, Curnws file) (detailing the efforts of
lawyers representing the Bar of England and Wales Human Rights Committee to petition
the United States courts on behalf of the defendants in Lackey, arguing that holding the
two prisoners for a combined duration exceeding 30 years on death row amounted to cruel,
inhuman, and degrading treatment, in violation of both the Eighth Amendment and
ICCPR).
However, American public opinion seems to have been moving in the opposite direc-
tion. See, e.g., Tina Rosenberg, The Deadliest D.A., N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, July 16,1995,
at 20 (profiling Philadelphia District Attorney Lynne Abraham, of whom Rosenberg states
that "no one is more zealous in seeking the death penalty," and attributing Abraham's
popularity to her enthusiasm for capital punishment). In March, 1995, following the Re-
publican Party's landslide gains in the national elections of November, 1994, New York
revived its death penalty statute. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.06 (McKinney 1995); see Today's
News Update, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 8, 1995, at 1 (reporting that recently-elected Governor
George Pataki, "using the pens of two slain police officers, signed a bill yesterday making
New York the 38th state with a death penalty"). Bronx District Attorney Robert T. John-
son responded that his office would not seek the death penalty, but would opt to use
prosecutorial discretion to seek life without parole. Id.
371. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 654 (discussing Soering v. United Kingdom, 161
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989)).
372. Lillich, supra note 243, at 144. Lillich argues that "the Court apparently was reluc-
tant to rule that the 'death row phenomenon' in itself amounted to inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. Why it did not do so one can only speculate, for ample data to
justify such a ruling have been available for several decades." Id.
The English House of Lords, however, has ruled that the death row phenomenon does
not violate article 7 where the prisoner provides the impetus for the protracted wait on
death row by filing successive appeals. Riley, 1 A.C. at 725. But see Pratt and Morgan v.
Attorney-General of Jamaica, 2 A.C. 1 (1993) (examining the majority decision in Riley).
In Pratt and Morgan, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council ruled that a prolonged
delay in carrying out a death sentence could constitute inhuman treatment, irrespective of
whether the state or the individual's pursuit of appeals caused the delay. Id.; see also
Martin v. Jamaica, Communication No. 317/1988, reprinted in 1 ITrr'L HuM. RTs. R. 128,
131 (1994) (ruling that a prolonged stay on death row due to protracted judicial proceed-
ings does not per se constitute cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment under article 7, even
if it becomes a source of psychological strain for the condemned individual).
The Riley critique, that it is inconsistent to argue that a protracted wait on death row
violates the international standard when successive appeals have precipitated the wait, has
been criticized by both judges and writers. See Lenhard et al. v. Wolff, 444 U.S. 807, 812
(1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting from the Court's decision to deny a stay of execution);
Melvin I. Urofsky, A Right to Die: Termination of Appeal for Condemned Prisoners, 75 J.
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death row phenomenon373 may give rise to violations of ICCPR.37 4 This,
the Senate Report argued, obliged the United States to enter a "reserva-
tion limiting our undertakings in this respect to the prohibitions of the
Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments. '37 5
B. The Application of Capital Punishment to Juveniles
The Senate Report also incorporated a reservation to the ratification of
ICCPR with respect to the execution of juveniles.3 76 This reservation
sought to clarify that "the United States does not accept the [ICCPR]
prohibition on executing people for crimes committed while they were 16
or 17 years of age."'3 77 Specifically, the reservation limits the applicability
of article 6 of ICCPR in the United States."7 8 Article 6(5) states in perti-
nent part that a "[s]entence of death shall not be imposed for crimes com-
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 553, 554 (1984) (describing the view that there is no right to
terminate appeals since this is tantamount to "state-abetted suicide"). Urofsky disagrees
with this view and argues that, under a capital punishment system, condemned prisoners
should be free to elect to terminate their appeals and expedite their execution. Id.
373. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 654. The European Court characterized the
"death row phenomenon" as the highly damaging physical and emotional impact imposed
on convicts who experience a lengthy wait in prison between the imposition of a death
sentence and its execution. Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 41
(1989). Features of the phenomenon include the length of detention prior to execution,
prison conditions on death row, and the individual prisoner's age and mental state. Id. at
42-43.
374. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 654.
375. Id. One commentator has described a protracted wait on death row to be a form
of "death with torture." Robert Johnson, Death Row Is No Life, It's Legalized Torture,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1982, § 2, at 11; see also Under Sentence of Death, supra note 242, at
141; Barbara A. Ward, Competency For Execution: Problems In Law and Psychiatry, 14
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35, 38-40 (1986) (discussing the psychological impact on the con-
demned prisoner of a protracted sojourn on death row and documenting the phenomenon
of such prisoners becoming insane under death row conditions).
The UNHRC has reconciled continued application by States parties of the death penalty
with the constraints of articles 6 and 7 by stipulating that a death sentence "must be carried
out in such a way as to cause the least possible physical and mental suffering." Ng v.
Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, reprinted in 15 HuM. RTS. L.J. 149, 157 (1994) (dis-
cussed supra notes 284-88).
376. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 651.
377. Id.; see Edward F. Sherman, Jr., Note, The U.S. Death Penalty Reservation to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Exposing the Limitations of the Flexi-
ble System Governing Treaty Formation, 29 TEX. INT'L L.J. 69, 70-71 (1994) (describing and
criticizing the United States' reservation).
378. SENATE REPORT, supra note 9, at 651. Although the United States' reservation
addresses article 6 of ICCPR, it also reflects an inconsistency between article 7 of' ICCPR
and comparable United States law. Article 6 specifically addresses the death penalty and
discusses the circumstances under which capital punishment is inappropriate. Id. As such,
article 6 is really a subset of the broader protections guaranteed by article 7. By definition,
a violation of article 6 inevitably incorporates an article 7 violation. Compare ICCPR,
supra note 1, art. 6 (stipulating restrictions on the applicability of the death penalty) with
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mitted by persons below eighteen years of age." '379 The reservation was
necessary in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Stanford v. Ken-
tucky,38° in which the Court held that the imposition of capital punish-
ment on an individual for a crime committed at the age of sixteen or
-seventeen years does not necessarily constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
381
The reservation flies in the face of the non-derogability provisiorl con-
tained in article 5(2) of ICCPR, which unambiguously renders ICCPR's
article 6 prohibition against juvenile executions non-derogable. s2 In ad-
dition, the reservation begs the question whether article 6(5) of ICCPR
constitutes a peremptory, non-derogable norm of international law.3 83
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Ex-
ecutions has expressed the view that article 6(5) may constitute a non-
derogable norm.3 1 If article 6(5) does constitute a non-derogable norm,
ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 7 (prohibiting the infliction of cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment).
379. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 6(5).
380. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
381. Id.; see supra notes 152-68 and accompanying text (discussing the Stanford
decision).
382. ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 5. Article 5 states that:
1. Nothing in the present Covenant may be interpreted as implying for any State,
group or person any right to engage in any activity or perform any act aimed at
the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms recognized herein or at their
limitation to a greater extent than is provided for in the present Covenant.
2. There shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental
human rights recognized or existing in any State Party to the present Covenant
pursuant to law, conventions, regulations or custom on the pretext that the pres-
ent Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them to a lesser
extent.
Id.; see also Sherman, supra note 377, at 70-72. Sherman provides a detailed critique of the
reservation. Id. He assails the reservation for its inherent incompatibility with the non-
derogable provisions of ICCPR, and for its conceivable incompatibility with the object and
purpose of ICCPR. Id. at 70-71. Furthermore, Sherman argues that the reservation may
violate customary international law, and may be void per se if it violates a peremptory
norm of international law. Id. at 71. Sherman adds that the reservation constitutes "[t]he
United States' defiance of international legal obligations." Id.
383. See generally supra notes 336-49 and accompanying text (discussing the concepts
of jus cogens and peremptory norms); see also supra notes 346-49 and accompanying text
(discussing the incompatibility of the United States' reservations with the non-derogability
provision contained in article 4(2) of ICCPR).
384. See supra note 259 and accompanying text (explaining the role of the Special Rap-
porteur). Describing the article 6 prohibition on juvenile executions as "a United Nations
standard of global validity," the Special Rapporteur has stated that:
[t]he International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights proscribes the applica-
tion of the death penalty to anyone below the age of 18 at the time when the
offence was committed. While some reservations have been formally entered to
this provision, the Covenant nevertheless has a special status, having been pro-
claimed and adopted by the General Assembly and having received for the most
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then the United States' reservation on juvenile executions is an invalid
and redundant attempt to derogate from a fundamental tenet of interna-
tional law.385 Irrespective of the issue of the non-derogability provision
of article 6(5), the need for the juvenile execution reservation underlined
the irreconcilable gap between United States and international law on
this issue. Specifically, the United States' position, as propounded by the
Supreme Court in Stanford, is diametrically opposed to the international
consensus approach embodied in articles 6 and 7 of ICCPR.
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States' rationale for the "non-self-executing" declaration
was partially premised on the notion of comparability between article 7
and the Eighth Amendment.38 6 The language of the two provisions is not
actually congruent: Article 7 is more detailed and specific than that of
the Eighth Amendment. Yet, the very ambiguity of the Eighth Amend-
ment's language arguably leaves room to accommodate an interpretation
consonant with article 7.
Until the early 1980s, the Supreme Court pursued a course of steadily
expanding its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, with the
Furman decision, which represented the high-water mark of this expan-
sion, the Court broadened its definition of Eighth Amendment protection
to a point of symmetry with international law - at least with respect to
the death penalty.387 International standards and norms clearly influ-
part widespread acknowledgement throughout the international community. In
some recent instances the attention of the Special Rapporteur has been drawn to
persons executed or about to be executed, having been duly convicted and sen-
tenced in accordance with the law although it has been established beyond doubt
that they were under 18 years of age when the crimes in question were
committed.
Weissbrodt, supra note 259, at 689-90 (quoting the fourth report of the Special Rap-
porteur, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/21, at 100).
Weissbrodt concludes that "[tihis provision [article 6(5)] may not be the subject of dero-
gation under any circumstances." Id. at 690 (citing similar provisions in the American
Convention on Human Rights and the Geneva Convention on the Protection of Civilians
in Time of War as further support for the non-derogability of article 6(5)).
385. See supra note 336-49 (discussing the concept of non-derogable or peremptory
norms of international law and explaining why no state may deviate or seek exemption
from compliance with such a norm).
386. Of course, if the United States could show that the protections of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments compensate for any deficiencies of protection in the Eighth
Amendment relative to article 7, then the United States' rationale would be sustainable.
387. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972) (striking down certain state
death penalty statutes as violating the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the
Eighth Amendment); cf ICCPR, supra note 1, art. 6 (disapproving and limiting the appli-
cation of, but not prohibiting, the death penalty); Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct.
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enced this expansion.
Since the early 1980s, however, the Supreme Court has retreated from
this progressive course. The result has been a narrowing of Eighth
Amendment protection relative to that of the international standard.
This narrowing has been sufficiently significant to suggest that little or no
symmetry now exists between the Eighth Amendment and the interna-
tional standard as embodied by article 7.
Decisions of both the European Court and the UNHRC indicate signif-
icant areas of protection under the international standard that are not
available under the Eighth Amendment. Indeed, it is difficult to recon-
cile even the most narrow interpretation of the international standard
with the Supreme Court's prevailing interpretation of the Eighth Amend-
ment. The divergent treatment of the issues of the death row phenome-
non and the application of capital punishment to juveniles under article 7
and the Eighth Amendment clearly illustrates this schism.
The legitimacy of the Supreme Court's retreat from the path of pro-
gressive Eighth Amendment interpretation may be questioned in the con-
text of domestic constitutional jurisprudence. By distancing itself from
the protections of article 7, however, the Supreme Court has undermined
the United States' rationale for the "non-self-executing" declaration. The
premise of the "non-self-executing" declaration was the assertion that
United States law meets the requirements of ICCPR, and that therefore
implementing legislation is not necessary. But if the Eighth Amendment
fails to incorporate the relevant provisions of ICCPR, then the United
States is left with two options. It either may pass implementing legisla-
tion enabling article 7 to become part of United States law, or it can repu-
diate article 7 entirely. The present hedge of stillborn ratification is not
viable.
David Heffernan
H.R. (ser. A) at 40 (1989) (recognizing that the European Convention, following ICCPR,
does not provide a total ban on the infliction of capital punishment).
[Vol. 45:481
